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Notations
This thesis consists of independent chapters and for this reason all of them are self-
contained. It is possible that some of the notation is introduced inmore than one chapter.
Anyway, the following symbols and notation are common for all the chapters.
N The set of natural numbers
N∗ The set of natural numbers including 0
Z The set of integer numbers
R The set of real numbers
∅ The empty set
2N The set of all subsets of N
T ⊆ S T is a subset of S
T ⊂ S T is a subset of S and T is not equal to S
T × S The cartesian product of T and S
|S| The number of elements of S
P∗(X) the set of nonempty subsets of a set X
R A binary relation on a set X
< A binary relation on P∗(X)
2 The end mark of a proof
3 The end mark of an example
 The end mark of a remark
Let x, y ∈ RN:
x > y xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ...
x  y xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ...





This dissertation is devoted to the extensive field of decision-making, in both the indi-
vidual and collective cases. It is organized in four independent chapters. The first three
ones deal with different individual situations where a decision-maker has to decide.
Chapters 1 and 2 have to do with ranking different alternatives of a set and Chapter
3 involves cases in which the decision-makers’ preferences are represented as choice
functions.
In Chapter 1 we deal with the problem of resolving distributional conflicts among an
infinite and countable number of generations. In this context, economists are interested
in postulating axioms of equity among the generations and efficiency in a variety of
forms. The properties of efficiency under inspection are different versions of Pareto
axiom. Equity is considered many times a synonym of anonymity, and this property is
considered a suitable axiom for a social welfare function or relation.
We deal in this chapter with the Basu-Mitra (2003) approach to the problem of in-
tergenerational social choice, and contribute to such approach by analyzing the impact
of the structure of the feasible set of utilities on Banerjee’s (2006) impossibility theorem.
Here the properties under inspection are Weak Dominance and a weak equity postu-
late that was introduced in Asheim and Tungodden (2004), namely Hammond Equity
for the Future (HEF). Banerjee (2006) proves that they are incompatible under the Basu-
Mitra perspective when the feasible utilities are [0, 1]. Here we prove that if we consider
the discrete domainN instead, then an explicit expression for a Paretian social welfare
function that accounts for a strengthened form of Hammond Equity for the Future can
be given.
In a similar line of inquiry we wonder whether different versions of the Hammond
Equity postulate can be combined into a Paretian social welfare function. Both the con-
tinuous [0, 1] and the discreteN∗ instances are analyzed. The analysis is more complex
than the previous case, and the range of situations is richer.In the continuous case all the
results we obtain are impossibility results. In the discrete case, nonetheless we prove
that HE is incompatible with any version of Strong Pareto, we obtain that there exist
social choice functions that combine a version of HE with a weaker expression of Pareto
postulate.
This chapter is based on Alcantud and García-Sanz (2008).
Chapter 2 is devoted to the problem of extending an agent’s preference over a set of
alternatives to a ranking of its nonempty subsets. We first consider a situation in which
the decision is made in two or more different times (this question has been partially
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studied in Krause (2007) for the two-times case) and using the indirect-utility criterion
characterized by Kreps (1979). We characterize a ranking defined over sequences of
ordered subsets (elements of a direct product), each one from the set of alternatives in
each time. This ranking consists on the application of the indirect-utility criterion to
each coordinate in a lexicographic way.
Some rankings of subsets consisting on the lexicographic compositions of two cri-
teria of ranking subsets have been studied by different authors. Some of these compo-
sitions are completely characterized using suitable axioms. We address the interested
reader to Barberá et al. (2004).
In a second section we consider a model where we rank the subsets of a set of alter-
natives also applying the indirect-utility criterion, but now we consider the possibility
of having an adviser for those cases where such criterion produces ties. This adviser has
not an individual binary relation defined on the set of alternatives, but rather for any
subset of alternatives he selects some “focal elements” (those that he prefers the most),
that we represent by a choice function.
Chapter 3 deals with the rationality of choice functions. In Suzumura (1983) we can
find a survey of the characterization theorems considering the classical concept of ra-
tional choice functions defined on different domains. Here we adopt and extend this
classical concept: we also consider as rational the behavior of a decision-maker that ap-
plies sequentially such type of choices. This behavior is represented as the composition
of different choice functions in an established order. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995)
also consider this kind of choice behavior and Kalai et al. (2002) study the rationality of
a choice function by multiple rationales when the choice is a sigle element in the set of
alternatives and applying all the rationales simultaneously at each instance. We follow
the line initiated by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) who consider the sequential rational-
ity of a choice function by the application of different rationales in a fixed order, and
specifically the case of two rationales. They restrict their study to the case of single-
valued choice functions. We think that it is interesting to analyze the problem in terms
of set-valued choice functions and this is the case we consider along Chapter 3.
We focus on how the compound function of two choice functions behaves and specif-
ically which properties verified by the two initial choice functions carry over to the com-
pound function. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) study some instances of this problem
for properties of choice functions defined over domains which contain all the finite and
nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives. We add to this study with the analysis of
some other properties in domains of the same kind, and with some properties of choice
functions defined on arbitrary domains.
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Finally we obtain some results of rationality in the classical sense for a compound
choice function defined on different domains and then, for the cases in which the do-
main contains all the finite and nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives, we give a
complete characterization of a choice function that is rational by two sequential criteria
in terms of two testable necessary and sufficient conditions.
In Chapter 4 we focus on problems where at least two agents are implied in such a
way that the decisions they take affect the others agents’ outcomes.
It is not difficult to find problems of different social or economic situations where
different agents (players) appear with different points of view. Game Theory surged
in the 20th century as a branch of Mathematics that considers this class of situations.
As these problems are very common in the real life, Game Theory has achieved a high
impact in different branches of knowledge such as biology, politics, psychology,..., and
over all, economics.
The agents implied in a game problem have well-defined objectives, thus they act
rationally, and at the same time, they take into account the knowledge or expectations of
other decision-makers’ behavior, thus they also act strategically.
In non-cooperative models, players can negotiate about what to do, but binding
agreements are not possible.
Opposite, in cooperative models binding agreements are possible, and also side pay-
ments can be allowed.
On the other hand, operations research analyzes situations where a decision-maker
faces an optimization problem guided by an objective function. Most fields within op-
erations research have been approached from a game theoretical perspective, for the
cases in which several decision makers interact in situations that can be modelled as
optimization problems. Borm et al. (2001) provides a review of this topic.
One of the major branches within operations research is queueing theory (see, for
example, Gross and Harris (1998)). Surprisingly enough, queueing models have rarely
been approached from the point of view of cooperative game theory. González and
Herrero (2004) is one of the scarce papers in which cooperation is analyzed in queueing
models. In this last chapter of the thesis we also approach different queueing situations
from that point of view. Thus we obtain different models of cost games and study if
cooperation is or not a good option. For those cases where the answer is affirmative we
propose and characterize an allocation rule for distributing the costs.
Recently we became aware of the paper of Yu et al. (2008) that also deals with coop-
eration in queueing systems. They optimize the capacity of the system (in the models
we study the capacity is given by the average times that the clients spend in the system
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or in the queue) and they do not fix maximum values for the times that the clients spend
in it.
This chapter is based on García-Sanz et al. (2008).
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8 Chapter 1. Egalitarian evaluation of infinite utility streams
1.1 Introduction
The problem of “evaluating a stream” emerges from some economic problems which
have the common characteristic of “not having a natural termination date”. For in-
stance, the optimization of the economic growth with streams (of consumption, for ex-
ample) which extend over an infinite future.
We deal in this chapter with the problem of resolving distributional conflicts among
an infinite and countable number of generations.
In this context, economists are interested in postulating axioms of equity among the
generations and efficiency in a variety of forms.
The properties of efficiency are materialized as different versions of the Pareto ax-
iom. The equity is considered many times a synonym of anonymity, and the anonymity
property or the finite anonymity are considered suitable axioms to be verified for a so-
cial welfare function or relation. Hammond (1976) postulates another equity condition,
the Hammond Equity, that establishes that when comparing distributions that give all,
except two generations, the same benefits “any order-preserving change which dimin-
ishes inequality of utilities between the conflicting generations is socially preferable”.
Recently Asheim and Tungodden (2004a) have introduced a variation of the Hammond
Equity postulate, the “Hammond equity for the future” property. This property is a one
sided equity condition that states that “a sacrifice of the present generation leading to
an equal gain for all future generations is weakly desirable if the present remains better
off than the future” and it is considered instead of the anonymity property.
Another factor we have to take in consideration when dealing with the problem of
ranking infinite horizon intergenerational streams is the domain for the utility levels
associated with each period (equal across generations). Moreover it is more realistic to
make some restrictions over the domains we are dealing with. For example it seems
reasonable to consider that the human perception is not unlimited, so that a natural
restriction to impose is a discrete domain. It is also natural that the utilities have a well-
defined smallest unit (as happens when they measure monetary amounts).
In this field the researcher has a natural tendency to try and avail himself with an
explicit numerical expression associated with each infinite stream. But as suspected by
Ramsey (1928), respecting the equal treatment of all generations poses some intrinsic
incompatibilities for the efficiency that can be assured. Discounting future generation’s
endowments is common place but it does not treat all generations alike. The Rawlsian
criterionWR(x) = in f {xi : i = 1, 2, 3, ....} is ‘more ethical’ in the sense that it is not influ-
enced by the position that each generation occupies, but it violates very weak versions
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of Pareto efficiency. Thus an alternative approach to the resolution of the aggregation
problem postulates the existence of social welfare relations instead.
The analysis of inter-generational equity in the context of aggregating infinite util-
ity streams started with the aforementioned work of Ramsey (1928) who established
a conjecture about the difficulty of aggregating infinite streams respecting an inter-
generational equity. Following Koopmans (1960), Diamond (1965) proves the impossi-
bility of having a Paretian welfare function, continuous in the sup norm, and that treats
all generations equally. The domain for the utilities he considers is the unit interval. Ep-
stein (1986), Shinotsuka (1998), Fleurbaey andMichel (2003), Suzumura and Shinotsuka
(2007) and Sakai (2003, 2006) also obtain impossibility results in the same line. Basu and
Mitra (2003) prove that the impossibility result from Diamond survives without the re-
striction of continuity and without any topological consideration or domain restriction.
Despite this negative situation Svenson (1980) makes a positive contribution by giv-
ing a non-constructive proof of the existence of a social welfare order over the set of infi-
nite streams of utilities verifying the Pareto condition and some requirements of equity
(anonymity). He considers a stronger topology than the one used in Diamond (1965)
and the same domain (the unit interval). Bossert et al. (2004) provide a strengthening
of Svenson possibility result and Hara et al. (2007) contains some other impossibility
results in this same line of inquiry. Basu and Mitra (2007) generalize the Svenson pos-
sibility result for a general domain for the utilities and at the same time they establish
the relation among these results in the sense that a social welfare order satisfying Pareto
axiom and anonymity can not be representable 1.
In this sense Basu and Mitra (2007) consider the possibility of weakening the Pareto
axiom and obtain that it is possible to combine Anonymity and a weak form of the
Pareto postulate, labelled Weak Dominance, in a social welfare function irrespective of
the domain for the utility levels.
Nevertheless, for some other sets of axioms the structure of the domain is crucial
and in the same work Basu and Mitra prove that in their original impossibility re-
sult, if the Strong Pareto axiom is replaced by the Weak Pareto axiom the impossibil-
ity result remains. But if the domain considered for the utility levels changes to be
N∗ = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, then the impossibility result becomes a possibility one.
The inspection of Paretian social welfare functions that agree with other equity ax-
ioms has little tradition in the literature. Asheim and Tungodden (2004a) obtain another
impossibility result for a social welfare order with domain of utilities the unit interval
1An order < on a set X is representable if there exists a real function f on X such that x < y ⇔ f (x) >
f (y).
10 Chapter 1. Egalitarian evaluation of infinite utility streams
when they deal with the weak equity condition named “Hammond Equity for the Fu-
ture” (HEF) and some other postulates. The HEF axiom expresses a weak preference for
profiles where the sacrifice of the present generation makes all future generations better
off by a constant utility amount. It is introduced in that paper as a weak form of the
Hammond Equity postulate.
Asheim et al. (2007) prove that it is impossible to aggregate infinite utility streams
in an upper semi-continuous binary relation that satisfies a weak version of Weak Dom-
inance and HEF. The domain they consider is any Y such that [0, 1] ⊆ Y ⊆ R.
Banerjee (2006) considers the Hammond Equity for the Future property in the case of
social welfare functions (instead of orders) and obtains impossibility when the domain
is the unit interval and the function verifies the Weak Dominance axiom.
We are not aware of any other work that studies the compatibility of equity axioms
other than anonymity with a Paretian function.
We prove in section 1.4 that under the conditions in Banerjee’s theorem the impos-
sibility also turns into possibility when we consider the domain of utilitiesN∗ instead
of the unit interval and with a stronger form of the Hammond Equity for the Future.
Moreover we give a constructive proof, thus an explicit expression for a Strongly Pare-
tian social welfare function that accounts for a strengthened form of Hammond Equity
for the Future can be given.
In a similar line of inquiry we wonder whether different versions of the Hammond
Equity postulate can be combined into a Paretian social welfare function. Both the con-
tinuous [0, 1] and the discreteN∗ instances are analyzed. Such problem is investigated
in section 1.5.
This chapter is based in Alcantud and García-Sanz (2008).
1.2 Notation and Preliminaries
Let X denote a subset of RN, that represents a domain of utility sequences or infinite-
horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such utility streams: x =
(x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. By (y)con wemean the constant sequence (y, y, ....), and = (x, (y)con)
holds for (x, y, y, y, ....). We write x > y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x y if xi > yi
for each i = 1, 2, .... Also, x > ymeans x > y and x 6= y.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R. In this paper we are
concerned with two sets of axioms of different nature on SWFs. Firstly we introduce
some consequentialist equity axioms.
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Axiom 1a (Hammond Equity, also HE). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk for
some j, k ∈N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
Axiom 1b (Hammond Equity -Lauwers’ version-, also HE(L)). If x,y ∈ X are such that
xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x) .
Axiom 1c (Hammond Equity (a), also HE(a)). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk >
xk for some j, k ∈N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x) .
Axiom 1d (Hammond Equity (b), also HE(b)). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj = yk >
xk for some j, k ∈N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x) .
Axioms 1a to 1d above are variations of a common equity principle: when there is
a conflict between two generations, every other generation being as well off, the stream
where the least favoured generation is better off must be weakly preferred.
The precise meaning of the term “conflict” produces different formal requirements.
We also discuss some implications of the following axiom, that was introduced in
Asheim and Tungodden (2004a).
Axiom 2 (Hammond Equity for the Future, also HEF). If x,y ∈ X are such that x =
(x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) (x1 > y1 > y > x) , then W(y) >W(x) .
HEF states the following ethical restriction on the ranking of streams where the level
of utility is constant from the second period on and the present generation is better-off
than the future: if the sacrifice by the present generation conveys a higher utility for
all future generations, then such trade off is weakly preferred. Asheim and Tungodden
(2004a) and Asheim et al. (2007), Section 4.3, explain that it is a very weak equity condi-
tion –under certain consistency requirements on the social preferences “condition HEF
is muchweaker andmore compelling than the standard ‘Hammond Equity’ condition”–
that can be endorsed both from an egalitarian and utilitarian point of view.
Notation. In all the axioms above, when W(y) > W(x) is requested in place of
W(y) >W(x) we refer to HE+, ... , HEF+.
As a reinforcement of HEF+ we introduce a consequentialist equity axiom in the
spirit of Lauwers’ (1998) Non-Substitution property. It captures the following ethical
principle: a large but finite improvement in the first generation can never compensate a
sustained improvement for all future generations.
Axiom 2′ (Restricted Non-Substitution, also RNS). If x,y ∈ X are such that x =
(x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) with y > x, then W(y) >W(x) .
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Of course, in addition we intend to account for some kind of efficiency. In this sense
the stronger axiom we deal with is the following.
Axiom 3 (Strong Pareto, also SP). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >W(y) .
The next efficiency axiom is implied by Strong Pareto.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity, also MON). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >W(y) .
Other axioms that are succesively weaker versions of Strong Pareto follow.
Axiom 5 (Weak Pareto, also WP). If x,y ∈ X and either x  y or there is j ∈ N such
that xj > yj and xi = yi for all i 6= j, thenW(x) >W(y).
Axiom 6 (Dominance, also D). If x,y ∈ X then (a) if there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj
and xi = yi for all i 6= j, thenW(x) >W(y), and (b) if x y thenW(x) >W(y).
Axiom 7 (Weak Dominance, also WD). If x,y ∈ X and there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj,
and xi = yi for all i 6= j, thenW(x) >W(y).
1.3 Some relationships and other auxiliary results
We have mentioned that RNS implies HEF+. Besides RNS is stronger than Weak Non-
Substitution (cf., Asheim et al., 2006) and in the presence of either WD or MON, RNS
implies Non-Substitution (cf., Lauwers, 1998).
Our analysis below is simplified by recalling that the Rawlsian criterion WR(x) =
in f {xi : i = 1, 2, 3, ....} satisfies a reinforced version of MON (but not WD), generic
Anonymity (i.e., it attaches the same values to all the permutations of a given stream),
HEF+, and all four versions of Hammond Equity (Axioms 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d) that we
have stated. It does not agree with (Restricted, Weak) Non-Substitution. However a
modified version, namelyWFR(x) = in f {xi : i = 2, 3, ....}, does satisfy MON and RNS.
Remark 1.1. Some trivial relationships among requirements we have defined follow. Of
course HE(L)⇒HE(a)⇒HE(b). Besides HE(a)= HE+ HE(b)⇒HE, and the converse
is true under eitherWD orMON inwell-established instances like l∞, the set of bounded
real-valued infinite sequences, or X = YN with Y ⊆ R order-dense. 
We now recall other relationships between HE and HEF under Monotonicity or
Dominance.
Lemma 1.1. AnyHE or HE(b) andMonotonic SWF satisfies HEF. Also, if X = l∞ or X = YN
with Y ⊆ R order-dense, then HE(b) plus D entail HEF.
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Proof. Asheim et al. (2006), Proposition 3, states a result alike the first statement for
social welfare relations. Its proof is direct and can be mimicked here.
Suppose now thatW is a SWF on either X = l∞ or X = YN with Y ⊆ R order-dense,
and also that W agrees with HE(b) and D. In order to check that W satisfies HEF too,
take x,y ∈ X such that x = (x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) with x1 > y1 > y > x .
There is z such that y > z > x . Define z = (z, z, x, x, x, ...), thus y  z and by D we
obtain W(y) > W(z). Because x1 > z = z1 = z2 > x = x2 and xi = zi for each i > 2,
HE(b) yields W(z) >W(x) thus W(y) >W(x) .
Remark 1.2. One can readily check that HE(L) is incompatible with Weak Dominance in
virtually any useful instance of X. 
We end this section with a technical result that is used later on.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose that W : YN −→ R satisfies HE (resp., HE(b)) and MON.
(a) If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk (resp., xj > yj = yk > xk) for some
j, k ∈N and yt > xt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x) .
(b) If we further assume ys > xs for some j 6= s 6= k and SP, then W(y) >W(x) .
Proof. Pick z ∈ X such that zt = xt when j 6= t 6= k, zj = yj, zk = yk.
Using MON we obtain W(y) > W(z). If case (b) holds then SP entails W(y) >
W(z). In each instance the conclusion follows because HE (resp., HE(b)) yields W(z) >
W(x).
1.4 Existence of RNS and SP Social Welfare Functions
Basu and Mitra, 2003, Theorem 1 states that no SWF is Strongly Paretian and Equitable
or Anonymous 2.
If we replace Anonymity by Hammond Equity for the Future, then Banerjee (2006)
proves that the impossibility of making these requirements compatible with an SWF
remains when Y = [0, 1] even though we only require Weak Dominance instead of
Strong Pareto. We proceed to analize the situation when Y =N∗.
Theorem 1.1. There are SWF’s on X = YN, where Y = {0, 1, 2, ....}, that satisfy both RNS
and Strong Pareto.
2The Anonymity axioms states that a finite permutation of a utility stream produces a utility stream
with the same social utility.
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Proof. Our proof is constructive: we give an explicit expression for an SWF on X that
satisfies RNS and SP.




for each n ∈N∗
mapsN∗ into [0, 1) and satisfies: m < n if and only if ψ(m) < ψ(n) for every possible
m, n (Bridges and Mehta, 1996, p. 30).
Now for any x = (x1, x2, x3, ....) ∈ X let







This expression produces a well-defined function because ψ(xi) ∈ [0, 1) when i =
3, 4, .... The properties of ψ permit to prove that W is Strongly Paretian. In order to
check thatW satisfies RNS, take x1, x′1 and y′ > y elements from Y. Because
W(x′1, (y′)con) = ψ(x′1) + y′ +
ψ(y′)
4
W(x1, (y)con) = ψ(x1) + y+ ψ(y)4
we deduce that the difference




is strictly positive. The reason for such inequality is that ψ(x′1)−ψ(x1) > −1, y′− y > 1,
and ψ(y′)− ψ(y) > 0.
The criterion given in Theorem 1.1 has other nice features, for example it must sat-
isfy all four sensitivity properties recalled in Asheim at al. (2007), namely Strong Sen-
sitivity, Sensitivity to the Present, Restricted Sensitivity, and Weak Sensitivity. A severe
drawback is that it discriminates future generations. Besides, it contradicts the Inde-
pendent Future postulate (cf., Fleurbaey and Michel, 2003) as the comparison between
the streams (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, ...) and (0, 0, 2, 0, 0, ...) proves. As a consequence of the results in
Section 1.5 below, it can not fulfil any version of HE either.
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1.5 Existence of HE and SP Social Welfare Functions
As happens with the weaker HEF, the problem of combining the ethics that the Ham-
mond Equity principle incorporates with efficiency under the Basu-Mitra approach de-
pends on the domain of utility streams. In subsection 1.5.1 we show that the problem
when the domain is X = [0, 1]N has been ellucidated in part and we complete the cor-
responding study. An analysis of the case where X = YN with Y =N∗ is performed in
subsection 1.5.2. Even though we have recalled the standard defense of this framework,
we emphasize that we do not argue in order to endorse any concrete structure for such
domain.
1.5.1 “Continuous” domain
The next consequence of Lemma 1.1 follows immediately after Banerjee (2006), Theorem
1.
Corollary 1.1. There is no Dominant SWF on [0, 1]N that satisfies any of the axioms 1a to 1d.
Proof. We have argued that if a Dominant SWF satisfies any of the axioms 1a to 1d then
it satisfies HE(b). But Lemma 1.1 ensures that such SWF must satisfy HEF, which is
impossible by virtue of Banerjee (2006), Theorem 1.
Despite this Corollary, one may wonder if there exist SFWs that are both HE(b) and
WD when X = [0, 1]N. We now show that the answer to this latter question is negative,
thus no version of the Hammond Equity postulate under inspection is compatible with a Domi-
nant SWFwhen the domain is [0, 1]N. This conclusion is unsurprising since HEF is much
weaker than HE in the presence of either MON or D, and HEF is already incompatible
with WD under the Basu-Mitra approach.
Proposition 1.1. There are not SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that satisfy both HE(b) and WD.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let W : [0, 1]N −→ R be HE(b) and WD. For
each 0 < x < 1 we let L(x) := W(x, x, 0, 0, ....) and R(x) := W( 1+x2 , x, 0, 0, ....). Then
I(x) := (L(x),R(x)) is nonempty becauseW is WD.
Besides, 12 > y > x > 0 implies I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅:
L(y) = W(y, y, 0, 0, ....) >W(
1+ x
2
, x, 0, 0, ....) = R(x)
by application of HE(b) to 1+x2 > y > x. This is impossible because an uncountable
number of different rational numbers are assigned.
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Remark 1.3. Observe that the arguments in this section apply to l∞ as well. 
1.5.2 “Discrete” domain
Now we wonder if it is possible to combine any version of Hammond Equity with
WD (or stronger axioms) under the Basu-Mitra perspective when X = YN and Y =
{0, 1, 2, ....}.
In Theorem 1.2 we show that the answer to that question is in the negative when SP
and either HE, HE(L), HE(a) or HE(b) is required. In fact in order to reach such negative
conclusion we only need that Y has enough elements as to make the Hammond Equity
principle meaningful. Observe that according to Remark 1.1 it suffices to deal with
HE(b) and HE.
Theorem 1.2. There are not SWFs on X = YN, where |Y| > 3 (resp., |Y| > 4), that satisfy
both HE(b) (resp., HE) and SP.
Proof. We first prove that HE and SP can not be displayed by anyW on X.
We use a standard construction to produce a suitable uncountable collection {Ei}i∈I
of infinite proper subsets of N. We request that ∀i, j ∈ I [ i < j ⇒ Ei ( Ej and Ej −
Ei is infinite ]. We also need that there is an index q ∈ Ei for all index i ∈ I. In order
to justify that such collection exists, we take {r1, r2, ....} an enumeration of the rational
numbers in (0, 1) and set E(i) = {n ∈ N : rn < i} for each i ∈ I = (r1, 1) in order that
q = r1 ∈ E(i) for each i ∈ I.
In order to ease the notation we assume without loss of generality that {0, 1, 2, 3} ⊆
Y. Let us define the following two utility streams associated with each i ∈ I:
r(i)p =

1 if p ∈ Ei, p 6= q




1 if p ∈ Ei, p 6= q
2 if p = q
0 otherwise
By SP, the open interval (W(l(i)), W(r(i))) is not empty.
We intend to check that j < i ⇒ W(l(i)) > W(r(j)), which is impossible because
an uncountable number of distinct rational numbers would be obtained. Let us fix k ∈
Ei − Ej. We claim that Lemma 1.2 (b) applies to coordinates q and k of l(i) and r(j).
Observe that 3 = r(j)q > 2 = l(i)q > 1 = l(i)k > 0 = r(j)k. Also, when q 6= p 6= k we
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have: l(i)p = r(j)p when either p ∈ Ei ∩ Ej or p /∈ Ei ∪ Ej, and l(i)p = 1 > 0 = r(j)p for
every p ∈ Ei, p /∈ Ej (recall that there are an infinite number of elements in Ei − Ej). This
ends the argument for the case HE plus SP.
In order to prove that HE(b) and SP are incompatible in the current assumptions, we
assume that {0, 1, 3} ⊆ Y in order to ease the algebra. Then we mimick the argument
with the following variation of the l(i)’s streams (and the r(i)’s remaining the same):
l(i)p =
{
1 if p ∈ Ei
0 otherwise
Observe that we now appeal to the appropriate variation of Lemma 1.2 to conclude the
argument.
Despite this negative result, Theorem 1.3 below assures that WP can be combined
with HE+/HE(a)+/HE(b)+ even in the presence of Anonymity. In order to prove it we
state the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 1.3. The function ν(n) = ∑i=0,1,...,n 12i (n = 0, 1, 2, ...) is strictly increasing in n and
satisfies: x > y2 > y1 > z⇒ ν(y1)− ν(z) > ν(x)− ν(y2).
Proof. Fix x > y2 > y1 > z. Some straightforward computations yield
ν(y1)− ν(z) = 12z+1 (1+
1
2






ν(x)− ν(y2) = 12y2+1 (1+
1
2














Because y2 > z+ 1 the conclusion follows.
Theorem 1.3. There are SWFs on X = YN, where Y = {0, 1, 2, ....}, that satisfy both HE(a)+,
Anonymity, and WP.
Proof. We closely followMitra and Basu’s proof in (2007) that there areWP and Anony-
mous SFWs on X = YN. The binary relation on X given by x ∼ y if and only if xi = yi
eventually is an equivalence relation. The equivalence class of x is denoted by [x]∼. We
select an element g([x]∼) from each equivalence class [x]∼ in the quotient set X∼ . For
simplicity we write gx = g([x]∼), and as usual gx = (gx1, g
x
2, ...). Thus when x,y satisfy
that xi = yi eventually one has gx = gy.
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Let us denote AN(x) = ν(x1) + ....+ ν(xN)− (ν(gx1) + ...+ ν(gxN)) for each N ∈ N
and x ∈ X, and consider the function h(x) = limN→∞(AN(x)), which is well defined
because AN(x) is eventually constant (for any fixed x). Then h is clearly Anonymous
and Weakly Dominant. We now prove that h satisfies HE(a)+.
If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when
j 6= t 6= k, our construction entails gx = gy. Therefore there is an index N0 such that
AN(y) − AN(x) = ν(yj) − ν(xj) + ν(yk) − ν(xk) for each N > N0. Now Lemma 1.3
yields AN(y)− AN(x) > 0 whenever N > N0 and thus h(y) > h(x) .





1+ |h(x)| +min{x1, x2, ...}
It is clear that W is Anonymous because so is h. By mimicking Mitra and Basu’s argu-












and thus whenever y  x because min{y1, y2, ...} > min{x1, x2, ...}+ 1 we always get
W(y) > W(x). In order to prove that W is HE(a)+, let us select x,y ∈ X such that
xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. Now W(y) >
W(x) is enforced due to the following two inequalities: h(y) > h(x) as was proved
above, thus H(h(y)) > H(h(x)) because H is strictly increasing; and min{y1, y2, ...} >
min{x1, x2, ...}.
1.6 Conclusions
Banerjee (2006) argued that “ ... a compromise that generates a possibility of ranking
infinite utility streams is open to debate and does not necessarily call for abandoning the
appealing equity postulate, Hammond Equity for the Future.” Here we provide support
for such possibility: if the feasible set of utilities is contained inN∗ then it is possible to
strengthen HEF to RNS even if we require the full force of the Pareto postulate under
the Basu-Mitra approach. Our argument is constructive and a explicit criterion has been
provided. Evidences like the discouraging Zame (2007, Theorem 4′) –which implies that
noWeak Paretian and Anonymous welfare relation can be “explicitly described”– make
this feature especially valuable.
Now we have more arguments to contribute to the following debate: in combining
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equity and Pareto-efficiency under the Basu-Mitra position, what is the influence of the
choice of the set of feasible utilities? If we are bound by the HEF/RNS ethics we con-
clude that the set of feasible utilities is the determinant factor: when it is [0, 1] even the
weakest possible combination ends in impossibility, but when it is N∗ there is an ex-
plicit criterion that accounts for their strongest versions. It was known that this is not
the case when Anonymity is the equity principle under inspection: we can not assure
that a given structure produces compatibility or incompatibility without considering
the amount of Pareto-efficiency we want to reach. In addition, we have proved that if
we are interested in imposing the HE spirit instead then the appeal to [0, 1] as the set of
feasible utilities determines incompatibility, while the appeal to N∗ does not (and the
other factors must be examined: namely, the precise form of the HE postulate and the
version of the Pareto axiom in use).
The following tables gather some of the results that have served us to motivate our
discussion, and permit to compare differences in the approaches when we vary the fea-
sible utilities.
Table 1. Summary of results for domains of utility streams YN under Anonymity
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Non-existence ? Non-existence
WP Existence † Non-existence
D Existence Non-existence 
WD Existence Existence ‡
Statement ? is proven in Basu and Mitra (2003). All †, ‡ and  appear in Basu and
Mitra (2007). The other statements in the table derive from  and †.
In each of the four cases where compatibility is guaranteed, one can try to identify
the class of groups of permutations for which extended anonymity (orQ-Anonymity as
introduced by Mitra and Basu, 2007) is compatible with the respective efficiency axiom
under the Basu-Mitra approach. We have not pursued this topic yet.
Table 2. Summary of results for domains of utility streams YN under RNS
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Existence ? Non-existence
WP Existence Non-existence
D Existence Non-existence
WD Existence Non-existence 
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Banerjee (2006) proves that  holds even if RNS is weakened to HEF. Statement ? is
justified in Theorem 1.1, where an explicit SWF that satisfies RNS and SP is provided.
The other statements in the table derive from them.
This results add to Asheim et al. (2007), where incompatibilities of HEF with the
Pareto postulate are obtained under continuity assumptions.
Table 3. Summary of results for domains of utility streams YN under different versions
of HE
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Non-existence ? Non-existence
WP Depends on version † Non-existence
D Depends on version Non-existence
WD Depends on version Non-existence 
With respect to HE(L), all the combinations in the table are impossible as is stated
in Remark 1.2. Unless otherwise stated, the statements in the table concern all the other
variations of the Hammond Equity postulate.
Proposition 1.1 conveys statement  irrespective of the version of HE that we re-
quire. The statements above  are now trivial. Case ? is non-existence for all the ver-
sions of Hammond Equity that we have dealt with by Theorem 1.2 plus Remark 1.1.
Combination † and the instances below it produce non-existence for HE(L), but even if
Anonymity is imposed we can combine HE(a)+ and WP/D/WD into an explicit SWF
when Y =N∗ (cf. Theorem 1.3).
We recall that the Rawlsian criterion proves that in tables 1 and 3 above, existence
is guaranteed when the efficiency axiom requested is MON (irrespective of X and the
equity axiom). As for table 2, the discrete case is trivial because in that case we can even
obtain SP, and WFR(x) = in f {xi : i = 2, 3, ....} satisfies MON and RNS as mentioned
before.
This latter table permits us to contribute to de debate in Banerjee (2006) , regarding
how demanding are the properties of representability and continuity (in the adequate
sense) for a social welfare ordering. We thus narrow the focus to the continuous case of
our study. Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura (2007) prove that there exist social welfare
orders that satisfy HE and Weak Pareto (which implies existence when HEF replaces
HE, because HE andWP together imply the HEF property in this context). We also have
that there are no social orders satisfying the postulates of HEF, WP and a kind of con-
tinuity (Roemer and Suzumura (2007), chapter 4), thus we have the same impossibility
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result when combining HE, WP and continuity in a social welfare order. Moreover we
have proved that there exist no social welfare functions satisfying HE and any version
of Pareto efficiency on these domains. In particular no social welfare orderings satisfy-
ing HEF and WP is representable. Thus we can conclude that continuity (in the sense
of Roemer and Suzumura (2007)) and representability are equally demanding in this
setting.
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Chapter 2. Ranking opportunity sets.
A characterization of an advised choice
2.1 Introduction
This chapter concerns rankings of subsets of a set of alternatives, also named opportu-
nity sets. The standard model of a situation of this class considers an agent’s preference
ordering over a set of alternatives and extend it to a ranking of its nonempty subsets. In
the literature about this topic there are many interpretations for these kinds of problems
and different axioms are considered suitable depending on the specific context.
A simple example where an agent ranks subsets of alternatives, already cited by
Kreps (1979), concerns ranking menus in a restaurant. The individual will choose a
meal, but initially he has to select a menu from which he will choose his meal later. We
can mention some other contexts where problems of this kind are found, such as vot-
ing situations (the selection of a committee), matchings and assignments (admission of
groups of students in colleges, hire several workers,...), coalition formations (an agent
has to assign different values to the different subsets of colleagues for making a coali-
tion), and so on.
In all these situations the elements are feasible alternatives and the subsets are “op-
portunity sets” (or menus) of feasible alternatives. There are different criteria to rank
these opportunity sets that can be applied considering the particular characteristics of
the situation we are dealing with. We can cite some of such situations in order to illus-
trate and motivate the chapter.
• Choice under complete uncertainty. In these situations a decision can lead to dif-
ferent consequences and the decision-maker has not the possibility of assigning
probabilities to them. So making a decision is equivalent to the ranking of the sets
of consequences. Different criteria can be considered suitable to be applied here:
the maxmin criterion (pessimistic), the minmax criterion (optimistic),...
• Freedom of choice and preference for flexibility. In this kind of contexts the decision-
maker attaches value not only to the quality of the choice, but also to the degree
of freedom he gets from it. For example, it is usual to prefer a situation where the
decision-maker makes the choice better than another one in which the decision-
maker is forced to select an alternative, even if the final option is the same in
both cases. It is also frequent that the decision-maker prefers those subsets with a
greater number of alternatives because (for example) all the alternatives are attrac-
tive for him, or because he does not know if he is going to change his preferences
before making the final choice,...
• Limited rationality. In this sense, in some decision-situations, one may tend to
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concentrate on certain “focal” elements or features ignoring the rest of elements
or available information.
We mention especially here the indirect-utility criterion because it is the one
we use in this chapter. It is applied when the quality of the final choice of
the agent is all that matters: those subsets with better “best elements” are
preferred.
There are many authors that have made an axiomatic approach of this topic: they se-
lect desirable criteria for a situation and seek to identify the rankings satisfying different
combinations of them.
Fishburn (1972) pioneered the study of preferences of voters over sets of alterna-
tives. Kannai and Peleg (1984) obtain an impossibility result for an order over the set
of subsets of a set verifying two attractive axioms. Some other impossibility results are
obtained weakening these axioms or considering some others (Barberá and Pattanaik
(1984), Fishburn (1984), Holzman (1984)). Bossert (1989) characterizes a preorder with
the Kannai-Peleg axioms and a neutrality property also used by other authors. Nehring
and Puppe (1996) extend an order over the set of elements to a ranking of its nonempty
subsets based on principles of independence and continuity. They characterize rankings
that depend on the maximal and minimal elements of the different subsets of alterna-
tives only. Bossert et al. (2000) andArlegi (2003) approach the problem in the framework
of choice under complete uncertainty. They characterize four decision rules not focused
on worst or best outcomes only and with intuitive justifications in terms of “limited
rationality”.
This context has been extended to incorporate the value of freedom of choice (Bossert
et al. (1994), Puppe (1996), Pattanik and Xu (2000) and Xu (2004)). Dutta and Sen (1996)
and Alcalde-Unzu and Ballester (2005) among others characterize utilitarian rules, and
Alcantud and Arlegi (2008) axiomatize a meaningful family of additively representable
rankings of sets. Some other models have served to study these problems, an extensive
survey of which can be found in Barberá et al. (2004).
On the other hand, either individual or social decision making may be based in
multiple criteria that can be applied in more than one stage. For example, we can think
about a family deciding a place for holidays or how to distribute its income (different
criteria for parents and children). In many situations of this kind we give preference to
a criterion over another one, using a second criterion only for breaking ties produced by
the application of a first one: lexicographical order. Different procedures of choice for
such lexicographic applications of multiple criteria have been considered in Houy and
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Tademuna (2007). We deal with the lexicographical application of different criteria to
finite sequences of subsets of different sets of alternatives.
Lexicographic compositions of two criteria of ranking subsets have been studied
by different authors. Some of these compositions are completely characterized using
suitable axioms. We address the interested reader to Barberá et al. (2004). In this chapter
we also characterize two different criteria for ranking subsets based on lexicographic
compositions in the line of those in Barberá et al.
So, our approach in this work follows the line of choice under limited rationality
that determines the ranking of the subsets looking only at their best alternatives. Such
a model is the germ of the indirect-utility approach characterized by Kreps (1979): A <
B⇔ max(A)Rmax(B), where R is an individual complete preorder on X (a finite set of
objects) that is not necessarily a linear order.
In section 2.3 we study a choice in different times. Both the sets of alternatives and
the decision-maker criteria can be different in the different times we deal with. We
define a ranking for sequences of ordered subsets (elements of a direct product), each
one from the set of alternatives in each time. We first study the case of two different
times, and thus we have pair of subsets of alternatives, and then we generalize it to the
case of n different times. The ranking we deal with is defined using the indirect-utility
criterion applied in each coordinate and with a lexicographical order.
This question has already been studied in Krause (2008) for the case of two different
times. He uses 5 axioms for its characterization including a neutrality one and a techni-
cal axiom called “simple time discounting”. He uses a slightly different notation from
ours and supposes that for all the subsets that include alternatives from both times “it
is natural” to assume its equivalence with a two-element subset, one from each time,
because he is concerned with the indirect utility context only. In this sense he expresses
the axioms for the set of two-element subsets. He also uses complete preorders defined
over the sets of alternatives in both choice times.
In this chapter we characterize this criterion with only 3 axioms in a model where
the preorders over the sets of alternatives are not fixed, in the line of Kreps (1979), and
separating the study from the line in Krause that considers fixed preorders over both
sets of alternatives. We also generalize and characterize the criterion for the case of
choices in n different times.
In section 2.4 we also rely on the indirect-utility criterion for ranking the subsets
of X, but we change the model considering the possibility of having an adviser. This
adviser has not an individual binary relation defined on X, but rather for any S ⊆ X
he selects some “focal elements” (those that he prefers the most), that we represent by a
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choice function C : P∗(X) → P∗(X) such that ∅ 6= C(S) ⊆ S. Then, when we compare
two subsets we take into account this adviser only for those subsets that after the first
ranking (that of the indirect-utility criterion) are in the same indifference class. We then
apply the indirect-utility criterion too, but now to those subsets previously selected by
the adviser.
We call the ranking defined under these characteristics “ranking associated to a
choice function”. It is a complete preorder.
Afterwards we consider the next question:
Given a ranking of subsets of a finite set X, <, which is a complete preorder (and
therefore there exists a complete preorder on X trivially induced by <: aRb ⇔ {a} <
{b}), when is this observed ranking a ranking associated to a choice function? We give
a complete answer to this question in terms of two testable conditions.
This last situation we deal with can be considered a choice in two different stages
where both the sets of alternatives and the decision-maker criteria are the same. Nev-
ertheless we want to remark that the ranking associated to a choice function is not a
particular case of the ranking in two times. Though the sets of alternatives are the same
in both times (this is a particular case of our first situation), in the second stage we are
not applying a criterion to the subsets of the set of alternatives, but to smaller subsets of
them that include the alternatives previously selected by an adviser.
2.2 Notation and Preliminaries
Along this chapter we denote by X a finite set of objects (or alternatives) and by P∗(X)
the set of nonempty subsets of X.
A binary relation on X, R ⊆ X×X, is interpreted as a preference relation of an agent,
that is xRy (or (x, y) ∈ R) if and only if the element x ∈ X is considered at least as good
as the element y ∈ X. This relation produces in a natural way a strict relation P and an
indifference relation I :
xPy⇔ {xRy and not yRx}
and
xIy⇔ {xRy and yRx}.
Definition 2.1. Let X be a finite set of alternatives and R a binary relation on X. R is a total or
complete preorder if it is complete and transitive.
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Definition 2.2. Given a total preorder R on a finite set X, a best element for R is an element
x ∈ X such that
xRx′ for all x′ ∈ X.
According to this definition a best element has not to be unique (it is unique when R
is a linear relation, i.e. it satisfies the antisymmetric property) and all the best elements
are indifferent among them.
Abusing notation, max(A) stands for a best element of a subset A ⊆ X.
Definition 2.3. Let X be a set and D a nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X. A choice
function is an application C : D → P∗(X) such that C(S) ⊆ S.
Along this chapter D = P∗(X).
2.3 Choice in different times
In this section we study a choice situation in which a decision maker makes his choice
in different times and he can have different sets of alternatives in each time and differ-
ent binary relations on these sets of alternatives. Citing Krause (2008) “in reality agents
typicallymake a sequence of choices over time from a corresponding sequence of oppor-
tunity sets, rather than a single once-and-for-all choice from a single opportunity set”.
We can think for example in ordering different menus in a restaurant today for having
lunch, and the same tomorrow in a different restaurant with different menus (the set of
alternatives changes and perhaps our criterion for ranking meals too).
We divide this section in two subsections. In subsection 2.3.1 we formalize the case
in which the DM considers two different decision times. We introduce the axioms we
deal with, their independence and interpretation and the characterization theorem for a
two-times criterion. In subsection 2.3.2 we generalize the criterion, the axioms and the
characterization theorem to the case of n times. Nevertheless the proofs for this general
case are not very different to the ones for the two-times case we include them.
2.3.1 Choice in two different times
We first introduce further notation.
• X1 and Y2 are finite and nonempty sets of alternatives. They are available in times
1 and 2 respectively. X1 and Y2 can be equal or different sets.
2.3. Choice in different times 31
• R1 and R2 are transitive and complete binary relations defined on X1 and Y2 re-
spectively. They capture equal or different decision-maker’s criteria. Their re-
spective strict relations are denoted by P1 and P2 and their respective indifferent
relations by I1 and I2.
• The space of alternatives is P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2), and we denote a complete preorder
defined on it by < .
Let us first introduce some axioms on a complete preorder< over P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2).
As Proposition 2.1 below proves, they have important implications on the structure of
< .
Axiom 1 (A1). Independence of fixed coordinates.
a) Given (A, B), (A′, B) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2), then
(A, B) < (A′, B)⇒ (A, B′) < (A′, B′) for all B′ ∈ P∗(Y2).
b) Given (A, B), (A, B′) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2), then
(A, B) < (A, B′)⇒ (A′, B) < (A′, B′) for all A′ ∈ P∗(X1).
Axiom 2 (A2). Extension Robustness for both coordinates.
a) Given (A, B), (A′, B) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2), then
(A, B) < (A′, B)⇒ (A, B) ∼ (A ∪ A′, B).
b) Given (A, B), (A, B′) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2), then
(A, B) < (A, B′)⇒ (A, B) ∼ (A, B ∪ B′).
Axiom A1 states that the relation by < between two pairs of subsets remains the
same when one of the coordinates is fixed in both pairs, whatever the fixed coordinate
is.
Axiom A2 extends the Extension Robustness property introduced by Kreps (1979).
Such property establishes that adding a subset A′ that is at most as good as a given
subset A to A leads to a set that is indifferent to A itself. Axiom A2 establishes this
property for each coordinate when the other one is fixed.
The next proposition is crucial in the subsequent analysis. As we have explained
before, it supposes a key difference with Krause’s position.
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Proposition 2.1. Let < be a complete preorder defined over P∗(X1) × P∗(Y2), that verifies
axioms (A1) and (A2). Then for any (A, B) ∈ P∗(X1) × P∗(Y2) there exist a ∈ A and
b ∈ B such that (A, B) ∼ ({a}, {b}). Moreover the elements a ∈ A and b ∈ B verify that
({a}, B) < ({ai}, B) for all B ⊆ Y2 and for all ai ∈ A, and (A, {b}) < (A, {bj}) for all
A ⊆ X1 and for all bj ∈ B.
Proof. Let us denote A = {a1, . . . , an} and consider
({a1}, B), ({a2}, B), . . . , ({an}, B) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2).
As we know that< is complete and transitive, we can supposewithout loss of generality
({a1}, B) < ({a2}, B) < . . . < ({an}, B).
Taking into account again that < is transitive and applying axiom A2, part a), suc-
cessively we obtain
({a1}, B) ∼ ({a1, a2}, B) ∼ . . . ∼ ({a1, . . . , an}, B) = (A, B).
If we now take B = {b1, . . . , bm} we can suppose in the same way that
({a1}, {b1}) < ({a1}, {b2}) < . . . < ({a1}, {bm})
and again by the transitive property and the application of axiom A2, part b), succes-
sively we obtain
({a1}, {b1}) ∼ ({a1}, {b1, b2}) ∼ . . . ∼ ({a1}, {b1, . . . , bm}) = ({a1}, B).
By transitivity of the indifference relation we conclude
(A, B) ∼ ({a1}, {b1}).
This means that a = a1 and b = b1 satisfy our first claim. The second claim has been
established above for the set B. Axiom A1, a) extends it for any other subset B′ ⊆ Y2.
We also have above that ({a1}, {b1}) < ({a1}, {bi}) for all bi ∈ B. Applying now
axiom A1, b) we obtain that (A, {b1}) < (A, {bi}) for all bi ∈ B and for all A ⊆ X1,
which proves the last claim in the proposition.
Moreover these axioms are independent as we can observe in the next examples.
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Example 2.1. Let us consider the complete preorder defined on P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2) by
(A, B) < (A′, B′)⇔
{
|A| > |A′|, or
|A| = |A′| and |B| > |B′|
This ranking satisfies A1, but it does not satisfy A2, as it can be immediately proved
by considering, for example, A and A′ different singletons. 3
Example 2.2. Let us consider a complete preorder R defined on X. The ranking over
P∗(X)×P∗(X) defined as
(A, B) < (A′, B′)⇔
{
max(A)Pmax(A′), or
max(A)Imax(A′) and max(A ∪ B)Rmax(A′ ∪ B′)
is a complete preorder that satisfies A2, but it does not satisfy A1.
Indeed:
To prove property A2, part a), we have to consider (A, B) < (A′, B) and then con-
clude that (A, B) ∼ (A ∪ A′, B).
From (A, B) < (A′, B) we have two possibilities:
i) max(A)Pmax(A′) ⇒ max(A)Imax(A ∪ A′) and max(A ∪ B)Imax(A ∪ A′ ∪ B)
which implies that (A, B) ∼ (A ∪ A′, B).
ii) max(A)Imax(A′) and max(A∪ B)Rmax(A′ ∪ B) thus max(A)Imax(A∪ A′) and
max(A ∪ B)Imax(A ∪ A′ ∪ B) which also leads to (A, B) ∼ (A ∪ A′, B).
For part b) we take (A, B) < (A, B′) and we have to prove that (A, B) ∼ (A, B ∪ B′).
As we have that max(A)Imax(A), we obtain max(A ∪ B)Rmax(A ∪ B′) and then
we have that max(A ∪ B)Imax(A ∪ B ∪ B′) which concludes that (A, B) ∼ (A, B ∪ B′).
The assertion about property A1 can be proved considering, for example, A =
{a}, A′ = {a′}, B = {b} and B′ = {b′} being aPb′Pa′Pb. In this case (A, B) < (A, B′),
but (A′, B′)  (A′, B). 3
Let us now define a preorder over P∗(X1)× P∗(Y2) associated with the respective
criteria R1 and R2 over X1 andY2. It is a criterion based on the indirect-utility assessment
in both coordinates and we denote it by <U×U .
Definition 2.4. Let X1 and Y2 be finite sets of alternatives and R1 and R2 complete preorders
defined on X1 and Y2 respectively. The indirect-utility criterion in two times associated with R1
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and R2, <U×U , over P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2) is defined by:
(A, B) <U×U (A′, B′)⇔
{
a) max(A)P1max(A′), or
b) max(A)I1max(A′) and max(B)R2max(B′)
This ranking is a complete preorder that satisfies both axioms A1 and A2 as it can
be easily proved. Moreover it also verifies the next axiom that implies that whenever a
pair is strictly preferred to another one with the second coordinates being equal, it does
not matter the subsets we have in this second place. That is, any pairs of subsets with
the same first elements maintain the same order when comparing them, whatever the
subsets in the second coordinate are.
Axiom 3 (A3). First component wins. If (A, B)  (A′, B), then (A, B′)  (A′, B′′) for
any B′, B′′ ⊆ Y2.
Let us give now some examples to prove the independence among A3 and A1 and
A2.
The ranking in Example 2.2 satisfies axiom A3, but it does not satisfy axiom A1.
The ranking defined in the next example 2.3 verifies A1 and A2 and it does not verify
A3, as it can be easily proved.
Example 2.3. Let X1 and Y2 be finite sets of alternatives and R1 and R2 complete pre-
orders defined on X1 and Y2 respectively. We define the ranking < over P∗(X1) ×
P∗(Y2) by





The ranking in the Example 2.1 is a complete preorder that satisfies A3 and A1 and
it does not satisfy A2.
Our main theorem in this subsection proves that the criterion given by Definition 2.4
is characterized by axioms A1, A2 and A3.
Theorem 2.1. A complete preorder < over P∗(X1) × P∗(Y2) verifies A1, A2 and A3 if and
only if there exist complete preorders R1 over X1 and R2 over Y2 such that <=<U×U .
Proof. We have already mentioned that the ranking <U×U associated with R1 and R2
satisfies axioms A1, A2 and A3.
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Let us prove now that if < is a complete preorder over P∗(X1)× P∗(Y2) verifying
axioms A1, A2 and A3, there exist complete preorders R1 and R2 over X1 and Y2 respec-
tively such that “<=<U×U”.
Let us define R1 over X1 as
xR1x′ ⇔ ({x}, B) < ({x′}, B) ∀B ⊆ Y2
and R2 over Y2 as
yR2y′ ⇔ (A, {y}) < (A, {y′}) ∀A ⊆ X1.
Nevertheless the definitions of R1 and R2 are given for all B ⊆ Y2 and for all A ⊆
X1, it is enough to say that xR1y if and only if there exists a subset B ⊆ Y2 such that
({x}, B) < ({x′}, B), and the same for R2. Applying then that < satisfies A1, we obtain
the relation for all A ⊆ X1 and for all B ⊆ Y2 as it is established.
The relations R1 and R2 are obviously complete preorders because < is a complete
preorder.
Now let us denote by<U×U the indirect-utility criterion in two times over P∗(X1)×
P∗(Y2) associated with R1 and R2. We prove that <U×U=< .
We know that for every (A, B) ∈ P∗(X1)×P∗(Y2) there exist elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B,
given by Proposition 2.1, such that (A, B) ∼ ({a}, {b}), ({a}, B) < ({ai}, B) ∀ai ∈ A
and for all B ⊆ Y2 and (A, {b}) < (A, {bj}) ∀bj ∈ B and for all A ⊆ X1.
Let us see that it is also true that (A, B) ∼U×U ({a}, {b}).
Indeed we know that <U×U satisfies axioms A1 and A2, and then there must exist
a¯ ∈ A and b¯ ∈ B such that (A, B) ∼U×U ({a¯}, {b¯}). As it must be also true (Proposition
2.1) that
({a¯}, B) <U×U ({ai}, B), ∀ai ∈ A and ∀B ⊆ Y2
we have that this is also true if ai = a and then we have two possibilities.
a) a¯P1a ⇔ ({a¯}, B)  ({a}, B), which is not possible because ({a}, B) < ({ai}, B) for
all ai ∈ A and for all B ⊆ Y2.
b) a¯I1a and max(B)R2max(B).
In this case, as we have max(B)I2max(B) we obtain that ({a¯}, B) ∼U×U ({a}, B)
for all B. In particular if B = {b¯} we obtain that ({a¯}, {b¯}) ∼U×U ({a}, {b¯}).
Analogously we obtain that (A, {b}) ∼U×U (A, {b¯}) for all A. Thus, if A = {a} we
have ({a}, {b}) ∼U×U ({a}, {b¯}) ∼U×U ({a¯}, {b¯}) and then (A, B) ∼U×U ({a}, {b}).
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Now let (A, B) ∼ ({a}, {b}) and (A′, B′) ∼ ({a′}, {b′}) be such that (A, B) <U×U
(A′, B′). We have to prove that (A, B) < (A′, B′).
There are two possibilities to consider:
(i) aP1a′, thus applying the definition of R1 we have that ({a}, B)  ({a′}, B) for all
B ∈ Y2. In particular we obtain that
({a}, {b})  ({a′}, {b})
and applying axiom A3
({a}, {b})  ({a′}, B′) ∀B′.
Taking B′ = {b′} we conclude
({a}, {b})  ({a′}, {b′}).
(ii) aI1a′ and bR2b′. Then we have
({a}, B) ∼ ({a′}, B) ∀B
and
(A, {b}) < (A, {b′}) ∀A.
In particular if A = {a} and B = {b′} we obtain that
({a}, {b}) < ({a}, {b′}) ∼ ({a′}, {b′})
and we conclude.
To end, we have to prove that if (A, B) < (A′, B′), then it must be (A, B) <U×U
(A′, B′).
If this is not true, ({a′}, {b′}) U×U ({a}, {b}) and we have again two possibilities:
(i) a′P1a thus ({a′}, B)  ({a}, B) ∀B, and in particular if B = {b′} we have
({a′}, {b′})  ({a}, {b′}).
Applying A3 we obtain
({a′}, {b′})  ({a}, {b})
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against the hypothesis.
(ii) a′ I1a and b′P2b and then
({a′}, B) ∼ ({a}, B) ∀B
and
(A, {b′})  (A, {b}) ∀A.
Taking A = {a′} and B = {b} we obtain
({a′}, {b′})  ({a′}, {b}) ∼ ({a}, {b})
which also contradicts the hypothesis and concludes the proof.
2.3.2 Choice in n different times
In this subsection we generalize the indirect-utility criterion in two times to the case in
which a DM considers n different times. He can have different sets of alternatives in
each time and different binary relations defined on these sets of alternatives.
Our DM ranks subsets of alternatives in different times and we formalize this situa-
tion considering a ranking over the direct product of all the sets of nonempty subsets of
alternatives in each period
X = P∗(X1)× . . .×P∗(Xn)
where Xi stands for the finite set of alternatives in time i and Ri for the binary relation
defined on Xi.
Next definition formalizes the criterion consisting on the lexicographical application
of the indirect-utility criterion to the elements of X.
Definition 2.5. The indirect-utility criterion in n times associated with R1, . . . ,Rn.
(A1, . . . , An) <U (B1, . . . , Bn) if and only if
• max(Ai)Iimax(Bi) for all i = 1, . . . , n, or
• There exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such thatmax(Ai)Iimax(Bi) for all i = 1, . . . , j− 1
andmax(Aj)Pjmax(Bj).
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This criterion verifies the next axioms, that generalize the ones we have used in the
previous section, as it can be easily proved.
Axiom 1 (GA1). Independence of fixed coordinates.
If (A1, . . . , An) < (B1, . . . , Bn) where Ai = Bi for all i ∈ S ⊆ N, then it must be
(A′1, . . . , A
′
n) < (B′1, . . . , B′n) where A′i = B′i for all i ∈ S and A′j = Aj and B′j = Bj for all
j ∈ N \ S.
This axiom establishes that when we compare two elements in X with some co-
ordinates being equal, the relation between them does not change if we change such
coordinates in such way that they remain equal in both elements.
Next axiom enunciates the strong robustness property (Kreps (1979)) in each coordi-
nate when the others remain the same.
Axiom 2 (GA2). Strong Robustness in each coordinate.
If (A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , A′i, . . . , An) then it must be (A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An) ∼
(A1, . . . , Ai ∪ A′i, . . . , An).
Next we proceed as in the previous section, when we dealt with two decision peri-
ods, in order to characterize the indirect-utility criterion in n times.
Proposition 2.2. Let < be a complete preorder defined over X = P∗(X1) × . . . × P∗(Xn),
that verifies axioms (GA1) and (GA2). Then for any (A1, . . . , An) ∈ P∗(X1)× . . .×P∗(Xn)
there exist a1 ∈ A1, . . . , an ∈ An such that (A1, . . . , An) ∼ ({a1}, . . . , {an}). Moreover the
elements ai ∈ Ai verify that (A′1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , A′n) < (A′1, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , A′n) for all A′j ⊆
Xj, j ∈ N \ {i}, and for all a′i ∈ Ai.
Proof. Let us take (A1, . . . , An) ∈ X and A1 = {a11, a12, . . . , a1p1}. As we know that < is
complete, we can suppose without loss of generality that
({a11}, A2, . . . , An) < ({a12}, A2, . . . , An) < . . . < ({a1p1}, A2, . . . , An).
Taking into account that < is transitive and applying axiom GA2 successively we
obtain
({a11}, A2, . . . , An) ∼ ({a11, a12}, A2, . . . , An) ∼ . . . ∼ ({a11, . . . , a1n}, A2, . . . , An)
an then
({a11}, A2, . . . , An) ∼ (A1, . . . , An).
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If we now take A2 = {a21, . . . , a2p2} we can suppose in the same way that
({a11}, {a21}, A3, . . . , An) < ({a11}, {a22}, A3, . . . , An) < . . . < ({a11}, {a2p2}, A3, . . . , An)
and applying again axiom GA2 successively (and the transitive property) we obtain
({a11}, {a21}, A3, . . . , An) ∼ ({a11}, {a21, a22}, A3, . . . , An) ∼ . . . ∼
∼ ({a11}, {a21, . . . , a2p2}, A3, . . . , An) = ({a11}, A2, . . . , An).
By transitivity of the indifference relation we conclude
({a11}, {a21}, A3, . . . , An) ∼ (A1, . . . , An).
Let us now suppose (induction hypothesis) that
({a11}, {a21}, . . . , {ai−11 }, Ai, . . . , An) ∼ (A1, . . . , An)
and Ai = {ai1, . . . , aipi}.
We can suppose that
({a11}, {a21}, . . . , {ai−11 }, {ai1}, Ai+1, . . . , An) < ({a11}, {a21}, . . . , {ai−11 }, {ai2}, Ai+1, . . . , An) <
< . . . < ({a11}, {a21}, . . . , {ai−11 }, {aipi}, Ai+1, . . . , An).
Applying the transitive property and axiom GA2 successively we obtain
({a11}, {a21}, . . . , {ai1}, Ai+1, . . . , An) ∼ (A1, . . . , An).
Therefore we can conclude by induction that
(A1, . . . , An) ∼ ({a11}, . . . , {an1}).
This means that a1 = a11, . . . , an = a
n
1 satisfy our first claim. The second claim has been
established above for the first coordinate and the sets A2, . . . , An. Axiom GA1 extends it
for any subsets A′2 ⊆ X2, . . . , A′n ⊆ Xn.
We also have above that ({a11}, {a21}, A3, . . . , An) < ({a21}, {a2j }, A3, . . . , An) for all
a2j ∈ A2. Applying now axiom GA1 again we obtain that (A′1, {a21}, A′3, . . . , A′n) <
(A′1, {a2j }, A′3, . . . , A′n) for all a2j ∈ A2 and for all A′1 ⊆ X1, A′3 ⊆ X3, . . . , A′n ⊆ Xn which
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proves the second claim in the Proposition 2.2 for the second coordinate. In the same
way we conclude the claim for any coordinate i ∈ N.
Next examples prove the independence of the GA1 and GA2 axioms.
Example 2.4. Let us consider the complete preorder< defined onP∗(X1)× . . .×P∗(Xn)
by
(A1, . . . .An) < (B1, . . . , Bn)⇔

i) |Ai| = |Bi| ∀i = 1, . . . , n, or
ii) ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that |Ai| = |Bi| ∀i = 1, . . . , j− 1
and |Aj| > |Bj|
< satisfies GA1, but it does not satisfy GA2. 3
Next example gives a complete preorder satisfying GA2 and not satisfying GA1.
Example 2.5. Let us consider a complete preorder R defined on X and the ranking over
P∗(X)× . . .×P∗(X) defined as
i) (A1, . . . , An)  (B1, . . . , Bn)⇔ ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that max(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ai)I
max(B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bi) ∀i = 1, . . . , j− 1 and max(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Aj)Pmax(B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bj)
ii) (A1, . . . , An) ∼ (B1, . . . , Bn)⇔ max(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ai)Imax(B1 ∪ . . . Bi) for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
GA2 is satisfied because if
(A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , A′i, . . . , An)
we have that
max(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ai)Rmax(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ A′i)
and then
max(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ai)Imax(A1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ai ∪ A′i)
which leads to
(A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An) ∼ (A1, . . . , Ai ∪ A′i, . . . , An)
In order to prove that GA1 is not satisfied let us take a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ X such that
a1Pb2Pb1Pa2. We have
({a1}, {a2}, A3, . . . , An) < ({a1}, {b2}, A3, . . . , An)
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but
({b1}, {b2}, A3, . . . , An)  ({b1}, {a2}, A3, . . . , An)
because max({b1} ∪ {b2}) = b2Pmax({b1} ∪ {a2}) = b1. 3
Moreover the ranking given in definition 2.5 also satisfies the next axiom.
Axiom 3 (GA3). Impatience.
(A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An)  (A1, . . . , A′i, . . . , An)⇒
(A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , An)  (A1, . . . , A′i, A′i+1, . . . , A′n)
for all A′i+1 ⊆ Xi+1, . . . , A′n ⊆ Xn.
This last axiom implies that whenever an element is strictly preferred to another one
with only a different coordinate, then it does not matter which subsets we have in all
the coordinates after the different one. The element that was preferred goes on being
strictly preferred to those elements with the same coordinates until the different one,
whatever other subsets are in the rest of them.
It is immediate to prove that the rankings given in the examples 2.4 and 2.5 above
satisfy GA3. In order to finish the proof of the independence of this axiom and axioms
GA1 and GA2 we give in the next example 2.6 a ranking that obviously satisfies GA1
and GA2, but not GA3.
Example 2.6. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be finite sets of alternatives, R1, . . . ,Rn complete preorders
defined respectively over X1, . . . ,Xn and X = P∗(X1)× . . .×P∗(Xn).
If (A1, . . . , An), (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ X we define
(A1, . . . , An) < (B1, . . . , Bn) if and only if
• max(Ai)Iimax(Bi) for all i = 1, . . . , n, or
• There exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that max(Ai)Iimax(Bi) for all i = n, . . . , n− j+ 1
and max(Aj)Pjmax(Bj).
3
Next theorem characterizes the indirect-utility criterion in n times.
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Theorem 2.2. A complete preorder < over P∗(X1)× P∗(X2)× . . .× P∗(Xn) verifies GA1,
GA2 and GA3 if and only if there exist complete preorders Ri over Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
<=<U , where <U is the indirect-utility criterion associated with Ri, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. We have already mentioned that the ranking<U given by Definition 2.5 satisfies
axioms GA1, GA2 and GA3.
Let us prove now that if< is a complete preorder overP∗(X1)× . . .×P∗(Xn) verify-
ing axioms GA1, GA2 and GA3, there exist complete preorders Ri over Xi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n
such that “<=<U”.
Let us define Ri over Xi, just as the generalization of R1 and R2 in Theorem 2.1:
xiRiyi ⇔ (A1, . . . , {xi}, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , {yi}, . . . , An)
for all A1 ⊆ X1, . . . , Ai−1 ⊆ Xi−1, Ai+1 ⊆ Xi+1, . . . , An ⊆ Xn.
Nevertheless the definition of Ri is given for all Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N \ {i}, it can be
defined considering that xiRiyi if and only if there exists a subset Aj ⊆ Xj for each
j ∈ N \ {i} such that (A1, . . . , {xi}, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , {yi}, . . . , An). Applying then
axiom GA1 we conclude that the relation is verified for all Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N \ {i} as the
definition establishes.
Now let us denote by <U the total preorder over P∗(X1) × . . . × P∗(Xn) we have
called “indirect-utility criterion in n times” associated with R1, . . . ,Rn. We prove that
<U=< .
We know that for each (A1, . . . , An) ∈ P∗(X1)× . . .× P∗(Xn) there exist elements
ai ∈ Ai, for all i = 1, . . . , n as in Proposition 2.2 such that (A1, . . . , An) ∼ ({a1}, . . . , {an}),
(A1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , An) for all a′i ∈ Ai, and for all Aj ⊆ Xj,
j ∈ N \ {i}.
Let us see that it is also true that (A1, . . . , An) ∼U ({a1}, . . . , {an}).
Indeed we know that <U satisfies axioms GA1 and GA2, thus there must exist a¯i ∈
Ai, i = 1, . . . , n, such that (A1, . . . , An) ∼U ({a¯1}, . . . , {a¯n}). As it must be also true
(Proposition 2.2) that
(A1, . . . , {a¯i}, . . . , An) <U (A1, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , An), ∀a′i ∈ Ai and ∀Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N \ {i}
we have that this is also true if a′i = ai and then we must consider two possibilities.
a) a¯iPiai ⇔ (A1, . . . , {a¯i}, . . . , An)  (A1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , An), which is not possible
because (A1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , An) < (A1, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , An) ∀a′i ∈ Ai and for all
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Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N \ {i}.
b) a¯i Iiai and max(Aj)Pjmax(Aj).
This case is not possible because we have that max(Aj)Ijmax(Aj) for all j = i +
1, . . . , n. Then we obtain that (A1, . . . , {a¯i}, . . . , An) ∼U (A1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , An) for
all Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N ∈ \{i}.
Let us now consider the elements (A1, . . . , An) ∼ ({a1}, . . . , {an}) and (A′1, . . . , A′n) ∼
({a′1}, . . . , {a′n}) such that (A1, . . . , An) <U (A′1, . . . , A′n). We have to prove that then
(A1, . . . , An) < (A′1, . . . , A′n).
There are two possibilities to consider:
(i) There exists i ∈ N such that aj Ija′j for all j = 1, . . . , i− 1 and aiPia′i.
Applying the definition of the binary relation Ri we have that (A1, . . . , {ai}, . . . , An) 
(A1, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , An) for all Aj ⊆ Xj, j ∈ N \ {i}. In particular we obtain that
({a1}, . . . , {an})  ({a1}, . . . , {a′i}, . . . , {an}).
Because of axiom GA3 we have
({a1}, . . . , {an})  ({a1}, . . . , {a′i}, A′i+1, . . . , A′n) ∀A′j ⊆ Xj, j = i+ 1, . . . , n.
Taking A′j = {a′j} ∀j = i+ 1, . . . , n we conclude
({a1}, . . . , {an})  ({a1}, . . . , {ai−1}, {a′i}, . . . , {a′n}).
As we have aj Ija′j for all j = 1, . . . , i − 1, if we apply the definition of Rj, j =
1, . . . , i− 1 we have that
({a1}, . . . , {ai−1}, {a′i}, . . . , {a′n}) ∼ ({a′1}, . . . , {a′n})
and by transitivity
({a1}, . . . , {an})  ({a′1, . . . , {a′n}).
(ii) ai Iia′i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
In this case we have
({a1}, . . . {an}) ∼ ({a′1}, . . . , {a′n})
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and we conclude.
To end, we have to prove that whenever (A1, . . . , An) < (A′1, . . . , A′n), it must be
(A1, . . . , An) <U (A′1, . . . , A′n).
If not, ({a′1}, . . . , {a′n}) U ({a1}, . . . , {an}) and then we have that there exists i ∈
{1, . . . , n} such that a′j Ijaj for all j = 1, . . . , i− 1 and a′iPiai. Therefore
({a′1}, . . . , {a′i}, Ai+1, . . . , An)  ({a′1}, . . . , {a′i−1}, {ai}, Ai+1, . . . , An)
for all Aj ⊆ Xj, j = i+ 1, . . . , n.
In particular if we take Aj = {a′j}, j = i+ 1, . . . , n, we have
({a′1}, . . . , {a′n})  ({a′1}, . . . , {ai}, . . . , {a′n}).
Applying now axiom GA3 we obtain
({a′1}, . . . , {a′n})  ({a′1}, . . . , {a′i−1}, {ai}, . . . , {an})
As we know that
({a′1}, . . . , {a′i−1}, {ai}, . . . , {an}) ∼ ({a1}, . . . , {an})
because a′j Ijaj for all j = 1, . . . , i− 1 we conclude
({a′1}, . . . , {a′n})  ({a1}, . . . , {an})
against the hypothesis.
2.4 The case of an advised choice
In the same way that in the previous section, along this one we also consider a complete
preorder defined on a finite set X and extend it to a ranking of opportunity sets in two
steps. Again we appeal to the indirect-utility criterion.
Besides, for each complete preorder< on P∗(X) we consider the complete preorder
R on X naturally induced by it and defined as
xRy⇔ {x} < {y}, ∀x, y ∈ X.
The criterion of choice we consider in this section works as follows. In a first step, we
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apply the indirect-utility criterion directly to the subsets we are comparing, just as in the
classical way; and we use a second step to break ties only. In such a case we apply again
the indirect-utility criterion, but now to smaller subsets of each initial one. These smaller
subsets include some elements of the initial ones that we call “focal elements” and that
have been previously selected by “an adviser”. Therefore the situation is different from
the one in the previous section. There, both the set of alternatives and the preorders R1
and R2 defined on them could be different in the two different times in which the choice
took place. Nowwe consider the same set of alternatives and the same preorder defined
on it in the two different times. The only difference between these two different choice
times are the subsets to which we apply the indirect-utility criterion.
Before formalizing our criterion we introduce some examples from the real world to
motivate it.
Suppose that a couple is going to marry and they want to select a wedding list from
different shops. Each shop has its own catalogue with its wedding list and they have to
select one of them. In order to do that the woman ranks the catalogues looking only to
some concrete elements she considers indispensable in a wedding list and comparing
all these elements from the different catalogues. Then, her couple selects from each
catalogue in her best class of preference those presents that he considers indispensable
in his wedding list. Then she compares these subsets ranking them only looking to the
elements in them she likes the most. After having selected the catalogue, their relatives
and friends will decide which presents in the catalogue they buy.
Another example is a family making a decision about the place to spend some hol-
iday days. The parents select some places after considering how much they can pay,
how far the places are, and so on. Afterwards, in order to make the final choice they ask
their children opinion. Then they probably have smaller subsets of places for choosing.
The next definition formalizes this criterion for ranking subsets.
Definition 2.6. Let X be a finite set of alternatives and R a complete preorder on X, and let C
be a choice function on X.We define the ranking of subsets of X associated with R and C as:
A <C B if and only if
a) max(A)Pmax(B), or
b) max(A)Imax(B) andmax(C(A))Rmax(C(B))
for all A, B ⊆ X.
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Remark 2.1. The ranking <C is a total preorder on the set of nonempty subsets of X
because R is a total preorder on X. 
Let us introduce now an analytical example of this criterion for ranking subsets.
Example 2.7. Consider X = {a, b, b′, c, c} and R a complete preorder defined on X satis-
fying
aPbIb′PcPd
where P and I are the strict and the indifference relations associated to R.
Let C be the choice function defined on X given by:
C(S) = S for all S with |S| = 2
C({a, b, b′}) = {a, b, b′}
C({a, b, c}) = {c}
C({a, b, d}) = {a, b, d}
C({a, b′, c}) = {c}
C({a, b′, d}) = {d}
C({a, c, d}) = {d}
C({b, b′, c}) = {b, c}
C({b, b′, d}) = {d}
C({b, c, d}) = {c, d}
C({b′, c, d}) = {c}
C({a, b, b′, c}) = {a, b, c}
C({a, b, b′, d}) = {d}
C({a, b, c, d}) = {d}
C({a, b′, c, d}) = {c, d}
C({b, b′, c, d}) = {c, d}
C({a, b, b′, c, d}) = {d}
Let us now construct the ranking <C associated with C. We obtain:
{a} ∼C {a, b} ∼C {a, b′} ∼C {a, c} ∼C {a, d} ∼C {a, b, b′} ∼C {a, b, d} ∼C {a, b, b′, c} C
C {a, b, c} ∼C {a, b′, c} ∼C {a, b′, c, d} C
C {a, b′, d} ∼C {a, c, d} ∼C {a, b, b′, d} ∼C {a, b, c, d} ∼C {a, b, b′, c, d} C
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C {b} ∼C {b′} ∼C {b, b′} ∼C {b, c} ∼C {b, d} ∼C {b′, c} ∼C {b′, d} ∼C {b, b′, c} C
C {b, c, d} ∼C {b′, c, d} ∼C {b, b′, c, d} C
C {b, b′, d} C
C {c} ∼C {c, d}} C {d}.
3
Of course the criterion stated in Definition 2.6 is not universal: there are complete
preorders that can not be represented in this form. The next example illustrates this
statement.
Example 2.8. Let X = {a, b}. We consider the complete preorder on P∗(X) defined by
{a, b}  {a}  {b}.
Then < can not be represented as a ranking associated to a choice function C and the
complete preorder R on X induced by < and that is defined as
aRb and ¬(bRa)⇔ aPb.
Indeed:
A choice function C : P∗(X)→ P∗(X) can be defined in the three different forms:
a) C({a, b}) = {a},
b) C({a, b}) = {b}, or
c) C({a, b}) = {a, b}.
In all of them C({a}) = {a} and C({b}) = {b}.
From definitions a) and c) we obtain that the best element in C({a, b}) is a in both
cases and thus
{a, b} ∼C {a}.
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From definition b) the best element in C({a, b}) is b and then
{a} C {a, b}.
Therefore < 6=<C for any possible choice function C : P∗(X)→ P∗(X). 3
Our goal in this section is to characterize the ranking introduced by Definition 2.6:
we want to identify the behavior of a decision maker that uses it. In this sense we
analyze some properties that this criterion satisfies. Before introducing them, we deal
with a bit of notation. The next subsection 2.4.1 completes the analysis.
Remember that X denotes a finite set of alternatives, and < a ranking of subsets of
X which is a complete preorder. Using the usual decomposition in mutually disjoint
indifference classes by <we can write (and so it is considered along the whole section)
X = X1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn
in such a way that xi, x′i ∈ Xi ⇔ {xi} ∼ {x′i}, and {x1}  {x2}  · · ·  {xn} for all
xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. Or in terms of the complete preorder R induced by < over the
set of alternatives X, all the elements in Xi are indifferent by R and at the same time we
have x1Px2P . . . Pxn for all xi ∈ Xi and for all i = 1, . . . , n.
We can consider the restriction of the preorder< to any domain of nonempty subsets
of X. Let P ′(X) be one such domain and let us consider the restriction of < to it.
Definition 2.7. Let A1, . . . , Ap be elements in P ′(X). A chain of strict preferences
A1  A2  . . .  Ap−1
is maximum for Ap in P ′(X) with respect to the complete preorder < if it verifies
A1  A2  . . .  Ap−1  Ap
and also that if A ∈ P ′(X) verifies that A  Ap, then it must be A ∼ Ai for some i ∈
{1, . . . , p− 1}.
It is obvious fromDefinition 2.7 that if two subsets inP ′(X) have the samemaximum
chain, they have to be indifferent by < . In fact the next proposition holds.
Proposition 2.3. Let A be a subset in P ′(X) and let us suppose that
A1  . . .  Ak
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and
B1  . . .  Br
are two maximum chains for A inP ′(X). Then it must be r = k and Bi ∼ Ai for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. We know that A1  . . .  Ak is a maximum chain for A in P ′(X) and Bi  A for
all i = 1, . . . , r, so for every i = 1, . . . , r it is forceful that Bi ∼ Aj for some j = 1, . . . , k.
Because of Bi  Bj whenever i 6= j, it must be k > r. The same argument applied to the
fact that B1  . . .  Br is a maximum chain for A and Al  A for all l = 1, . . . , k yields
us to k 6 r. Thus we obtain that r = k.
Moreover it must be Bi ∼ Ai for all i = 1, . . . , k because if Bi ∼ Aj and i > j we
obtain that
B1  B2  . . .  Bi  Aj+1  . . .  Ak
is a chain for A and it has more than k elements because i > j which contradicts the fact
that A1  . . .  Ak is a maximum chain for A. The same argument in case that i < j
concludes the proof.
Definition 2.8. A chain of strict preferences A1  . . .  Ak is maximum inP ′(X)with respect
to the complete preorder< if any subset in P ′(X) is indifferent by< to any of the subsets in the
chain.
Then we obtain that every set of alternatives in P ′(X)with a maximum chain with k
elements must be indifferent to the subset that appears in the place k+ 1 in a maximum
chain in P ′(X) as the next corollary states.
Corollary 2.1. If A ∈ P ′(X) has a maximum chain with k subsets of P ′(X) and
A1  A2  . . .  Ap
is a maximum chain in P ′(X) with respect to the complete preorder <, then A ∼ Ak+1.
Let us now introduce two new properties for a ranking of subsets defined on X.
Property P1. If A and B are subsets of the finite set X and there exists an element a ∈ A
such that for every b ∈ B is {a}  {b}, then A  B.
We denote by [Xi] the set of subsets of X with best elements with respect to the
complete preorder R in Xi.
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Property P2. For any i = 1, . . . , n we can find subindexes i1, . . . , ip such that i = i1 <
i2 < . . . < ip 6 n and for any maximum chain in [Xi]
A1  A2  . . .  Ap
we have that A ∩ Xik 6= ∅ for all A ∈ [Xi] verifying that A ∼ Ak.
Remark 2.2. We obtain from P2 that in a maximum chain in [Xi], it must be A1 ∼ Xi
because, in other case, Xi ∼ Ak with k > 1, thus Xi should verify that Xi ∩ Xik 6= ∅ with
ik 6= i, which is impossible. 
Property P1 is fairly intuitive. If a single subset of a set A is strictly preferred to all
the single subsets of a set B, the set A is strictly preferred to the set B.
Property P2 requests that when a set A with best elements in a class i verifies that
Xi (a set with all its elements in the class i) is strictly preferred to it, A must contain
elements from another class worse than class i. In fact, all the subsets in [Xi] with a
maximum chain of order 2 in [Xi] must contain elements in Xi2 for some i2 > i1 = i.
Those subsets in [Xi] with a maximum chain of order 3 must contain elements in Xi3 for
some i3 > i2 > i1 = i, and so on those subsets in [Xi] with a maximum chain in [Xi] of
order kmust contain elements in some Xik with n > ik > . . . > i3 > i2 > i1 = i. We have
that A ∩ Xi 6= ∅ for all A ∈ [Xi]. Then if A ∈ [Xi] has a chain with no elements in [Xi]
(there are no elements in [Xi] strictly preferred to A), that is A ∼ A1, then A ∩ Xi 6= ∅,
and A can also have elements in other X′js with i < j or not.
Now we consider the ranking of subsets associated to a complete preorder R and a
choice function C defined on a set X given in Definition 2.6 and denoted by <C .
It is obvious that <C verifies P1.
Indeed, if there exists a ∈ A such that {a} C {b} ∀b ∈ B ⇒ max(A)Pmax(B) ⇒
A C B.
In Example 2.7 above we can observe that every subset with best element a is strictly
preferred to those subsets with best elements b or b′, which at the same time are strictly
preferred to those subsets with best element c, that are strictly preferred to the subset
{d} (the only one with the best element d).
Let us now prove that <C also satisfies P2.
Let us consider any i = 1, . . . , n and let
Xi ∼C A1 C A2 C . . . C Ap
be a maximum chain in [Xi] with respect to <C .
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As we know that max(Aj) ∈ Xi for all Aj ∈ [Xi] we obtain
max(C(A1))Pmax(C(A2))P . . . Pmax(C(Ap)).
This fact implies the existence of subindexes i = i1 < i2 < . . . < ip 6 n such that
max(C(Aj)) ∈ Xij .
We now prove that these subindexes i1, . . . , ip verify property P2.
Let us take a subset A ∈ [Xi] with a maximum chain in [Xi] with k elements. We
have (Corollary 2.1)
A1 C A2 C . . . C Ak C A
and
A ∼C Ak+1.




which let us conclude that
max(C(A)) ∈ Xik+1 and thus A ∩ Xik+1 6= ∅.
Following the Example 2.7 above we can illustrate this theoretical part. There we
have that X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 ∪ X4 = {a} ∪ {b, b′} ∪ {c} ∪ {d} and
[X1] = {{a}, {a, b}, {a, b′}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {a, b, b′}, {a, b, c}, {a, b, d}, {a, b′, c}, {a, b′, d},
{a, c, d}, {a, b, b′, c}, {a, b, b′, d}, {a, b, c, d}, {a, b′, c, d}, {a, b, b′, c, d}}
[X2] = {{b}, {b′}, {b, b′}, {b, c}, {b, d}, {b′, c}, {b′, d}, {b, b′, c}, {b, b′, d}, {b, c, d},
{b′, c, d}, {b, b′, c, d}}
[X3] = {{c}, {c, d}}
[X4] = {{d}}.
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Thus, in [X1] we have a maximum chain
{a} C {a, b, c} C {a, b, c, d}
among other possibilities.
In this chain i1 = 1. Now, if we take all the subsets in [X1] indifferent to {a, b, c}
we can observe that all of them have elements in X2, thus we can choose i2 = 2 > 1,
and in X3, thus we can also select i2 = 3 > 1. Now, considering all the subsets in [X1]
indifferent to {a, b, c, d} we observe that they all have elements in X4, but not in X3,
hence we can only choose i3 = 4 > i2 = 2 or 3 > i1 = 1. These subindexes verify P2 for
[X1].
In [X2]
{b} C {b, c, d} C {b, b′, d}
is a maximum chain among other possibilities.
In this chain we have that i1 = 2. Now we consider all the subsets in [X2] that are
indifferent to {b, c, d} and observe that they all have elements in X3 and X4, thus we can
choose i2 = 3 or i2 = 4. Nevertheless we know that the maximum chain in [X2] has three
elements therefore if we choose i2 = 4 we have not any possibility for i3. Thus i2 = 3
and then i3 = 4.
In [X3] there is a maximum chain with an only element, for Example X3, thus we
only have i1 = 3 for [X3] and the same for [X4] thus i1 = 4 in this last class of subsets.
2.4.1 A characterization of the ranking of subsets denoted by <C
In this subsection we solve the problem under inspection. Our primitive concepts are
the finite set X and a ranking of subsets of X, namely<, which is a complete preorder on
P∗(X). The question now is if we can define a choice function C over the set X in such a
way that the ranking of subsets associated with it (and the preorder R trivially induced
by <) coincides with the given ranking. We give a complete answer to this question in
terms of suitable properties.
We have already mentioned above that not any complete preorder on P∗(X) can be
represented as a complete preorder associated with a choice function (Example 2.8). We
alsomentioned some examples of the real worldwhere this kind of behavior takes place.
The next example shows that we can also find cases in which different choice functions
define the same ranking, so that even if we take into account different advisers, the final
choice can be the same.
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Example 2.9. Let X = {a, b} and < a ranking of subsets of X defined as
{a} ∼ {a, b}  {b}.
If we consider C({a, b}) = {a}, then <C=< .
But the choice function C ′({a, b}) = {a, b} also verifies that <C ′=< . 3
Therefore in cases where it is possible to find a choice function C in such a way
that <=<C , this choice function may not be unique. In order to propose a canonical
expression for a solution to our problem we first prove the next lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let X be a finite set of objects and < a complete preorder on P∗(X). If we can
define different choice functions C1, C2, . . . , Cr on P∗(X) such that <=<Ci for all i = 1, . . . , r,
then the choice function given by C = C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cr1 also verifies that <=<C .
Proof. If A, B ⊆ X and A <Ci B for all i = 1, . . . , r, we have:
a) max(A)Pmax(B), or
b) max(A)Imax(B) and max(Ci(A))Rmax(Ci(B)), for all i = 1, . . . , r.
If case a) happens for all A, B ⊆ X such that A <Ci B, then the definition of C is
irrelevant i.e., for any choice function C we obtain that A <C B.
Then we have to deal with the case b) in which it happens that there exist A, B ⊆
X such that A <Ci B for all i = 1, . . . , r and such that max(A)Imax(B). Therefore
max(Ci(A))Rmax(Ci(B)) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
We have
C(A) = C1(A) ∪ . . . ∪ Cr(A) and C(B) = C1(B) ∪ . . . ∪ Cr(B),
thus
max(C(A)) = max({max(C1(A)), . . . ,max(Cr(A))})
and
max(C(B)) = max({max(C1(B)), . . . ,max(Cr(B))}).
As we have that max(Ci(A))Rmax(Ci(B)) for all i = 1, . . . , r, we conclude that
max(C(A))Rmax(C(B))
1(C1 ∪ C2 ∪ . . . ∪ Cr)(S) = C1(S) ∪ C2(S) ∪ . . . ∪ Cr(S), ∀S ⊆ X.
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which implies that A <C B.
This lemma let us deal with a canonical choice function for a ranking of subsets< .
This canonical choice function is an application
C : P∗(X)→ P∗(X) such that <C=<
maximum in the sense that if there exists another choice function
C ′ : P∗(X)→ P∗(X) verifying <C ′=<
then
C ′(S) ⊆ C(S) for all S ⊆ X.
Now we suppose that we have a complete preorder < over P∗(X) such that there
exists a choice function C on X such that <=<C . We look for a canonical expression for
this choice function.
Recall that
X = X1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn
in such a way that all the elements in Xi are indifferent by R and at the same time we
have x1Px2P · · · Pxn for all xi ∈ Xi. We associate with each complete preorder < on
P∗(X) that satisfies property P2 a choice function according to the following recursive
definition for the subindexes that P2 assures.
Let us consider [Xi] for any i = 1, . . . , n and let
A1  A2  . . .  Ap
be a maximum chain in [Xi] with respect to <, so that P2 assures that we can find
subindexes i = i1 < i2 < . . . < ip 6 n such that Ak ∩ Xik 6= ∅.
We take the first subindex i1(i) = i, so that all the subsets S1 in [Xi] indifferent to
Xi ∼ A1 verify S1 ∩ Xi 6= ∅. We denote this subindex by i1(i) because we want to
remark that it depends on the domain [Xi] from X where we are.
Let us now consider all the subsets S2 in [Xi] indifferent to A2. We denote i2(i) the
minimum subindex l ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n} that verifies that S2 ∩ Xl 6= ∅ for all S2 ∼ A2.
Now we denote i3(i) the minimum subindex l ∈ {i2(i) + 1, . . . , n} that verifies that
S3 ∩ Xl 6= ∅ for all S3 ∼ A3.
2.4. The case of an advised choice 55
Recursively we obtain i = i1(i) < i2(i) < . . . < ip(i) 6 n such that Sk ∩Xik(i) 6= ∅ for
all Sk ∈ [Xi] indifferent to Ak, and with all the ir(i), r = 1, . . . , p as minimum as possible
verifying the necessary condition of non empty intersection.
Adding up the different maximum chains obtained by this way for every [Xi] we
obtain a maximum chain in X with respect to <
X1 ∼ Ai1(1)  . . .  Aip(1)  X2 ∼ Ai1(2)  . . .  Aip(2)  . . .  Xn ∼ Ai1(n) (2.1)
Then every subset of X must be indifferent to one of the subsets in this chain. The
next expression gives us the canonical choice function associated to < .
Definition 2.9. Let S be a subset of X with a maximum chain with respect to < as given by
equation (2.1). Let us suppose that S ∼ Air(k), that is, S is a subset with its best elements in Xk
and indifferent to the subset in place r in the maximum chain in Xk. Then
C(S) = S ∩ (Xir(k) ∪ Xir(k)+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn).
Remark 2.3. The definition of C can be given in many different forms. In fact, when
S ∼ Air(k) any definition of C(S) such that
C(S) ∩ Xir(k) 6= ∅ and S ∩ (X1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xir(k)−1) = ∅
verifies that<=<C . We choose the one given in Definition 2.9 by virtue of Lemma 2.1.
The next theorem is our main result in this section and it states the characterization
of the complete preorders on P∗(X) that can be represented as a preorder associated
with a choice function over P∗(X) through properties P1 and P2.
Theorem 2.3. Let X be a finite set of objects and< a complete preorder on P∗(X). There exists
a choice function C : P∗(X) → P∗(X) such that <=<C if and only if < verifies properties P1
and P2.
Proof. We have already mentioned that the complete preorder <C given in Definition
2.6 verifies properties P1 and P2.
Now, let us suppose that we have a complete preorder < on P∗(X) that verifies
properties P1 and P2 thus we can define the canonical choice function associated with
<, C : P∗(X)→ P∗(X), as the one given in Definition (2.9).
Finally we check that <=<C .
In the first place, we suppose that A < B, and we prove that A <C B.
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If A < B there must exist a ∈ A such that {a} < {b} for all b ∈ B, because in other
case, for all a ∈ A there would exist b ∈ B verifying that {b}  {a}. Then there would
exist b′ ∈ B and a′ ∈ A such that {b′}  {a′} < {a} for all a ∈ A. Applying now that <
verifies property P1 we conclude that B  A.
Then, if {a}  {b} for all b ∈ B the definition of <C yields A C B.
Therefore, let us suppose that there exists b ∈ B such that {a} ∼ {b} ⇔ aIb. This
means that max(A)Imax(B).
Case 1. If a ∈ Xi and A ∼ Xi, we would have that C(A) = A, thus
max(C(A))Imax(A)Imax(B)Rmax(C(B))
and this takes us to
A <C B.
Case 2. a ∈ Xi and Xi  A. As we know that A < B it is also true that Xi  B.
Now because of property P2 we have subindexes i1, . . . , ip such that i = i1 < i2 <
. . . < ip 6 n and in such way that if
A1  . . .  Ak
is a maximum chain for A ∈ [Xi], it is A ∩ Xik+1 6= ∅.
Now two possibilities arise:
i) If both A and B have a maximum chain with k elements we would obtain
A ∼ Ak+1 ∼ B, thus C(A) = A ∩ (Xik+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn) and C(B) = B ∩ (Xik+1 ∪
. . . ∪ Xn), which implies that max(C(A))Imax(C(B)) and therefore A ∼C B.
ii) If A and B have different maximum chains, the one for A has fewer subsets
from [Xi] than the one for B because A < B. Thus, if the maximum chain for
A is of order k (A ∼ Ak+1), and the maximum chain for B is of order l (B ∼
Al+1), then C(A) = A ∩ (Xik+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn) and C(B) = B ∩ (Xil+1 ∪ . . . ∪ Xn)
where ik+1 < il+1 which implies max(C(A))Pmax(C(B)) and then A C B.
To finish the proof we need to check that if A <C B then A < B, which is equivalent to
prove that
A  B⇒ A C B.
In case that A  B, we have that A and B have different maximum chains and we
obtain as in case 2 ii) above that A C B, which concludes the proof.
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Remark 2.4. We want to remark that although we have used in the proof of Theorem 2.3
the definition of C given by Definition 2.9 the precise construction of the subindexes is
not relevant in the proof. The only relevant issue is that they form a nondecreasing se-
quence. For this reason the theorem can be proved from any set of subindexes verifying
proposition P2.
In this connection recall that Example 2.9 has illustrated a related fact: different ad-
visers’ choice may produce the same ranking when the decision maker’s ordering re-
mains unchanged. Example 2.10 below emphasizes this feature of the model. 
We also want to remark that in Example 2.8 property P2 is not verified. In fact the
relation {a, b}  {a} would imply that the subset {a} should contain elements of at
least two different indifference classes by R, which is obviously impossible.
We finish recalling the ranking given in the Example 2.7. Now we investigate if we
can “recover” the adviser’s choice through the explicit construction given by the proof
of Theorem 2.3.
Example 2.10. Recall that we have X = {a} ∪ {b, b′} ∪ {c} ∪ {d} = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3 ∪ X4.
Now, let us suppose that we observe the next ranking on P∗(X) :
{a} ∼ {a, b} ∼ {a, b′} ∼ {a, c} ∼ {a, d} ∼ {a, b, b′} ∼ {a, b, d} ∼ {a, b, b′, c} 
 {a, b, c} ∼ {a, b′, c} ∼ {a, b′, c, d} 
 {a, b′, d} ∼ {a, c, d} ∼ {a, b, b′, d} ∼ {a, b, c, d} ∼ {a, b, b′, c, d} 
 {b} ∼ {b′} ∼ {b, b′} ∼ {b, c} ∼ {b, d} ∼ {b′, c} ∼ {b′, d} ∼ {b, b′, c} 
 {b, c, d} ∼ {b′, c, d} ∼ {b, b′, c, d} 
 {b, b′, d} 
 {c} ∼ {c, d}  {d}.
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Because it is the ranking <C associated with C in Example 2.7 it is a complete pre-
order that agrees with properties P1 and P2.
Let us now construct the choice function C ′ as in Theorem 2.3.
In [X1] we choose the maximum chain
{a}  {a, b, c}  {a, b, c, d}.
In [X2]
{b}  {b, c, d}  {b, b′, d}.
In [X3] we have a maximum chain with an only element {c}, and the same happens
in [X4] where we have the maximum chain {d}.
Adding up all these chains we have the maximum chain in X
{a}  {a, b, c}  {a, b, c, d}  {b}  {b, c, d}  {b, b′, d}  {c}  {d}.
For those subsets S ⊆ X that are indifferent to {a} we define C ′(S) = S ∩ X = S. We
have i1(1) = 1.
For those subsets S that are indifferent to {a, b, c} we can observe that the minimum
subindex j verifying that j > 1 and S ∩ Xj 6= ∅ is j = 2. Then we take i2(1) = 2 and
define C′(S) = S ∩ (X2 ∪ X3 ∪ X4). Thus
C ′({a, b, c}) = {b, c}, C ′({a, b′, c}) = {b′, c} and C ′({a, b′, c, d}) = {b′, c, d}
definitions that are different from the definitions of the initial C in the Example 2.7.
Let us consider now those subsets in [X1] indifferent to {a, b, c, d}. All of them have
elements in X4, but not in X3, thus i3(1) = 4 and C ′(S) = S ∩ X4. Then we have
C ′({a, b′, d}) = {d}, C ′({a, c, d}) = {d}, C ′({a, b, b′, d}) = {d}, C ′({a, b, c, d}) = {d}
and C ′({a, b, b′, c, d}) = {d}.
Let us continue now with the subsets in [X2].
For those subsets S in this class indifferent to {b} we define C ′(S) = S (we have
i1(2) = 2).
Observing the sets S in [X2] that are indifferent to {b, c, d} we have that all of them
have elements in X3 and in X4 (3,4>2), and then i2(2) = 3 or i2(2) = 4. As we have
to consider the minimum of these subindexes we take i2(2) = 3, and then i3(2) = 4.
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Therefore we have
C ′({b, c, d}) = {c, d}, C ′({b′, c, d}) = {c, d}, C ′({b, b′, c, d} = {c, d}
and
C ′({b, b′, d}) = {d}.
In [X3] we have an only subindex i1(3) = 3 and then
C ′({c, d}) = {c, d}.
We can check that the definition of C ′ does not coincide with the definition of C in the
Example 2.7. 3
Remark 2.5. The ranking in the example above does not verify P1 if we have, for example
{b, c}  {a, b, c}.
It does not verify P2 if we change the relation for, for instance, the subset {a, c} and
{a}  {a, c}  {a, b, c}  {a, b, c, d}
is a maximum chain for < in [X1], and the other relations being the same as above.
In this case we can not find the subindexes i1 = 1, . . . , ip 6 4 verifying property P2
for [X1]. 
2.5 Conclusions and future research
In this chapter we have dealt with rankings of subsets of a set of alternatives in different
times by using the indirect-utility criterion. In section 2.3 we have considered the pos-
sibility of having different sets of alternatives and different complete preorders defined
on them. We have characterized the ranking of subsets in different times comparing
sequences of subsets, one of every set of alternatives, using the indirect-utility criterion
in each coordinate and applying it in a lexicographical way.
In section 2.4 we have considered a two-period selection, but now with an only set
of alternatives. We rank the subsets applying the indirect-utility criterion too, but now,
in those cases where this produces ties we take into account an adviser that selects, for
any subset of alternatives, a smaller subset of them which we represent with a choice
function. Then the decision-maker applies the indirect-utility criterion to these smaller
subsets. We characterize this ranking of subsets via two properties.
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In the case we use an adviser we want to consider in the future the case in which
the choice function that represents it verifies some rationality properties. We intend to
focus our interest on advisers that behave in a “sensible” way.
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3.1 Introduction
In many decision problems the decision-maker’s preference is represented by a choice
function rather than a binary relation. Moreover, choice theory has a very important
factor of applicability, and its results underlie some economic, psychological, sociologi-
cal,... models, which awards to its study an extra appeal. The description of individual
choices by means of a binary relation is very common. The choice functions consisting
of the selection, for every set of alternatives, of those elements that are best preferred
outcomes for a binary relation is considered a “reasonable” choice. The interesting ques-
tion is the converse: given a choice function, is there a single underlying binary relation
from which our choice function is derived as we have detailed above? If the answer
is positive we say that the choice function is rational or that there exists a binary rela-
tion that rationalizes it. Different methods for axiomatizing “rational choice” have been
developed on the basis of choice functions generated by binary relations and optimiza-
tion criteria that are referred to as “revealed preferences”. In Suzumura (1983) we can
find a survey of the characterization of this classical concept of rational choice functions
that has been extensively studied for different authors among we can cite Arrow (1959),
Richter (1966), Wilson (1970), Sen (1971),...
Non-classical choice mechanisms have also been considered for other authors such
as Aizerman andMalishevski (1981). In this line of research, Nehring (1996) gives a first
contribution to the problem of the existence of maximal elements for non-binary choice
functions. Other results in the same line are in Tian and Zhou (1995), Rodríguez Palmero
and García Lapresta (2002) and Alcantud (2002, 2006). Some extensions of the classical
notion of rationality are Gaertner and Xu (2004) who give a concept of rationality based
on the classical one but taking into account that some available alternatives can have a
“degree of availability” because the decision-maker can consider the choice procedure
unacceptable or some of these alternatives are forbidden for any law; or Bossert and
Suzumura (2007) who “introduce a model of choice where external norms are taken
into consideration” and such model includes the traditional model as a particular case.
The reasons of the interest in choice theory are diverse. We can cite, among others,
the next ones.
• Many problems of decision theory, applied mathematics,... are based on the choice
of the “best” options in some sense from each given set of possibilities.
• Many economic and social models examine questions of individual choice. Also in
psychological phenomena, the idea of describing an individual behavior in terms
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of choosing the best options is a very attractive topic.
• Political problems also deal with models of this kind for formalizing different con-
cepts of individual voting choice and when the option that maximizes the individ-
ual utility also maximizes collective utility.
As expected, the study of rationality of a decision-maker is very extensive in the
literature. Given the choice of an agent, the literature of “revealed preference” tries to
explain this behavior.
In this regard we can find different results about the possible rationality of a choice
function depending on the satisfaction of some suitable properties. The meaning of
“rationality” has had different interpretations and we deal with the one that identi-
fies a rational choice function with the optimization of a binary relation irrespective
of the properties that this binary relation verifies. Nevertheless the literature on ratio-
nal choice functions also deals vastly with questions about which properties the binary
relation that rationalizes a rational choice function verifies: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-
transitivity,... We also include some results in this line.
Moreover the possible rationality of a choice function does not only depend upon
the properties that it verifies, but also upon the domain it is defined on. The problem of
choice implies the definition of the set of options and its relevant subsets. The possible
presence of restrictions over the subsets is essential in the formal model. Sen (1971),
Bandyopadhyay and Sengupta (1991) among others deal with choice functions defined
on domains that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a universal set of alter-
natives. Nevertheless Sen (1971) remarks that “while it is not required that the domain
includes all infinite sets as well, nothing would of course be affected in the results and
the proofs even if all infinite sets are included in the domain”, and that “it is not really
necessary that even all finite sets be included in the domain. All the results and proofs
would continue to hold even if the domain includes all pairs and triples but not all finite
sets”. In chapter 2 of Suzumura (1983) we can find a survey of this topic including the
case with a domain consisting on an arbitrary family of nonempty subsets of an arbi-
trary nonempty universal set of alternatives. More recently Bossert et al (2006) “develop
new necessary conditions for choice functions defined on arbitrary domains to be ratio-
nalized by binary relations that are quasi-transitive or acyclic”, and give a new sufficient
condition for a choice function to be rationalized by an acyclic binary relation.
Another aspect to bear in mind in the problems of decision is the possibility of hav-
ing different criteria for making a choice. If that is the case, we can give priority to some
of them over the others and apply them in a sequential way, which we call “sequential
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choice”. In case that we have two criteria applied in a sequential we say that the choice
is made by two sequential criteria. This means that we compose two choice functions in
an established order (Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) also consider this kind of choice
behavior and name this operation “superposition” of choice functions). So despite we
follow the classical rationality requirements we admit a mechanism for making a deci-
sion that is rather natural and logical, but that can produce a choice that is not rational
in a classical sense: the composition of choice functions. So our DMs consider rational
not only a choice function that is derived from a single binary relation, but also the se-
quential application of such type of choices. Examples of elections of this type are rather
frequent: selecting people applying criteria that reduce successively the set of alterna-
tives, selecting places or hotels for holidays (for example, we eliminate first those that
are too far, then those that are too expensive, and so on),...
Some authors have also studied similar aspects of choice theory: Kalai et al. (2002)
study the rationality of a choice function by multiple binary relations when the choice is
an only element in the set of alternatives and applying all the relations simultaneously
at each set of alternatives. Houy (2007) includes the study of the order of the criteria,
if it affects or not to the final choice, and different procedures of choice for such lexico-
graphic applications of multiple criteria have been considered in Houy and Tademuna
(2007). We follow the line initialized by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) who consider the
sequential rationality of a choice function by the application of different binary relations
in a fixed order, and specifically the case of two relations, but they also limit themselves
to the case of single-valued choice functions. We think that it is interesting to analyze
the problem in terms of set-valued choice functions and this is the case we consider in
this chapter.
We study how the compound function of two choice functions behaves, that is which
of the properties verified by the two initial choice functions are also verified by the
compound function. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) make this study for some proper-
ties and choice functions always defined over domains which contain all the finite and
nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives. We add to this study with the analysis of
some other properties in domains of the same kind, and with some properties of choice
functions defined on arbitrary domains. From the results of this study and the different
rationality characterization theorems we obtain some corollaries establishing the ratio-
nality of a choice function that is obtained as the composition of other two functions
that are rational in a certain sense.
For those problems inwhich the domain contains all the finite and nonempty subsets
of the sets of alernatives, we consider a choice function that does not verify the prop-
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erties of rationality that the different rationality theorems demand. We wonder when
we can find two rational choice functions (verifying the demanded properties) such that
the choice made by the sequential application of these two functions coincides with the
choice made by the decision-maker and that we had observed. When the answer is
positive we say that the choice function is “rational by two sequential criteria”.
We give a complete characterization of a choice function that is rational by two se-
quential criteria in terms of two testable necessary and sufficient conditions.
The rest of the chapter is organized al follows. In section 3.2 we set our notation and
recall different properties of rationality that afterwards will appear in the rationality
theorems. Section 3.3 is devoted to the analysis of the rationality properties that are
preserved under the operation of composition. In section 3.4 we characterize the class
of choice functions that are rational by two sequential criteria, and we conclude with
some final remarks in section 3.5.
3.2 Definitions and properties of rationality
In this section we set the notation and introduce different properties of rationality for a
choice function that are usual in the literature about this topic.
Definition 3.1. Let X be a set and D a nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X. A choice
function is an application C : D → P(X) such that C(S) ⊆ S and C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D.
Let C be a choice function on a domain D.
(i) C verifies the Chernoff condition if for any S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T we have
C(T) ∩ S ⊆ C(S)
which is equivalent to
∀S, T ∈ D, C(S ∪ T) ⊆ C(S) ∪ C(T)
whenever S, T ∈ D ⇒ S ∪ T ∈ D (Sertel and der Bellen (1979)).
(ii) C satisfies the Arrow’s axiom, if for any S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T then
C(T) ∩ S = C(S)
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Remark 3.1. It is obvious that Arrow’s axiom is stronger than the Chernoff condi-
tion. 
(iii) C satisfies the Concordance condition if for all S, T ∈ D such that S ∪ T ∈ D
C(S ∪ T) ⊇ C(S) ∩ C(T).
The next proposition is obtained directly from these definitions.
Proposition 3.1. A choice function C satisfies the Chernoff condition and the Concor-
dance property if and only if it satisfies:
For all S, T ∈ D such that S ∪ T ∈ D,
C(S) ∩ C(T) ⊆ C(S ∪ T) ⊆ C(S) ∪ C(T).
(iv) C satisfies the property γ (Sen 1971) if for any collection of subsets {Mi}i∈I in the
domain D such that ∪i∈IMi ∈ D, it is true that
x ∈ C(Mi) ∀i ∈ I ⇒ x ∈ C (∪i∈IMi) .
This property generalizes the Concordance property. Moreover, if we consider a
domain D that contains all the subsets with two elements of the set of alternatives
and apply this property to them, we obtain a weaker property also named the Di-
rect Condorcet Property in the literature and that we call the “binariness property”.
(v) C satisfies the Binariness property if for any S ∈ D and x ∈ S we have:
x ∈ C({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S⇒ x ∈ C(S)
where D must contain all the subsets of the set of alternatives with two elements.
Remark 3.2. If a choice function C verifies Arrow’s axiom, then C(⋃i∈I Mi) ∩Mi =
C(Mi), and from here we obtain that C verifies property γ and therefore the bina-
riness property1. 
(vi) C satisfies the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)2 if for any
S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T we have
1The domain must be closed under the union of sets.
2In Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) this property is called “independence of outcast of options”.
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C(T) ⊆ S⇒ C(S) = C(T)
or equivalently
S′ ⊆ T \ C(T) and T \ S′ ∈ D ⇒ C(T \ S′) = C(T)
(vii) C satisfies the Superset property if for all S, T ∈ D
S ⊆ T and C(T) ⊆ C(S)⇒ C(S) = C(T).
It is clear that when a choice function satisfies the IIA property it also verifies the
superset property, but both properties are not equivalent.
Remark 3.3. If a choice function satisfies Arrow’s axiom and we consider S, T ∈ D
such that S ⊆ T and C(T) ⊆ S, then we conclude that C(S) = C(T), which means
that the Arrow’s axiom implies the IIA property and thus the superset property.
Definition 3.2. Let X be a set of alternatives and D a nonempty domain of nonempty
subsets of X. Let C be a choice function on D.We define the binary relations on X denoted
by RC and R∗C as:
• (x, y) ∈ RC ⇔ there exists S ∈ D such that x, y ∈ S and x ∈ C(S).
• (x, y) ∈ R∗C ⇔ there exists S ∈ D such that x, y ∈ S, x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S \ C(S).
Definition 3.3. Let {x1, . . . , xt},with t > 2, be a finite sequence in a set X and C a choice
function on a domain D. {x1, . . . , xt} is an H-cycle of order t if it verifies:
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C, (xi, xi+1) ∈ RC (∀i = 2, 3, . . . , t− 1) and (xt, x1) ∈ RC.
Definition 3.4. Let {x1, . . . , xt},with t > 2, be a finite sequence in a set X and C a choice
function on a domain D. {x1, . . . , xt} is an SH-cycle of order t if it verifies:
(x1, x2) ∈ RC, (xi, xi+1) ∈ R∗C (∀i = 2, 3, . . . , t− 1) and (xt, x1) ∈ R∗C.
Definition 3.5. A finite sequence {x1, . . . , xt}, with t > 2, in a set X in such a way that
we have a choice function C on a domain D, is a cycle of order t if it verifies:
(xi, xi+1) ∈ R∗C (∀i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , t− 1) and (xt, x1) ∈ R∗C.
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If a cycle exists, then an SH-cycle exists and then an H-cycle exists, but the con-
verses are not true.
(viii) C satisfies Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference if there exists no H-cycle of any
order.
(ix) C satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference if there exists no SH-cycle of any
order.
Remark 3.4. Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference implies the strong axiom
of revealed preference. 
(x) C satisfies theweak axiom of revealed preference if for any x, y ∈ X, if (x, y) ∈ R∗C, then
(y, x) 6∈ RC. Equivalently, there exists no H-cycle of order 2 (therefore no SH-cycle
of order 2).
(xi) C is acyclic if it has not cycles of any order.
Definition 3.6. Let C be a choice function on a space of alternatives, and let (S1, . . . , St)
be a finite sequence of sets in such a space. We say that this sequence is C-related if and
only if
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1}, Si ∩ C(Si+1) 6= ∅ and St ∩ C(S1) 6= ∅
(xii) C satisfies the Hansson’s axiom of revealed preference if for any C-related sequence of
sets it is Si ∩ C(Si+1) = C(Si) ∩ Si+1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , t− 1.
The next proposition establishes some equivalences and implications among some
of the properties introduced above. They are useful when we deal with the rationality
theorems we state in the sections bellow.
Proposition 3.2 (Suzumura (1983), page 26). • Houthakker’s axiom of revealed prefer-
ence and Hansson’s axiom of revealed preference are equivalent.
• The strong axiom of revealed preference is implied by Houthakker’s axiom and implies the
weak axiom of revealed preference.
• The weak axiom of revealed preference implies Arrow’s axiom.
3.3 Rationality properties of a compound choice function
As we have already mentioned in the introduction we admit as rational a choice made
by the sequential application of different choice functions that are derived from different
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binary relations. In this sense we first need to consider choice functions that are rational
in a certain sense and study if their compound choice function is well-behaved with
respect to rationality. More technically we study the preservation of properties of choice
functions under the operation of composition. In this sense it is worth investigating the
properties of the choice function that we obtain as the composition of other two choice
functions belonging to a particular domain.
In this section wemake this study and also recall some classical theorems of rational-
ity that are present in the literature about this topic. We derive from them some results
of rationality of a compound choice function.
As the conditions of rationality for a choice function depend on the domain they
are defined on, we divide this section in two subsections. In the first one we deal with
choice functions defined on domains that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of
the set of alternatives, and in the second one we consider choice functions defined on
arbitrary domains.
First of all we set our framework.
X denotes a general set of alternatives. A binary relation on X, R ⊆ X × X, is in-
terpreted as a preference relation of an agent, that is xRy (or (x, y) ∈ R) if and only if
the element x ∈ X is considered at least as good as the element y ∈ X. This relation
produces in a natural way a strict relation P and an indifference relation I on X defined
as:
xPy⇔ {xRy and not yRx}
and
xIy⇔ {xRy and yRx}.
Let us recall now some properties of a binary relation that are relevant in different
contexts of choice theory.
Definition 3.7. Let X be a set of alternatives an R a binary relation defined on X.
• R is reflexive if xRx for all x ∈ X.
• R is transitive if whenever xRy and yRz it is xRz where x, y, z are arbitrary elements of
X.
• R is complete if for any x, y ∈ X it is xRy or yRx.
• R is an ordering if it is transitive and complete.
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• R is quasi-transitive if it is not transitive, but the strict relation derived from it is transi-
tive.
• R is acyclic if for any finite sequence of alternatives {x1, . . . , xt} such that
(x1, x2) ∈ P(R), (x2, x3) ∈ P(R), . . . , (xt−1, xt) ∈ P(R)
one has (xt, x1) 6∈ P(R), where P(R) is the strict relation derive from R.
The next definitions respectively formalize: i) the concept of “rational choice func-
tion”, and ii) the idea of sequential application of two criteria of decision-making as a
compound function.
Definition 3.8. A choice function C on D (see Definition 3.1) is rational if there exists a binary
relation R on X such that C(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S, (x, y) ∈ R}, for any set of alternatives
S ∈ D. That is, the choice is made by the optimization of a preference relation.
When the preference relation R is an ordering, we speak of complete or full rationality, or
we say that the choice function C is completely or full rational.
If the preference relation R is quasi-transitive, we say that the choice function C is quasi-
transitive rational.
If the relation R is acyclic, we say that the choice function C is acyclic rational.
Definition 3.9. Let X be a set of alternatives and
C1 : D → P(X) and C2 : D′ → P(X)
two choice functions with domains D and D′ respectively in such a way that C1(D) ⊆ D′. We
define the composition of C1 with C2 and write
C2 ◦ C1 : D → P(X)
as the choice function C such that:
A ∈ D ⇒ C(A) = (C2 ◦ C1)(A) = C2(C1(A)).
As we have mentioned above our aim in this section is the inspection of the ratio-
nality properties of the composition of two choice functions. The analysis depends both
on the properties of each factor and the structure of the domain they are defined on. We
proceed considering different classes of domains in two different subsections.
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3.3.1 Choice functions on domains containing all the finite and nonempty
subsets of the set of alternatives
In this subsection we deal with domainsD that contains all the finite and nonempty sets
of the set of alternatives. Some results are also true if we consider domains containing
only all the subsets with two and three elements of the set of alternatives (see Sen (1971)
and Suzumura (1983)), but for the sake of simplicity we refrain from distinguishing
these situations.
The order in our exposition is the following. We state the rationality characterization
theorems, beginning with the result that characterizes the full rationality and followed
by the subsequent theorem for the quasi-transitivity rationality. Then the theorem that
characterizes acyclicity rationality (⇔ rationality) is presented. After each case we study
the possible preservation of the properties involved by the operation of composition and
when possible, we state the corresponding theorem of rationality of the compound func-
tion. We consider not only compound functions of rational choice functions in the same
sense (both full, quasi-transitive or acyclic rational at the same time), but also when one
of them is, for example, full rational, and the other only quasi-transitive rational, etc. We
give examples for those cases in which the properties verified by the initial functions are
not verified by the compound function of them.
To begin with we present the characterization theorem for full rational choice func-
tions.
Theorem 3.1 (Arrow 1959). A choice function C overD is full rational if and only if it satisfies
Arrow’s axiom.
Wenow recall some results about the properties verified by a compound choice func-
tion that Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) have stated.
Theorem 3.2. Let us denote by K, H, C, O (as in Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995)) the domains
of choice functions that verify Arrow’s axiom, the Chernoff condition, the Concordance property
and the IIA property respectively. Then:
• The domain K is closed unconditionally under the composition of choice functions. Oppo-
site, none of the domains H, C, O, H∩C, H∩O, C∩O, H∩C∩O is closed unconditionally
with respect to the composition of choice functions.
• If C1 ∈K, then if C2 ∈H, C, O, H∩C, H∩O, C∩O or H∩C∩O, we have that C2 ◦ C1 ∈H,
C, O, H∩C, H∩O, C∩O or H∩C ∩O respectively.
These results are not true if we interchange C1 and C2 above.
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Remark 3.5. Though the compound function of two choice functions that verify the Cher-
noff condition does not necessarily verifies such property, we prove below (Remark 3.9)
that such compound function satisfies a weaker property that we call property P. 
From Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 we conclude that the choice function that results of the
composition of two full rational choice functions is also full rational in the classical sense
as is established in the next corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined on domains D and D′ that contain all
the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that C1(D) ⊆ D′. If C1 and
C2 are both full rational (or, which is equivalent, satisfy Arrow’s axiom), then C = C2 ◦ C1 is full
rational.
In Suzumura (1983) and Sen (1971) we find the next equivalences that establish the
full rationality of a choice function with some other properties different to (but equiva-
lent to in these domains) Arrow’s axiom.
Theorem 3.3. Let C be a choice function on a choice space containing all the finite and nonempty
subsets of a set of alternatives X. The next properties of C are mutually equivalent:
i) Full rationality.
ii) Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference.
iii) Strong axiom of revealed preference.
iv) Weak axiom of revealed preference.
v) Arrow’s axiom.
From Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 we obtain the next result that establishes the full
rationality of the composition of two choice functions when both of them verify full
rationality.
Corollary 3.2. Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined on choice spaces D and D′ (respec-
tively) that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that
C1(D) ⊆ D′. Then we have:
i) If C1 and C2 are full rational, then C2 ◦ C1 is full rational.
ii) If C1 and C2 verify Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference, then C2 ◦ C1 also verifies it,
and so it is full rational.
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iii) If C1 and C2 verify the strong axiom of revealed preference, then C2 ◦ C1 also verifies it, and
so it is full rational.
iv) If C1 and C2 verify the weak axiom of revealed preference, then C2 ◦ C1 also verifies it, and
so it is full rational.
Let us continue with the same study, but now for quasi-transitive rational choice
functions. We begin recalling the characterization theorem for this case due to Blair
(1976).
Theorem 3.4 (Blair et al. 1976, p. 367). A choice function C on a space that contains all the
finite and nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives is quasi-transitive rational if and only if it
verifies the properties: Chernoff condition, superset and binariness.
We know (see Theorem 3.2) that if C1 verifies the Arrow’s axiom and C2 verifies the
Chernoff condition, the choice function C = C2 ◦ C1 satisfies the Chernoff condition too.
We now study what happens when we pick C2 satisfying the superset property or the
binariness property and C1 fulfils the Arrow’s axiom or weaker properties. We obtain
that both properties are preserved in such situation as the next propositions state.
Proposition 3.3. Let C1 and C2 be choice functions respectively defined on domains D and
D′ that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that
C1(D) ⊆ D′. If C1 verifies the Arrow’s axiom and C2 the superset property, then the choice
function C2 ◦ C1 verifies the superset property.
Proof. Let us suppose that S and T are subsets of alternatives in D and
S ⊆ T and (C2 ◦ C1)(T) ⊆ (C2 ◦ C1)(S).
We have to prove that (C2 ◦ C1)(S) = (C2 ◦ C1)(T).
C1 verifies the Arrow’s axiom so that C1(T) ∩ S = C1(S), and then C1(S) ⊆ C1(T).
By assumption we have
C2 (C1(T)) ⊆ C2 (C1(S))
and also that C2 verifies the superset property. We can conclude then
(C2 ◦ C1)(S) = (C2 ◦ C1)(T).
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Proposition 3.4. Let D and D′ be two domains containing all the finite and nonempty subsets
of the sets of alternatives. Let C1 be a choice function defined on D that verifies the binariness
property and the Chernoff condition, and moreover C1(D) ⊆ D′. If C2 is a choice function
defined on D′ that verifies the binariness property, then the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1
verifies the binariness property.
Proof. We have to prove that for any S ∈ D
x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S⇒ x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(S).
From the assumptions we have that x ∈ C1({x, y}) ∀y ∈ S, and we know that C1
verifies the binariness property, thus we obtain x ∈ C1(S).
Since C2 verifies the binariness property too we have
x ∈ C2({x, z}) ∀z ∈ C1(S)⇒ x ∈ C2(C1(S)).
Then we are done if we prove that for any z ∈ C1(S), x ∈ C2({x, z}) holds true. Indeed:
z ∈ C1(S) implies, because of C1 verifies the Chernoff condition, z ∈ C1({x, z}), for
all x ∈ S.
Because x ∈ C1({x, y}) for all y ∈ S, we can conclude
C1({x, z}) = {x, z} for any z ∈ C1(S) and x ∈ S.
From x ∈ C2(C1({x, y})) ∀y ∈ S we obtain, in particular
x ∈ C2(C1({x, z})) = C2({x, z}) ∀z ∈ C1(S),
and from this and the fact that C2 verifies the binariness property, we obtain x ∈ (C2 ◦
C1)(S), which concludes the proof.
From Theorem 3.4 and Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 we obtain the next result that estab-
lishes the quasi-transitive rationality of the compound choice function of a full rational
choice function with a quasi-transitive one.
Corollary 3.3. Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined on domains D and D′ that contain
all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that C1(D) ⊆ D′. If
C1 is full rational and C2 is quasi-transitive rational, then the choice function C = C2 ◦ C1 is
quasi-transitive rational.
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Proof. C1 verifies the Chernoff condition and the binariness property because it ver-
ifies the Arrow’s axiom and those properties are implied by it (see Remarks 3.1 and
3.2). From Theorem 3.2 we know that C2 ◦ C1 satisfies the Chernoff condition and from
Proposition 3.3 we have that C2 ◦ C1 verifies the superset property. As Proposition 3.4
establishes that C2 ◦ C1 also verifies the binariness property, we conclude that it is quasi-
transitive rational.
We do not need to study the composition in the reverse order (C1 verifying the su-
perset property or the binariness property, and C2 verifying the Arrow’s axiom) because
we know that in this case the Chernoff condition is not preserved, thus the compound
function can be neither full rational nor quasi-transitive rational.
Next we study the composition of two quasi-transitive choice functions. In this case
the compound choice function has not to be necessarily quasi-transitive rational.
Proposition 3.5. Let C1 and C2 choice functions defined respectively on domainsD andD′ that
contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that C1(D) ⊆ D′.
Let us suppose that C1 and C2 are quasi-transitive rational choice functions. Then C = C2 ◦ C1
does not necessarily verify the superset property thus it is not necessarily a quasi-transitive
rational choice function.
The next example proves this proposition.
Example 3.1. Let us consider the set X = {x, y, z, t}. We define the next choice function
on P∗(X) :
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({x, t}) = {t}
C1({y, z}) = {y, z}
C1({y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C1({x, y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({x, z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({y, z, t}) = {y, z, t}
C1({x, y, z, t}) = {y, z, t}.
C1 verifies the property γ (and therefore the binariness property), the Chernoff condition
and the superset property.
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We define now C2 on P∗(X) according to:
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({y, z}) = {y, z}
C2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C2({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C2({x, y, z, t} = {x, y, z}.
C2 also verifies the property γ, the Chernoff condition and the superset property.
Then we have that C = C2 ◦ C1 is given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {t}
C({y, z}) = {y, z}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C({x, y, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {y, z}
and it does not verify the superset property because C({x, z, t}) = {z} $ C({x, z}). 3
From Proposition 3.4 we obtain the weaker result that states that the compound
choice function of two quasi-transitive rational choice functions verifies the binariness
property.
Proposition 3.6. Let C be a choice function on a domain containing all the finite subsets of a set
of alternatives X. If C is the compound function of two quasi-transitive rational choice functions,
then C verifies the binariness property.
Finally we set the conditions for a choice function to be acyclic rational or, which is
equivalent, rational.
Theorem 3.5 (Blair et al. 1976). A choice function on a domain containing all the finite and
nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X is acyclic rational (⇔ is rational (Suzumura (1983),
page 35)3) if and only if it verifies the Chernoff condition and the binariness property.
Using again Proposition 3.4 and Theorem 3.2 we conclude directly from Theorem
3.5 the acyclic rationality of a compound choice function that results of the composition
of a full rational choice function with an acyclic rational choice function.
3The same text establishes that this property is not true for choice functions on general domains.
3.3. Rationality properties of a compound choice function 81
Corollary 3.4. Let C1 and C2 be choice functions defined respectively on domainsD andD′ that
contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that C1(D) ⊆
D′. Let C1 be full rational and let C2 be acyclic rational. Then, the compound choice function
C = C2 ◦ C1 is acyclic rational (or equivalently it is rational).
Moreover if we compound two quasi-transitive rational choice functions we obtain
a choice function that is not necessarily acyclic rational, because it may not verify the
Chernoff condition as the next example proves.
Example 3.2. Let us consider the choice functions defined by the expressions
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({x, t}) = {x, t}
C1({y, z}) = {y}
C1({y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C1({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C1({x, z, t}) = {x, z, t}
C1({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
and C1({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
and
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({y, z}) = {y, z}
C2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C2({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
and C2({x, y, z, t} = {x, y, z}
that verify the binariness property (in fact, the stronger property γ), the Chernoff con-
dition and the superset property.
Then the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1 is given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
and C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
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and it does not verify the Chernoff condition because
{x, z, t} ⊆ {x, y, z, t}
but
C({x, y, z, t}) ∩ {x, z, t} = {x, t} * {x, z} = C({x, z, t}).
3
This example entails that the composition of two acyclic rational choice functions
may not be an acyclic rational choice function.
Proposition 3.7. If C1 and C2 are choice functions respectively defined on domains D and D′
that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of a set of alternatives X, and such that C1(D) ⊆
D′, that verify the Chernoff condition and the binariness property, then the compound function
C2 ◦ C1 may not verify the Chernoff condition (Example 3.2), thus it may not be acyclic rational
(⇔ rational). That means that the compound choice function of two acyclic rational (⇔ rational)
choice functions is not necessarily rational.
From Proposition 3.4 we can conclude the weaker result that states that when we
compound two acyclic rational choice functions we obtain a choice function that verifies
the binariness property (just as in the case of two quasi-transitive choice functions, as
Proposition 3.6 establishes).
Proposition 3.8. Let C be a choice function over a domain containing all the finite and nonempty
subsets of a set of alternatives X. If C is the compound function of two acyclic rational (rational)
choice functions, then C verifies the binariness property.
3.3.2 Choice functions defined on arbitrary domains
Throughout this subsection we do not impose any restriction on the domains under
inspection. In particular, they may not contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of
the set of alternatives.
The organization of this subsection is alike the previous one. First, we state the char-
acterization theorems of rationality for choice functions. Then we consider two choice
functions verifying different properties of rationality and study when the compound
function of them verifies such properties. When it is possible we state the correspond-
ing result of rationality of the compound choice function.
We begin with an analysis of full rationality. We make use of the following charac-
terization.
3.3. Rationality properties of a compound choice function 83
Theorem 3.6 (Suzumura 1977). A choice function over a domain D is full rational if and only
if it satisfies Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference.
Now we proceed to study the behavior of the compound choice function of two full
rational choice function on these domains. First of all we prove that the condition of full
rationality is preserved when we compound two choice functions that verify it.
Proposition 3.9. If two choice functions C1, defined on an arbitrary domain D, and C2, defined
on an arbitrary domain D′ such that C1(D) ⊆ D′, satisfy Houthakker’s axiom of revealed
preference, then the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1 satisfies Houthakker’s axiom of revealed
preference.
Proof. Let us suppose that C1 and C2 have not H-cycles and that nevertheless C = C2 ◦ C1
has anH-cycle. This implies that there exists a finite sequence of alternatives {x1, . . . , xt}
with t > 2 such that:
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C, (xi, xi+1) ∈ RC i = 2, . . . , t− 1 and (xt, x1) ∈ RC.
So we obtain:
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C ⇒ ∃S ∈ D : x1, x2 ∈ S, x1 ∈ C(S) and x2 ∈ S \ C(S) (3.1)
(xi, xi+1) ∈ RC ⇒ ∃Si ∈ D : xi, xi+1 ∈ Si and xi ∈ C(Si) ∀i = 2, . . . , t− 1 (3.2)
and
(xt, x1) ∈ RC ⇒ ∃St ∈ D : xt, x1 ∈ St and xt ∈ C(St) (3.3)
From equation (3.1) we have:




Case 1: x2 6∈ C1(S), or
Case 2: x2 ∈ C1(S) \ C2(C1(S))
Case 1: (x1, x2) ∈ R∗C1 .
From equation (3.2) we conclude that for all i = 2, . . . , t − 1 there exists Si ∈ D
such that xi, xi+1 ∈ Si and xi ∈ C1(Si), thus (xi, xi+1) ∈ RC1 , ∀i = 2, . . . , t− 1. From
(3.3) we have that there exists St ∈ D such that x1, xt ∈ St and xt ∈ C1(St) thus
(xt, x1) ∈ RC1 . Therefore we obtain that C1 has an H-cycle, and we conclude.
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Case 2: (x1, x2) ∈ RC1 , (x2, x1) ∈ RC1 and (x1, x2) ∈ R∗C2 (because x1 ∈ C2(C1(S)) and
x2 ∈ C1(S) \ C2(C1(S))where S ∈ D and then C1(S) ∈ D′). Now we deal with two
different possibilities:
i) If xi+1 ∈ C1(Si) ∀i = 2, . . . , t− 1 (and recalling that xi, xi+1 ∈ Si with Si ∈ D)
we obtain (xi, xi+1) ∈ RC2 , i = 2, . . . , t − 1, because xi ∈ C2(C1(Si)) as equation
(3.2) establishes. If we also have x1 ∈ C1(St), equation (3.3) implies that xt ∈
C2(C1((St)), and we conclude the existence of an H-cycle for C2, which ends the
argument.
ii) If xi+1 6∈ C1(Si) for some i = 2, . . . , t− 1, we obtain that (xi, xi+1) ∈ R∗C1 and
(xi, xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xn, x1, x2, . . . , xi−1)
is an H-cycle of C1 which finishes the proof.
In case that it is x1 6∈ C1(St), (xt, x1, . . . , xt−1) is an H-cycle for C1 and the proof
also concludes.
Thus we can establish the full rationality of a compound choice function of two full
rational choice functions over arbitrary domains.
Corollary 3.5. If C1 and C2 are choice functions defined on arbitrary domains D and D′ re-
spectively and such that C1(D) ⊆ D′, and both of them satisfy Houthaker’s axiom of revealed
preference, then the compound choice function C2 ◦ C1 is full rational. Equivalently: if two choice
functions are full rational, their compound function is also full rational.
Because of the equivalence between the Houthaker’s axiom and the Hansson’s ax-
iom we also have the same result for this property.
Corollary 3.6. If C1 and C2 are choice functions defined on arbitrary domains D and D′ re-
spectively such that C1(D) ⊆ D′, and both of them satisfy the Hansson’s axiom of the revealed
preference (which is equivalent to saying that both functions satisfy the Houtaker’s axiom of the
revealed preference, and then equivalent to saying that both functions are full rational), then the
compound choice function C2 ◦ C1 is full rational.
Let us now continue with the case of quasi-transitive rational choice functions, for
which we have the next result.
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Theorem 3.7 (Suzumura 1983, p. 50). A choice function C on a space of choice is quasi-
transitive rational if it satisfies the strong axiom of revealed preference.
When we study if the sufficient condition of quasi-transitive rationality (the strong
axiom of revealed preference) is preserved by the composition of two choice functions
(defined on arbitrary domains) we obtain that the answer is negative, as the next propo-
sition establishes.
Proposition 3.10. If two choice functions C1, defined on an arbitrary domainD, and C2, defined
on an arbitrary domain D′ such that C1(D) ⊆ D′, satisfy the strong axiom of revealed prefer-
ence, then the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1 does not necessarily satisfy the strong axiom of
revealed preference.
Next example proves this proposition.
Example 3.3. Let X = {x, y, z, t} and the domain of choice D = {{x, y}, {y, z}, {z, t},
{x, t}} and over it we define a choice function C1 as
C1({x, y}) = {x}
C1({y, z}) = {y, z}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, t}) = {t}
Nowwe consider the domain D′ = {{x, y}, {y, z}, {z, t}, {x, t}, {x}, {t}} and over it we
define a choice function C2 as
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({y, z}) = {y}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({x}) = {x}
C2({t}) = {t}
We have that C1(D) ⊆ D′ thus we can define over D the choice function C = C2 ◦ C1
that is given by
C({x, y}) = {x}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, t}) = {t}
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As we can observe, C1 and C2 have not any SH-cycles therefore both of them verify the
strong axiom of revealed preference, but {x, y, z, t} is an SH-cycle for C. 3
Therefore if we compose two choice functions that verify the strong axiom of re-
vealed preference, we obtain a choice function that may not be quasi-transitive rational.
We also have that if C1 (over an arbitrary domain D) has not SH-cycles (which im-
plies that it is quasitransitive rational) and C2 (over an arbitrary domain D′ such that
C1(D) ⊆ D′) is full rational (it verifies the Houthaker’s axiom of revealed preference),
then the choice function C = C2 ◦ C1 does not necessarily satisfy the strong axiom of
revealed preference, thus it is not necessarily quasi-transitive rational or full rational.
This is proved considering in Example 3.3 above, the choice function C ′2 defined as
C ′2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C ′2({y, z}) = {y}
C ′2({z, t}) = {z}
C ′2({x, t}) = {x}
C ′2({x}) = {x}
C ′2({t}) = {t}
in place of C2. In this case {x, y, z, t} is also an SH-cycle for C ′2 ◦ C1.
If we consider the reverse statement, that is, C1 verifies Houthaker’s axiom of re-
vealed preference (it is full rational) and C2 verifies the strong axiom of revealed pref-
erence (which implies that it is quasi-transitive rational), then the compound choice
function C = C2 ◦ C1 may not verify the Houthaker’s axiom of revealed preference and
then it is not necessarily full rational as the next example shows.
Example 3.4. Let X = {x, y, z, t} and the domain of choice D = {{x, y}, {x, z}, {z, t},
{x, y, t}} and define a choice function C1 on D by
C1({x, y}) = {x}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, t}) = {x, t}
Nowwe consider the domainD′ = {{x, y}, {x, z}, {z, t}, {x, t}, {x, y, t}, {x}} and define
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a choice function C2 on D′ by
C2({x, y}) = {x}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({z, t}) = {z, t}
C2({x, t}) = {t}
C2({x, y, t}) = {t}
C2({x}) = {x}
We have that C1(D) ⊆ D′ thus we can define the choice function C = C2 ◦ C1 over D
by
C({x, y}) = {x}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({z, t}) = {z, t}
C({x, y, t}) = {t}
As we can observe, C1 has no H-cycles (thus it has not SH-cycles, either) and C2 has not
any SH-cycles (it has H-cycles), but {t, x, z} is an H-cycle for C, thus it does not verify
Houthaker’s axiom of revealed preference and therefore it is not full rational. 3
Nevertheless, we have a positive result when we compound a full rational choice
function with a choice function that has not any SH-cycle (and then, it is quasi-transitive
rational). The result is a quasi-transitive rational choice function, as the next proposition
establishes.
Proposition 3.11. Let C1 be a choice function defined on an arbitrary domain D that has not
any H-cycle (⇔ is full rational) and C2 a choice function defined on a domain D′ such that
C1(D) ⊆ D′ and such that it has not any SH-cycle (which implies that C2 is quasi-transitive
rational). Then the compound choice function C = C2 ◦ C1 has not any SH-cycle, thus it is
quasi-transitive rational.
Proof. Let us suppose that C has an SH-cycle, hence there exists a finite sequence of
alternatives {x1, . . . , xt} such that
(x1, x2) ∈ RC, (xi, xi+1) ∈ R∗C i = 2, . . . , t− 1 and (xt, x1) ∈ R∗C
and we have the following assertions.
There exists S1 ∈ D such that x1, x2 ∈ S1 and x1 ∈ C(S1).
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For any i = 2, . . . , t− 1 there exists Si ∈ D such that xi, xi+1 ∈ Si, xi ∈ C(Si) and
xi+1 ∈ Si \ C(Si).
There exists St ∈ D such that xt, x1 ∈ St, xt ∈ C(St) and x1 ∈ St \ C(St).
From these facts we obtain
x1, x2 ∈ C1(S1), and xi ∈ C1(Si) ∀i = 2, . . . , t.
Moreover, xi+1 ∈ Si \ C(Si) for i = 2, . . . , t− 1 and x1 ∈ St \ C(St).
Now if xi+1 6∈ C1(Si) for some i = 2, . . . , t− 1, then {xi, xi+1, . . . , xt, x1, . . . , xi−1} is an
H-cycle for C1 which is against the hypothesis, and the same holds for {xt, x1, . . . , xi−1}
if x1 6∈ C1(St). Therefore
xi+1 ∈ C1(Si) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . t− 1, and x1 ∈ C1(St).
From here we conclude that {x1, x2, . . . , xt} is an SH-cycle for C2 which produces a
contradiction and finishes the proof.
We now continue with the case of acyclic rational choice functions. First we state the
characterization theorem for this type of rational choice functions.
Theorem 3.8 (Suzumura 1983, p. 51). A choice function defined on an arbitrary domain is
acyclic rational if it satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference and R∗C is acyclic.
Our next proposition studies the preservation of the sufficient properties for a choice
function to be acyclic rational by the operation of composition. The weak axiom of
revealed preference is preserved, however the acyclicity of R∗C is not.
Proposition 3.12. a) If C1 (defined on an arbitrary domain D) and C2 (defined on an arbi-
trary domain D′ such that C1(D) ⊆ D′) are two choice functions that verify the weak
axiom of the revealed preference, then the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1 also satisfies
this axiom.
b) If R∗C1 and R
∗
C2 are acyclic, then R
∗
C may not be acyclic, where C = C2 ◦ C1.
Proof. a) Because C1 and C2 satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference we have
that none of them has H-cycles of order two, that is:
If (x, y) ∈ R∗C1 ⇒ (y, x) 6∈ RC1 .
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If (x, y) ∈ R∗C2 ⇒ (y, x) 6∈ RC2 .
Let us now suppose that C has anH-cycle of order two, thus there exist alternatives
x, y such that (x, y) ∈ R∗C and (y, x) ∈ RC. Then
(x, y) ∈ R∗C ⇒ ∃S ∈ D : x, y ∈ S, x ∈ C(S) and y ∈ S \ C(S).
Therefore
x ∈ C(S) = C2(C1(S))⇒ x ∈ C1(S). (3.4)
Moreover
(y, x) ∈ RC ⇒ ∃S′ ∈ D : x, y ∈ S′ and y ∈ C(S′) = C2(C1(S′))
and therefore
y ∈ C1(S′)⇒ (y, x) ∈ RC1 . (3.5)
From y 6∈ C2(C1(S)), two cases arise:
(a) If y 6∈ C1(S) we conclude, because in that case we have by (3.4) that (x, y) ∈
R∗C1 , and also by (3.5) that (y, x) ∈ RC1 , which contradicts the fact that C1
verifies the weak axiom of revealed preference.
(b) If y ∈ C1(S), as y 6∈ C2(C1(S)) we obtain that (x, y) ∈ R∗C2 by (3.4).
Moreover we have that x, y ∈ S′ and y ∈ C2(C1(S′)), and then
b.1) If x ∈ C1(S′)we finish, because in that case (y, x) ∈ RC2 , thus C2 does
not verify the weak axiom of revealed preference.
b.2) If x 6∈ C1(S′) we obtain from (3.5) that (y, x) ∈ R∗C1 , but C1 verifies
the weak axiom of revealed preference and this implies (x, y) 6∈ RC1 which
contradicts the fact that x ∈ C1(S) and y ∈ S.
b) The next example proves this part.
Example 3.5. Let us consider the choice functions on the set of finite and nonempty
subsets of the set {x1, x2, x3} given by:
C1({x1, x2}) = {x1}
C1({x1, x3}) = {x1, x3}
C1({x2, x3}) = {x2}
C1({x1, x2, x3} = {x1, x2, x3}
⇒
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C1
(x1, x3) ∈ RC1 and (x3, x1) ∈ RC1
(x2, x3) ∈ R∗C1
(x2, x1) ∈ RC1 and (x3, x2) ∈ RC1
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C2({x1, x2}) = {x1}
C2({x1, x3}) = {x3}
C2({x2, x3}) = {x2, x3}
C2({x1, x2, x3} = {x1, x2, x3}
⇒
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C2
(x3, x1) ∈ R∗C2
(x2, x3) ∈ RC2 and (x3, x2) ∈ RC2
(x2, x1) ∈ RC2 and (x1, x3) ∈ RC2 .
R∗C1 and R
∗
C2 are acyclic. Let us consider the compound function C = C2 ◦ C1,
defined as:
C({x1, x2}) = {x1}
C({x1, x3}) = {x3}
C({x2, x3}) = {x2}
C({x1, x2, x3} = {x1, x2, x3}
⇒
(x1, x2) ∈ R∗C
(x3, x1) ∈ R∗C
(x2, x3) ∈ R∗C.
We have that (x1, x2, x3) is a cycle for R∗C and so C is not acyclic. 3
As we have shown above, when we compound two choice functions C1 and C2 (re-
spectively defined on general domains D and D′ such that C1(D) ⊆ D′) verifying the
weak axiom of revealed preference and such that R∗C1 and R
∗
C2 are acyclic, we can obtain
a choice function that is not acyclic rational.
Contrary to this discouraging situation we have a positive result when we com-
pound a full rational choice function with another one that verifies the weaker axiom of
revealed preference and that R∗C is acyclic. In such a case we obtain an acyclic rational
choice function as the next proposition proves.
Proposition 3.13. Let C1 be a full rational choice function on an arbitrary domainD (⇔ C1 has
not H-cycles) and C2 a choice function on an arbitrary domain D′ (such that C1(D) ⊆ D′) that
verifies the weak axiom of revealed preference and such that R∗C2 is acyclic (which implies that C2
is acyclic rational). Then C = C2 ◦ C1 is also acyclic rational.
Proof. It is clear from Proposition 3.12 that C = C2 ◦ C1 verifies the weak axiom of
revealed preference.
Let us see that R∗C is acyclic.
Otherwise, there exists a finite set of alternatives {x1, . . . , xt} such that
(xi, xi+1) ∈ P(R∗C) ∀i = 1, . . . , t− 1 and (xt, x1) ∈ P(R∗C)
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where P(R∗C) is the strict preference relation associated to R
∗
C .
From this we obtain that for all i = 1, . . . , t− 1 there exists Si ∈ D such that xi, xi+1 ∈
Si, xi ∈ C(Si) and xi+1 ∈ Si \ C(Si), and there exists St ∈ D such that xt, x1 ∈ St,
xt ∈ C(St) and x1 ∈ St \ C(St).
Then we have
xi ∈ C2(C1(Si)) and xi+1 6∈ C2(C1(Si)) ∀i = 1, . . . , t− 1
and
xt ∈ C2(C1(St)) and x1 6∈ C2(C1(St)).
If xi+1 6∈ C1(Si) for some i = 1, . . . , t − 1, then {xi, xi+1, . . . , xt, x1, . . . , xi−1} is an
H-cycle for C1 against the hypothesis, and the same would be true for {xt, x1, . . . , xt−1}
if x1 6∈ C1(St). Therefore xi, xi+1 ∈ C1(Si) for all i = 1, . . . , t− 1, and in the same way
xt, x1 ∈ C1(St).
We conclude that (xi, xi+1) ∈ R∗C2 for all i = 1, . . . , t− 1, and (xt, x1) ∈ R∗C2 . Because
C2 verifies the weak axiom of revealed preference we obtain that (xi+1, xi) 6∈ R∗C2 for
all i = 1, . . . , t − 1 and (x1, xt) 6∈ R∗C2 . This implies that (xi, xi+1) ∈ P(RC∗2 ) for all
i = 1, . . . , t− 1 and (xt, x1) ∈ P(RC∗2 ) which is not possible because R∗C2 is acyclic, and
the proof concludes.
Remark 3.6. Proposition 3.13 remains true if we interchange the properties of C1 and C2
and reinforce Houthaker’s axiom to the strong axiom of revealed preference. We omit
the proof because it is essentially the same as the one for Proposition 3.13 above. 
Finally we state the conditions for a choice function over an arbitrary domain to be
rational.
Theorem 3.9 (Suzumura 1983, p. 51). A choice function C is rational if it satisfies the weak
axiom of revealed preference.
Because of Proposition 3.12 a) we conclude that the composition of two choice func-
tions that verify the weak axiom of revealed preference is a rational choice function too.
Corollary 3.7. If C1 and C2 are choice functions (defined on arbitrary domains D and D′ re-
spectively such that C1(D) ⊆ D′) that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference, then the
compound choice function C2 ◦ C1 is rational.
As the strong axiom of revealed preference is implied by Houthakker’s axiom and
implies the weak axiom of revealed preference (Proposition 3.2) we obtain that when
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two choice functions verify either Houthakker’s axiom, the strong axiom of revealed
preference or the weak axiom of revealed preference, then their compound function is
rational.
3.4 Choice functions rational by two sequential criteria
This far we have considered choice functions that are rational in some way depending
on the properties that they verify and the domains they are defined over.
Besides we have focused on the composition of two choice functions and studied
when the properties verified by two choice functions are transferred to the compound
function of them. As corollaries we have obtained some results that include different
conditions for a compound choice function to be rational.
Nowwe take the reverse position. Along this section we consider the problem of the
decomposition of a given choice function with respect to some rational (in the classical
sense) choice functions. That is, the choice made by the decision-maker for any set of
alternatives is our primitive concept. We investigate if such behavior can be explained
by the sequential application of two “rational” choice functions in an established order:
given a choice function, we wonder if there exist two (full, acyclic, quasi-transitive,...)
rational choice functions such that their compound function produces the choice that
we had observed. Of course the case when the primitive choice function is already
“rational” has been studied before.
Our main finding is Theorem 3.11 that characterizes the choice functions that can
be expressed as the composition of two rational choice functions using two testable
properties. One of these properties is property γ and the other one is introduced below
(see Definition 3.12).
Along this section we always deal with choice functions defined over domains that
contain all the finite and nonempty sets of the set of alternatives.
First we introduce the “upper and lower approximations of a choice function” (Aiz-
erman and Aleskerov (1995)), that intend to approximate a non rational choice function
by a rational one. To that purpose we introduce the next definitions.
Definition 3.10. Let C be a choice function on D. The upper approximation of C in the class of
choice functions on D satisfying certain properties is another choice function Cu on D in that
class such that C(S) ⊆ Cu(S) for any S ∈ D, and such that if C¯ is another choice function on
D in the same class and verifying that C(S) ⊆ C¯(S) for all S ∈ D, it must be Cu(S) ⊆ C¯(S)
for all S ∈ D.
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Definition 3.11. Let C be a choice function on D. The lower approximation of C in the class of
choice functions on D satisfying certain properties is another choice function C l on D such that
C l(S) ⊆ C(S) for any S ∈ D, and such that if C¯ is another choice function on D in the same
class and verifying that C¯(S) ⊆ C(S) for all S ∈ D, it must be C¯(S) ⊆ C l(S) for all S ∈ D.
In both definitions we say that the functions Cu and C l are in a class Q if they verify
the properties of all the functions in such class.
The next result (Theorem 5.15 in Aizerman andAleskerov (1995)) settles which choice
functions can be approximated by choice functions verifying the properties γ and Cher-
noff.
Theorem 3.10. For any choice function C there exists an upper approximation that verifies the
Chernoff condition and the binariness property (in fact it verifies property γ) and this function
is given by
Cu(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S there exists S′ ∈ D such that x, y ∈ S′ and x ∈ C(S′)}.
Moreover if the choice function C verifies the binariness property, it also has a lower approxima-
tion that is defined as
C l(S) = {x ∈ S : x ∈ C({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S}
and that also satisfies the Chernoff condition and the binariness property.
We stress the fact that for any choice function C on a domain DD verifying the bina-
riness property, the choice functions C l and Cu defined above satisfy that for all S ∈ D
C l(S) ⊆ C(S) ⊆ Cu(S).
Thus Cu(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D (remember that we have C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D
(Definition 3.1)). By virtue of Theorem 3.5 we conclude that Cu is rational.
The case of C l deserves an special remark.
Remark 3.7. The choice function that we have denoted C l verifies the binariness property
and also the Chernoff condition, but it must not verify that C l(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D (see
Example 3.8 bellow). Theorem 3.5 is a characterization theorem for choice functions C
satisfying that C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D, thus when C l verifies such property we can apply
that theorem and conclude that C l is also rational. Nevertheless, even when C l(S) may
be empty, we can find a binary relation Rl on the set of alternatives that rationalizes it.
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This relation Rl is defined by
xRly if and only if x ∈ C({x, y}).
Therefore C l is always rational.
Moreoverwe can always assure that for any subset S ∈ Dwith two elements C l(S) 6=
∅ because C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D and thus Rl is complete. 
Now let us introduce a new property for a choice function C on D.
Definition 3.12. A choice function C satisfies the Property P if given two elements x, y of the
set of alternatives and S, T ∈ D, in such a way that
{x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T,
then
if C({x, y}) = {x} and x ∈ C(T), it must be y 6∈ C(S).
This property is weaker than the Chernoff condition and thereforewhenever a choice
function is rational it verifies property P. On the other hand this property allows for
cyclical patterns even in pairwise comparisons.
The next example shows that if a choice function satisfies property P it must verify
neither binariness property nor the Chernoff condition, which are the two necessary
and sufficient conditions for a choice function over a domain containing all the finite
and nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives to be rational.
Example 3.6. Let C be a choice function defined on the domain of nonempty subsets of
X = {x, y, z, t} given by
C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z, t}
C({x, y, z}) = {y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
This function does not verify the binariness property because x 6∈ C({x, y, z}) and x ∈
C({x, y}) and x ∈ C({x, z}).
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Moreover it does not verify the Chernoff condition because C({x, y, z, t})∩{x, y, z}) =
{x, y} * C({x, y, z}).
Nonetheless C verifies property P. 3
Nevertheless we now prove that a choice function verifying property P can be writ-
ten as the composition of two rational functions. We formalize this concept in the next
definition.
Definition 3.13. A choice function C on D is rational by two sequential criteria if there
exist two rational choice functions C1 defined on D and C2 on D′ with C1(D) ⊆ D′, such that
C = C2 ◦ C1.
Obviously, if C is a rational choice function then it is rational by two sequential cri-
teria by considering, for example, C1 = C and C2 the trivial choice function (C2(S) = S
for all S ∈ D′).
We first prove a lemma that leads us to consider an initial choice function C that
verifies property γ.
Lemma 3.1. If C1 and C2 are choice functions (defined respectively on domains D and D′ that
contain all the finite and nonempty sets of the set of alternatives and such that C1(D) ⊆ D′) that
verify the Chernoff condition and the binariness property, then the compound function C2 ◦ C1
verifies property γ.
Proof. Let {Si}i∈I a collection of subsets of alternatives in D. We must prove that
x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(Si), ∀i ∈ I ⇒ x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(∪i∈ISi).
We know that
x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(Si), ∀i ∈ I ⇒ x ∈ C1(Si) ∀i ∈ I.
Because C1 verifies the Chernoff condition we obtain that
x ∈ C1({x, y}) ∀y ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ I ⇔ x ∈ C1({x, y}) ∀y ∈ ∪i∈ISi,
and C1 satisfies the binariness property, thus we have
x ∈ C1(∪i∈ISi).
On the other hand we know that C2 verifies the Chernoff condition, and then
x ∈ C2(C1(Si)) ∀i ∈ I ⇒ x ∈ C2({x, y}) ∀y ∈ C1(Si) ∀i ∈ I.
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Thus applying that C2 verifies the binariness property we have
x ∈ C2(∪i∈IC1(Si)).
Taking into account now that C1 verifies the Chernoff condition we have
C1(∪i∈ISi) ⊆ ∪i∈IC1(Si).
Because
x ∈ C2(∪i∈IC1(Si)) ∩ C1(∪i∈ISi),
and C2 verifies the Chernoff condition we conclude that
x ∈ C2(C1(∪i∈ISi)) = (C2 ◦ C1)(∪i∈ISi)
which finishes the proof.
As we have already mentioned, if we want to obtain a choice function that may not
verify the necessary properties of rationality as the compound function of two rational
ones, in such way that both of them must verify the Chernoff condition and the bina-
riness property, we have to consider an initial choice function that verifies property γ.
Our next theorem proves that this property together with property P characterize such
functions.
Theorem 3.11. Let C be a choice function on a domain D that contains all the finite and
nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives. C is rational by two sequential criteria if and only if
it verifies properties γ and P.
Proof. We first prove that if C verifies properties P and γ, then it is rational by two
sequential criteria.
Indeed let C be a choice function defined on a domain D satisfying the mentioned
properties. Then we have by Theorem 3.10 that there exist an upper approximation
and a lower approximation of it which verify the Chernoff condition and the binariness
property (in fact they verify the stronger property γ), thus both of them are rational
choice functions in the classical sense (see Theorem 3.5 and Remark 3.7). We consider
these functions defined on the same domain D as C is defined on. Theorem 3.10 gives
their respective expressions:
Cu(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S there exists S′ ∈ D such that x, y ∈ S′ and x ∈ C(S′)}
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and
C l(S) = {x ∈ S : x ∈ C({x, y}), ∀y ∈ S}.
Let us now prove that C1 = Cu and C2 = C l satisfy C = C2 ◦ C1.
i) C(S) ⊆ (C2 ◦ C1)(S):
x ∈ C(S)⇒ x ∈ C1(S), because we can select S′ = S for all y ∈ S.
Let us now suppose that x 6∈ C2(C1(S)).
In this case there exists y ∈ C1(S) such that {y} = C({x, y}) because of the defini-
tion of C2.
From y ∈ C1(S) we obtain that for all s ∈ S there exists Sys such that y, s ∈ Sys and
y ∈ C(Sys).
As C verifies property γ we conclude that y ∈ C(∪s∈SSys).
Then we have
{x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ ∪
s∈S
Sys
with {y} = C({x, y}) and y ∈ C(∪s∈SSys).
Applying now that property P is verified by C we conclude that x 6∈ C(S), against
the hypothesis.
Therefore we conclude that x ∈ C2(C1(S)).
ii) C(S) ⊇ (C2 ◦ C1)(S):
Select x ∈ C2(C1(S)), thus by the definition of C2 we have that x ∈ C({x, y}) for all
y ∈ C1(S). In particular x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ C(S) (because C(S) ⊆ C1(S)). As
we have that C verifies property γ we conclude that x ∈ C(C(S)) ⊆ C(S).
Conversely, let us prove that if C is the compound choice function of two rational
choice functions, then C satisfies properties P and γ.
Let us denote by R1 and R2 the binary relations that rationalize C1 and C2 respec-
tively, i.e.,
C1(S) = {x ∈ S : (x, y) ∈ R1, ∀y ∈ S} = CR1(S)
and
C2(S) = {x ∈ S : (x, y) ∈ R2, ∀y ∈ S} = CR2(S),
and C(S) = C2(C1(S)) = CR2(CR1(S)).
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Let us now prove that C = C2 ◦ C1 verifies property γ.
Let {Si}i∈I be a collection of sets in the domain D such that x ∈ C(Si) for all i ∈ I.
We must prove that x ∈ C(⋃i∈I Si).
We have
x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I
and then
x ∈ CR1(Si) ∀i ∈ I
which implies
xR1y for all y ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I ⇒ xR1y ∀y ∈
⋃
i∈I




If x 6∈ CR2(CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si)), then there exists z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) such that ¬(xR2z).
But on the other hand x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I and z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) ⊆⋃
i∈I CR1(Si) thus z ∈ CR1(Si) for some i ∈ I and thus xR2z, which leads to a contra-
diction.
To end the proof we argue that C satisfies property P.
We take
{x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T
such that
{x} = (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}) and x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(T).
We prove that y 6∈ C(S).
Indeed let us now suppose that y ∈ C(S). Then we have
(y, s) ∈ R1 for all s ∈ S and (y, s′) ∈ R2 for all s′ ∈ S such that s′R1s for all s ∈ S.
As we also have that x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(T) we obtain that
(x, t) ∈ R1 for all t ∈ T.
We deduce that, in particular
i) (y, x) ∈ R1 because x ∈ S and (x, y) ∈ R1 because y ∈ T, and
ii) (y, x) ∈ R2 because xR1t for all t ∈ T and S ⊆ T.
Thus
CR1({x, y}) = {x, y} and y ∈ CR2({x, y}) = C({x, y})
which contradicts the hypothesis.
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The next remark gives a different proof for the fact that the composition of two ra-
tional choice functions, both of them verifying that the choice is never empty, verifies
properties P and γ without using the binary relations, but only with the properties ver-
ified by C1 and C2.
Remark 3.8. We can give a proof of the necessary condition of Theorem 3.11 when we
suppose that both rational choice functions verify the condition of not making an empty
choice for any subset of alternatives.
If C = C2 ◦ C1 where C1 and C2 are rational, they both verify the Chernoff condition
and the binariness property. We conclude from Lemma 3.1 that C satisfies property γ.
Let us now prove that C satisfies property P.
We take
{x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T
such that
{x} = (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}) and x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(T).
We have to prove that y 6∈ C(S). We proceed by contradiction.
Let us suppose that
y ∈ C(S) = (C2 ◦ C1)(S)
and therefore
y ∈ C1(S).
C1 verifies the Chernoff condition thus it must be y ∈ C1({s, y}) for all s ∈ S, in particular
y ∈ C1({x, y}).
From {x} = (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}) we obtain that x ∈ C1({x, y}) too, thus we conclude
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}.
Then we have
{x} = (C2 ◦ C1)({x, y}) = C2({x, y}). (3.6)
Moreover x ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)(T)⇒ x ∈ C1(T).
Because C1 satisfies the Chernoff condition it must be true that x ∈ C1(S) and then
{x, y} ⊆ C1(S).
The facts that y ∈ C2(C1(S)) and C2 verifies the Chernoff condition entail y ∈ C2({x, y})
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which contradicts equation (3.6) and ends the argument. 
Remark 3.9. In Remark 3.8 above we have not used the fact that the choice functions C1
and C2 verify the binariness property, and thus we have proved the next result:
If C1 and C2 are two choice functions that verify the Chernoff condition, then C2 ◦ C1
satisfies property P.
Recall (Theorem 3.2) that when the two initial choice functions satisfy the Chernoff
condition, the compound function of them must not verify it. We have reinforced the
analysis by proving that at least it verifies the weaker property P. 
As a corollary we can obtain the case of single-valued choice functions that has been
studied by Manzini and Mariotti (2007). For such case property P becomes
{x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T such that {x} = C({x, y}) and {x} = C(T)⇒ {y} 6= C(S)
which is exactly the property that Manzini and Mariotti use (together with property γ)
for characterizing “single-valued choice functions rationalized by two rationales”. In
fact they consider in property P the strict inclusions {x, y} ⊂ S ⊂ T, but when we
deal with single-valued choice functions, S = T implies obviously that C(T) = {x} ⇒
C(S) 6= {y}, and if {x, y} = S then C({x, y}) = {x} = C(S) ⇒ {y} 6= C(S). Moreover
their approach is different in the sense that they consider that a choice function C is
rational when there exists an acyclic binary relation P such that C(S) = {x ∈ S|@y ∈
S for which (y, x) ∈ P} instead of the definition of rational choice function that we use
(see Definition 3.8), and they obtain asymmetric binary relations, property that is not
verified by the relations that we obtain in the proof of Theorem 3.11.
The next example illustrates our result (Theorem 3.11) and at the same time proves
that a choice function that verifies the two properties in the hypothesis of such Theo-
rem 3.11 must not verify the Chernoff condition, thus it must not be a rational choice
function.
Moreover we see that a choice function rational by two sequential criteria can be
decomposed as the composition of two rational choice functions in more than one way.
Example 3.7. Let X = {x, y, z, t} and we define the choice function C on P∗(X) as:
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C({x, y}) = {x, y}
C({x, z}) = {x, z}
C({x, t}) = {x, t}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({y, t}) = {y, t}
C({z, t}) = {z}
C({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
This choice function satisfies property γ and property P. It does not satisfy the Cher-
noff condition ({x, z, t} ⊆ {x, y, z, t} but C({x, y, z, t}) ∩ {x, z, t} = {x, t} * {x, z} =
C({x, z, t})).
The rational choice functions C1 and C2 such that C = C2 ◦ C1 are defined in this way
following the line given in the proof of Theorem 3.11:
C1({x, y}) = {x, y}
C1({x, z}) = {x, z}
C1({x, t}) = {x, t}
C1({y, z}) = {y}
C1({y, t}) = {y, t}
C1({z, t}) = {z, t}
C1({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C1({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C1({x, z, t}) = {x, z, t}
C1({y, z, t}) = {y, t}
C1({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C2({y, z}) = {y}
C2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C2({z, t}) = {z}
C2({x, y, z}) = {x, y}
C2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C2({y, z, t}) = {y}
C2({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y}
It is direct to prove that C = C2 ◦ C1.
Nevertheless these choice functions C1 and C2 do not provide a unique solution to
our problem as we can see by considering, for example, the choice function C ′2 defined
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as follows.
C ′2({x, y}) = {x, y}
C ′2({x, z}) = {x, z}
C ′2({x, t}) = {x, t}
C ′2({y, z}) = {y, z}
C ′2({y, t}) = {y, t}
C ′2({z, t}) = {z}
C ′2({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}
C ′2({x, y, t}) = {x, y, t}
C ′2({x, z, t}) = {x, z}
C ′2({y, z, t}) = {y, z}
and C ′2({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, z}.
C ′2 verifies property γ and the Chernoff condition. Some simple computations show that
C = C ′2 ◦ C1. 3
We finish with an example in which a single-valued choice function C is considered.
Such function verifies properties γ and P and we construct C1 and C2 as in Theorem
3.11 in such a way that C = C2 ◦ C1. In this example the choice function C2 verifies that
C2(S) = ∅ for some S ∈ D.
Example 3.8. Let X = {x, y, z}, D = P∗(X) and C the choice function defined on D as
C({x, y}) = {x}
C({x, z}) = {z}
C({y, z}) = {y}
C({x, y, z}) = {z}.
C verifies the properties γ an P in a trivial way (and it does not verify the Chernoff
condition) thus we can define C1 and C2 as in Theorem 3.11. Their respective expressions
are:
C1({x, y}) = {x}
C1({x, z}) = {z}
C1({y, z}) = {y, z}
C1({x, y, z}) = {z}
and
C2({x, y}) = {x}
C2({x, z}) = {z}
C2({y, z}) = {y}
C2({x, y, z}) = ∅.
C1 is rational because it verifies the Chernoff condition and the binariness property. C2
is rationalized by R2 defined as
xR2y and ¬(yR2x), zR2x and ¬(xR2z), yR2z and ¬(zR2y).
3
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3.5 Conclusions and future research
In this chapter we have considered the classical concept of rational choice functionwhen
we deal with a function that is rationalized by a single rational. Nevertheless we further
consider as rational a decision-maker behavior that makes his choices applying different
rational choice functions (in a classical sense) successively.
We have studied the choice functions that result when we compound choice func-
tions verifying the different properties of rationality and analyze their behavior, that is
we study which properties of rationality it verifies.
The following tables gather these results. In Table 1 we consider the case in which
the choice functions are defined on domains containing all the finite and nonempty sub-
sets of the set of alternatives. In Table 2 we summarize the case in which the domain
is arbitrary. The notation we use is: A= Arrow’s axiom, CH= Chernoff condition, C=
Concordance property, IIA= Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, SUP= Superset
property, B= Binariness property, H= Houthakker’s axiom of revealed preference, SR=
Strong axiom of revealed preference, WA=Weak axiom of revealed preference, FR= full
rational, QTR=quasi-transitive rational, AR=Acyclic rational and R= rational (for do-
mains that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives AR=R).
In both cases we have two tables, but the one on the right gathers the results obtained
directly from the results on the table on the left and the rationality theorems.
Table 1. Results for domains containing all the finite and nonempty subsets of the set of
alternatives.
C1 C2 C2 ◦ C1
A A A ?
A CH CH ?
A C C ?
A IIA IIA ?
A SUP SUP
B+CH B B






The assertions ? are proved in Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995). These authors also
proved that Arrow’s axiom is the only property unconditionally preserved by the com-
position of two choice functions in this list, and that it this not the case for properties
C, CH and IIA. These are preserved when C2 satisfies the respective property and C1
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satisfies Arrow’s axiom. We have proved that the same is true for properties SUP and B
and moreover that the binariness property is satisfied by C2 ◦ C1 when it is satisfied by
both C1 and C2 and C1 satisfies the Chernoff condition.
Table 2. Results for arbitrary domains.
C1 C2 C2 ◦ C1
H H H
H SA SA
H WA+R∗C2 acyclic AR
WA WA WA
C1 C2 C2 ◦ C1
FR FR FR
FR SA QTR
FR WA+R∗C2 acyclic AR
WA WA R
As far as we know this study does not appear in previous literature. We obtain in
this case that the results are not very different from those in Table 1, bearing in mind
that the conditions of rationality are only sufficient conditions except the case of FR in
which H is a necessary and sufficient condition. The sufficient conditions for QTR (SA)
and AR (WA and R∗C2 acyclic) are not preserved when C1 and C2 satisfy them, but they
are when they are satisfied by C2 and C1 is FR (⇔ satisfies H).
In the last part of this chapter we have dealt with the problem of the decomposition
of a choice function by two choice functions that are rationalized by a single binary
relation in the classical sense. We have obtained a characterization theorem for choice
functions defined over domains that contain all the finite and nonempty subsets of the
set of alternatives which is a common assumption to many related analysis.
For a future research we intend to extend this study to the case of the decomposition
by more than two rational choice functions with weaker rationality properties. That
should permit to check for a wider range of “rational” behavior.
Moreover the problem of the decomposition by two rational ones is not solved yet
in the case of choice functions defined over arbitrary domains. A similar result to the
one given in our characterization Theorem 3.9 for domains containing all the finite and
nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives, or at least the identification of significant
sufficient conditions as in such theorem would provide very interesting insights.
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4.1 Introduction
The study of cooperation and competition in operational research models is a fruitful
and challenging topic nowadays. Most fields within operations research are being ap-
proached from a game theoretical perspective, for the cases in which several decision
makers interact in situations that can be modelled as optimization problems. Borm et
al. (2001) provides a review of this topic.
One of the major branches within operations research is queueing theory. Competi-
tion in queueing models has been treated in many papers, a survey of which is Hassin
and Haviv (2003) (for a survey in the control of queues, the reader is referred to Tadj
and Choudhury (2005)). There are also a number of papers on cooperative issues in
sequencing and scheduling (see, for instance, a review in Curiel et al. (2002) or other
recent references such as Moulin and Stong (2002) and Maniquet (2003)). However, sur-
prisingly enough, queueingmodels have rarely been approached from the point of view
of cooperative game theory. González and Herrero (2004) is one of the scarce papers in
which cooperation is analyzed in queueing models. It considers a Markovian situation
in which several agents maintaining their own servers agree to cooperate and hold a
common server for their populations. Each agent has specified a maximum value for
the expected time in the system of the members of his population. The problem of how
to allocate among the agents the cost of a common server, that fulfills the specification
of each one, is dealt with, and applied to a cost sharing problem in the Spanish health
system.
The study of cooperation in queueing models is a relevant issue which deserves the
attention of game theorists and operation researchers. In many real world situations
several providers of a particular service agree to maintain common servers which are
available for all their populations: think of a group of banks which share a network of
cash machines, a cluster of universities which hold one high-performance computer, or
a set of hospitals keeping a joint blood bank. In all these situations questions like how
to allocate the cost of the common servers or when a group of service providers should
cooperate are really relevant and should be approached from a scientific point of view.
This chapter is based on García-Sanz et al. (2008) which is devoted to deal with such
questions in some Markovian models.
Moreover we have recently become aware of the paper of Yu et al. (2008) that also
deals with cooperation in queueing systems. Nevertheless they do not consider dif-
ferent maximum values for the expected times in the system of the members of each
populations, but the same for all of them, before and after cooperation.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we set up our notation
and analyze a variation of themodel in González andHerrero (2004). In this model, each
agent has a specification for themaximum time in the system and for the probability that
one of his customers spends more than this maximum. In Section 4.3 we consider a new
variation which allows for preemptive priority schemes to decrease the total cost. In this
kind of problems it is usual to wonder how to share the earnings or costs of the grand
coalition if all agents cooperate. So, in this context a rule for allocating the holding costs
of the common server is introduced and axiomatically characterized. This rule can be
easily computed and, moreover, provides core allocations. In section 4.4 we consider
the model in Gonzalez and Herrero (2004), but in this case the agents are interested in
the time in the queue instead of in the time in the system. In section 4.5 we conclude
with some final comments.
4.2 Basic Markovian models
Consider a basic queueing system where customers arrive requiring a service, have to
queue while the unique server is occupied, are selected from the queue by a certain dis-
cipline (i.e., a specification of the order in which they are selected), and leave the system
after having been served. An M/M/1 model describes a system of this kind, when the
arrivals occur according to a Poisson process with parameter λ (i.e., inter-arrival times
are independent and identically distributed following an exponential distribution with
mean 1λ ), the service time follows an exponential distribution with average
1
µ , and the
queue discipline is FCFS (first to come, first to be served). The steady state condition for
this system is λ < µ. From now on we only deal with M/M/1 systems in steady state.
We assume that the reader is familiar with elementary issues ofMarkovian queues, more
precisely, with the model M/M/1. Anyway, we briefly recall whenever needed some
features in connection with that model (which is treated in deep, for instance, in Gross
and Harris (1998)).
Consider a situation in which n agents run n M/M/1 systems which provide a sim-
ilar service. Each agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} runs his own queue and provides the service
to his own population, λi, µi denoting the parameters characterizing agent i’s M/M/1
system. Besides, each agent i wants that the average time that his customers spend in
the system does not exceed a certain maximum value ti. Moreover, the cost of main-
taining a server is supposed to be a linear function of its efficiency, measured by the
inverse of its expected service time (which, according to the properties of the exponen-
tial distribution, turns out to be the expected number of service completions per time
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unit), i.e. c(i) = kµi, for all i ∈ N. Generally game theory deals with solutions which
are invariant to scale changes, so we assume without loss of generality that k = 1. Now,
since agents want to minimize the cost and since the expected time of a customer i in









González and Herrero (2004) considered the following question. How is the new situ-
ation if some agents agree to maintain one common server to attend their customers?
They assume that this unique server should assure that the average time of a customer
in the system is the lowest of the maximum admissible values for all the agents that
make the arrangement (notice that this includes a feasibility assumption which guaran-
tees that it is possible to ensure the desired service rate at the common server). If we
take S the coalition of these agents and denote tS := min{ti : i ∈ S} and λS := ∑i∈S λi,





Notice that ∑i∈S c(i) ≥ c(S), so sharing the server in this way leads to a cost reduction.
Equation (4.1) defines a cost TU-game (N, c). Remember that a cost TU-game is a pair
(N, c), where N is a finite set of agents and c is the characteristic function, which assigns
for every S ⊆ N a real number c(S) that indicates the cost of a particular project for the
agents in coalition S, being C(∅) = 0 by convention. It is common to identify the game
(N, c) with its characteristic function.
González and Herrero (2004) observe that c defined by (4.1) is the sum of an additive
game plus an airport game. So, c is a concave game and its core is known to be the
convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors. Moreover, its Shapley value Φ(c) can
be easily computed and provides core allocations. For details on concave games and on
airport games the reader can consult Owen (1995).
In the following we extend the model in (4.1) to deal not only with expected times.
We consider the case where every agent i needs to guarantee for each of his customers
that his time in the system will be smaller than or equal to a critical value ωi with a
sufficiently high probability 1− αi. In this case the cost of the unique server for coalition
S is given in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.1. In the conditions above, the cost of a common server which fulfills the condi-
tions of the agents in S is given by:





Proof. Let us denote byWi the randomvariable “time in the system spent by a customer
of type i". Therefore, for all i ∈ N, the condition
P(Wi ≤ ωi) ≥ 1− αi
must hold. It is a well-known result that the time that a customer spends in an M/M/1
systemwith parameters λ and µ follows an exponential distribution with mean 1µ−λ . So,
i will maintain a server with expected service time µi such that
P(Wi ≤ ωi) = 1− e−(µi−λi)ωi = 1− αi,
which implies that
ln αi = −(µi − λi)ωi
and thus
µi = λi − ln αi
ωi
.
Now if a coalition S forms to maintain a common server which fulfills the specifications
of all the agents, it should be satisfied that, for all i ∈ S,
P(WS ≤ ωi) ≥ 1− αi,
whereWS is the random variable “time in the system spent by a customer of any agent
in S". Then, the average service time µ of the server must satisfy for every i ∈ S
1− e−(µ−∑i∈S λi)ωi ≥ 1− αi,
which implies that
µ ≥ λS − ln αi
ωi
for all i ∈ S. So, for all S ⊂ N,
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Equation (4.2) defines a cost TU-game (N, cˆ). We remark that our model includes as
a particular case the cost game in González and Herrero (2004). Indeed, taking αi = 1e ,
for all i ∈ N, we obtain exactly the same game as in their paper. Moreover, we note
again that cˆ is the sum of an additive game plus an airport game which, once more,
implies that cˆ is concave, its core can be fully described and its Shapley value provides
a specially noticeable core allocation. Following Littlechild and Owen (1973), the next
corollary gives an explicit expression of the Shapley value in this context.









− − ln αpi(1)
ωpi(1)
)










for all i ∈ N, and where pi is a permutation of N such that
− ln αpi(1)
ωpi(1)
≤ − ln αpi(2)
ωpi(2)
≤ . . . ≤ − ln αpi(n)
ωpi(n)
.
We finish this section with two remarks. The first has to do with the motivation of
the new model treated here. The second is a technical comment.
Remark 4.1. The new model treated in this section is very natural and can be applied
in many different scenarios, for instance in the cost sharing problem in the Spanish
health system described in González and Herrero (2004). In fact, it is quite sensible to
specify, for some specially delicate pathologies, a maximum value for the time in the
system (with a high probability) instead of a maximum value for the expected time in
the system. 
Remark 4.2. In this section we have considered queueing systems with an FCFS disci-
pline. Actually, this assumption is only necessary to obtain expression (4.2) for cˆ. The
expression for c given in this section is still valid if we simply assume that the system
discipline satisfies the conservation law (see Kleinrock (1976) for details on the conser-
vation law). 
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4.3 Cooperation under preemptive priority
In this sectionwe deal with the following question. Taking into account that the different
players have different specifications for their populations, would it be helpful in order
to diminish the cost of the common server that a priority scheme in the queue discipline
is adopted?
We assume that the agents in N have agreed to run a common server to attend their
customers. However, now we suppose that a priority scheme with n classes (one for
each agent) has been established. In this section we always deal with priority schemes
allowing preemption. Each class i ∈ N corresponds to agent i, so it generates an ex-
pected number of clients per time unit λi, and it has a maximum value ti for the ex-
pected waiting time in the system. We will moreover allow the use of mixing priority
schemes. A mixing priority scheme (or priority policy) consists of multiplexing a finite
set of priority schemes in such a way that each of them will operate during a desired
percentage of time. The following theorem proves that in this context there always ex-
ists a priority policy whose associated cost is less than or equal to the cost of the FCFS
system given in (4.1).
Theorem 4.1. For any vector (t1, . . . , tn) of maximum expected waiting times in the system for
the agents in N, there exists a priority policy that ensures these waiting times with a cost less
than or equal to the one given by the approach in (4.1).
Proof. Let us denote by Π(N) the set of permutations of the finite set N. Let σ ∈ Π(N)
be an ordering of the n classes which establishes the priority scheme of the queue. Here
σ(i) represents the position which has been assigned to the class i. The smaller the
position index, the higher priority associated to the class. It is well-known (see, for
instance Gross and Harris (1998), page 233) that for any µ > λN , the expected waiting









Notice that Wi(σ, µ) is a decreasing function of µ. We denote by W(σ, µ) the vector
whose coordinates are given by (4.3) and by F (N, µ) the set
F (N, µ) = conv {W(σ, µ) ∈ Rn : σ ∈ Π(N)} ,
where conv stands for convex hull. We distinguish two cases.
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Case 1. t ∈ F (N, µ) for some µ > λN .
Theorem 2 in Coffman and Mitrani (1980) established that t = (t1, . . . , tn) is achiev-
able by some priority policy using a common server with a service rate µ if and only
if (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ F (N, µ). Then, since t, λ and µ must satisfy the conservation law for







µ− λN . (4.4)
Hence, the common service rate µ can be obtained solving equation (4.4). Its value is





µ ≤ λN + 1tN , (4.6)
so, in view of (4.1), the cost of the common server diminishes if a priority scheme is
adopted under which the required vector (t1, . . . , tn) is in F (N, µ).
Case 2. t 6∈ ⋃µ>λN F (N, µ).
From Lemma 2 in Coffman and Mitrani (1980), it is derived that any vector of ex-
pected waiting times in the system (t1, . . . , tn) with ti = tj for every i, j ∈ N belongs to
the interior of F (N, µ) for some µ. (Note that, in this case, µ = λN + 1tN .)
To prove the result, assume without loss of generality that t1 = tN . Let l(t) be the
line segment with extreme points t and tˆ = (t1, . . . , t1). The segment l(t) is included in
the halfspace H+ = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i∈N λiλN xi ≥ tN}. Indeed, the hyperplane defining the
halfspace H+ contains tˆ and its normal vector ( λ1λN , . . . ,
λn
λN
) ≥ 0. Thus, tˆ+Rn+ ⊂ H+.
Now, since clearly l(t) ⊂ tˆ+Rn+, the inclusion l(t) ⊂ H+ follows.
The above construction proves that l(t) intersects
⋃
µ>λN F (N, µ) in a subsegment.
All the points in that intersection, with the exception of tˆ, are attainable by priority
policies with service rates smaller than 1tN + λN , that corresponds to the policy attaining
tˆ. (Notice that the service rate decreases while ‖W‖ increases along the ray {x ∈ Rn+ :
x1 = x2 = . . . = xn > 0}, see (4.3). An illustration can be found in Figure 2.)
Hence, any service rate µ∗ associated with a point
t∗ ∈ (l(t) \ {tˆ}) ∩ ⋃
µ>λN
F (N, µ)
satisfies the aspiration level given by t and with a service rate smaller than the one in
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(4.1), namely 1tN + λN .
Now we illustrate the result above for the two-classes situation. Here, the extreme





(µ− λ1)(µ− λN) ), (
µ
(µ− λ2)(µ− λN) ,
1
µ− λ2 ).
Of course, it must hold that µ > λN = λ1 + λ2. Figure 1 illustrates this result where












Figure 1: Vectors of achievable expected waiting times in the system.
According to Theorem 2 in Coffman andMitrani (1980), any (t1, t2)which lies inside
the region limited by the curves corresponding to the orderings σ and τ is achievable
using a certain priority policy, by a server with common service rate




as it is derived from the conservation law (4.4).
Figure 2 displays the case where (t1, t2) 6∈ ⋃µ>λN F (N, µ). The cost associated with
t¯, according to Theorem 4.1, is less than or equal to 1tN + λN .











Figure 2: The case where (t1, t2) /∈ F (N, µ).
From now on we consider problems where the expected waiting time vector in the
system t = (ti)i∈N is achievable. (Notice that t being achievable implies that for any S ⊂
N then (ti)i∈S is achievable as well.) Let us denote by QS the set of queueing situations
(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) such that N is finite and (ti)i∈N ∈ F (N, µ)with µ = λN + λN∑i∈N λiti .
Then, the maintenance cost of a common server for any coalition S ⊂ N is given by




Notice that, as we have already remarked, c¯(N) is smaller than or equal to the total cost
in González and Herrero’s model.
The problem now is how to allocate c¯(N) among the agents. In order to do it, we










In the class of queueing situations QS, an allocation rule f is a function which asso-
ciates to each (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS a non-negative vector in RN , denoted by
f (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N), such that the sum of its components equals c¯(N). We define
the proportional allocation rule, denoted by ϕp, as
ϕ
p
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According to this rule, each agent i ∈ N pays an additive part λi plus a splitting of λN∑
j∈N
λjtj










so ϕp can also be said to allocate to each agent a splitting of c¯(N) proportional to λi.
An important property for an allocation rule f is that it provides core allocations. In
this context this means that, for every (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS and every S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈S
fi(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ≤ c¯(S)
or, in words, that the allocation of the total cost c¯(N) is acceptable for every coalition
S ⊂ N. The following proposition shows that the proportional allocation rule in fact
provides core allocations.
Proposition 4.2. ϕp provides core allocations.


















An obvious consequence of Proposition 4.2 is that each game c¯ associated with an
element of QS is totally balanced. The following example shows that c¯ needs not to be
concave and also that the Shapley value of c¯ may fall outside its core.
Example 4.1. Take N = {1, 2, 3}, λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1, and t1 = 1, t2 = 47.29 and
t3 = 53.71. After some algebra, it is easy to check that (N, {λi}i∈n, {ti}i∈n) ∈ QS. Then
we have:
• c¯({1}) = 2, c¯({2}) = 1.021, c¯({3}) = 1.019,
• c¯({1, 2}) = 2.041, c¯({1, 3}) = 2.037, c¯({2, 3}) = 2.02,
• c¯({1, 2, 3}) = 3.029.
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Consider S = {1} ⊂ T = {1, 2} and i = 3. Then
c¯(S ∪ {i})− c¯(S) < c¯(T ∪ {i})− c¯(T),
so c¯ is not a concave game. Moreover, if we compute the Shapley value of this game we
obtain that Φ(c¯) = (1.343, 0.845, 0.841), which is not a core allocation because Φ1(c¯) +
Φ2(c¯) = 2.188 > c¯({1, 2}) = 2.041. 3
In summary, ϕp is a reasonable allocation rule that (a) can be easily computed and
(b) provides core allocations. So, this rule is our proposal for allocating the maintenance
cost of the common server in this context. We finish the section providing an axiomatic
characterization of this rule which shows that it has excellent properties from the point
of view of the immunity to possible manipulations.
To start with, let us introduce two appealing properties for an allocation rule f de-
fined on QS.
P1. Non advantageous reallocation. Let the queueing situations (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈




λ˜i t˜i and λN = λ˜N . Then
∑
i∈T
fi(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) = ∑
i∈T
fi(N, {λ˜i}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N)
for any T ⊂ N with λT = λ˜T.
The meaning of this property is that a rule should be invariant to reallocations of the
parameters λi within any coalition T while keeping the total cost. This reallocation is
one possible way in which a certain coalition can manipulate its parameters to obtain
some advantage. Another possible way is performing artificial mergings or splittings.
These manipulations are prevented by the next property. Before its introduction we
need the following definition.
Definition 4.1. Let (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS be such that ti = t, for every i ∈ N.
Then for each S ⊂ N, the S-manipulation of (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) is the queueing situation
(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {ti}i∈NS) ∈ QS where
• NS = (N \ S) ∪ {iS},
• λiS = ∑i∈S λi, and
• tiS = t.
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Notice that, in these conditions, c¯(N) = c¯(NS) for every S ⊂ N. Now we present
the second property.
P2. Non advantageous merging or splitting. Let (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS be such
that ti = t, for every i ∈ N. Then, for each S ⊂ N,
fiS(N
S, {λi}i∈NS , {ti}i∈NS) = ∑
i∈S
fi(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N).
It is clear that the proportional allocation rule ϕp satisfies P1 and P2. Moreover, the
next theorem shows that these two properties characterize the proportional allocation
rule.
Theorem 4.2. The proportional allocation rule ϕp is the unique allocation rule defined on QS
which satisfies P1 and P2.
Proof. We have already mentioned that ϕp satisfies P1 and P2. Let us check its unique-
ness. Take an allocation rule f defined on QS which satisfies P1 and P2. Consider
(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS and fix arbitrarily j ∈ N. We have to prove that












observe that P1 implies that
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) = f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) (4.9)
(notice that P1 can be applied because ∑i∈N λi t˜i = ∑i∈N λiti).
Now take the S-manipulation of (N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) for S = N \ {j}. We know that:
• c¯(NS) = c¯(N), (4.10)
• c¯(NS) = f j(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜i}i∈NS) + fiS(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜i}i∈NS), (4.11)
• c¯(N) = f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) +∑
k 6=j
fk(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N). (4.12)
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Since (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12) hold, and f satisfies P2, then
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) = f j(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜i}i∈NS).
Hence, it is clear that f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) can be written as a function of λN , λj and
t˜j (notice that t˜j = t˜ does not really depend on j). So,
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N) = F(λN ,λj, t˜).
Suppose that F is linear in its second variable (we will prove below that this is actually
true). Then,




f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜i}i∈N)
= g(λN , t˜)λN ,
and so g(λN , t˜) =
c¯(N)
λN
. Now, in view of (4.9) and (4.13), we get:
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) = c¯(N)
λN






So, to finish the proof we just need to check that F is linear in its second variable. Notice
that we have a collection of functions
{F(α, ·, β)|α, β ∈ (0,+∞)}
such that F(α, ·, β) : (0, α] −→ [0, α + 1β ], for all α, β ∈ (0,+∞). Let us take now
α, β, x, y ∈ (0,+∞) with x+ y ≤ α. Then, there exists (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS where
ti = β for every i ∈ N, λ1 = x, and λ2 = y. Define the S-manipulation of this problem
for S = {1, 2}. Then, since f satisfies P2,
F(α, x+ y, β) = fiS(N
S, {λi}i∈NS , {ti}i∈NS)
= f1(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) + f2(N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N)
= F(α, x, β) + F(α, y, β).
So, for every α, β ∈ (0,+∞), F(α, ·, β) is additive. Since F(α, ·, β) is also non-negative, it
is clear that it is increasing. It is an easy exercise to prove that every additive, increasing
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function h : (0, α] −→ [0, α+ 1β ] is also linear. This completes the proof.
Finally we check that these two properties are independent.
(i) The rule f 1 which assigns to each queueing situation (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS
the vector whose jth coordinate is given by
f 1j (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) =
c¯(N)
|N| ,
where |N| is the number of agents in N, satisfies P1, but it does not satisfy P2.
(ii) The rule f 2 which assigns to each queueing situation (N, {λi}i∈N , {ti}i∈N) ∈ QS
the vector whose jth coordinate is given by






satisfies P2, but it does not satisfy P1.
4.4 The basicMarkovianmodelwith expected times in the queue
When we need a service and have to queue in order to get it, many of the times we
are very worried about the time we have to spend in the queue, but not so much about
the service time. For example, in the context of a health system that we have already
mentioned above, it is reasonable to deal with times in the queue instead of times in the
system, because the times that what we really want to diminish are the waiting times
for a surgical intervention instead of the time of the surgery itself.
This section shows some difficulties when extending the results in section 4.2 to
the case in which the agents are concerned with expected times in the queue instead of
in the system. Surprisingly enough, this slight variation leads to a scenario in which
sometimes it is better for the agents not to cooperate.
Consider again the same situation as in González and Herrero (2004) but in such
a way that now each agent i has a maximum admissible value tqi ∈ (o,+∞) for the
expected time of his customers in the queue. In a stationary M/M/1 system with pa-
rameters λ and µ, the average waiting time in the queue by a customer is given by
λ
µ(µ− λ) .
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So, each i will choose a server with an expected service time µi such that
tqi µ
2























From the fact that µi > λi for all i ∈ N, it follows that only the positive square root is















If coalition S ⊆ N forms, all the agents in S assume that the common server should
assure that the average time in the queue of a client is the lowest of all the maximum























where tqS = mini∈S{tqi }, and λS = ∑i∈S λi.
The following example shows that in a situation like this, players may prefer not to
cooperate.
Example 4.2. Take N = {1, 2} and λ1 = λ2 = 1, tq1 = 100, tq2 = 1. Then:
• cq(N) = 1+
√
1+ 21 = 1+
√
3.
• cq(1) + cq(2) = 12 +
√( 1
2
)2 + 1100 + 12 +√( 12)2 + 11 = 1+√0.26+√1.25.
Hence, cq(1) + cq(2) < cq(N). 3
So, in the case that the agents are concerned with the time their customers spend in
the queue, instead of with the time their customers spend in the system, maybe they
will not have incentives to cooperate, at least under the conditions considered up to
now. The next proposition gives a sufficient condition that makes cooperation to be a
good option.
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i ≤ λStqS (4.15)
for all i ∈ S.













Taking tq1 = 4 in the Example 4.2 above, one checks that the condition in Proposition
4.3 is not necessary.
The interpretation of condition (4.15) is clear. It says that the common server has to
be able to take on more work than each one of the individual servers whilst maintaining
expected sojourn time guaranties for the individual agents. In particular, this is true






The problem now is how to allocate the total cost cq(N) in those cases in which
condition 4.15 is satisfied, and therefore the agents have incentives to cooperate.
Let us denote by QSq the set of queueing situations (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) such that
N is finite and λit
q
i ≤ λStqS for all i ∈ S. If all the agents in N agree to maintain a







order to allocate this total cost among the agents, we consider the cost TU-game (N, cq)
with characteristic function given by equation 4.14.
Definition 4.2. In the class of queueing situations QSq, an allocation rule f is a function
which associates to each (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) ∈ QSq a non-negative vector in RN , denoted
by f (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N), such that the sum of its components equals cq(N).
The following example shows that this game is not necessarily a concave game.
Example 4.3. Take N = {1, 2, 3}, λ1 = 3, λ2 = 2, λ3 = 4, and tq1 = 7, tq2 = 8 and tq3 = 3.
Then we have:
• cq({1}) = 3, 136634177, cq({2}) = 2, 118033989, cq({3}) = 4, 309401077,
• cq({1, 2}) = 5, 138993315, cq({1, 3}) = 7, 318813079, cq({2, 3}) = 6, 31662479,
• cq({1, 2, 3}) = 9, 32182538.
Consider S = {1} ⊂ T = {1, 2} and i = 3. Then
cq(S ∪ {i})− cq(S) < cq(T ∪ {i})− cq(T),
and this implies that cq is not a concave game. 3
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So, the Shapley value is not necessarily a core allocation, and moreover the expres-
sion of this game makes it a bit difficult to calculate. Then we propose another rule in
order to allocate the cost cq(N) when the sufficient condition (4.15) is true. We define a


















This rule assigns to each agent i a splitting of cq(N) proportional to λi.
Nevertheless this value is not necessarily either a core allocation. For instance, if we
calculate ϕq(cq) in the Example 4.3 above we obtain
ϕq(cq) = (3, 107275127, 2, 071516751, 4, 143033502),





q) > c¯q({1, 2}).
The next proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the proportional
rule to be a core allocation.










for all S ⊆ N.

















This condition states that the common server for the whole coalition has to be able to
take onmore work than the common sever for any other coalition S ⊂ N. In particular it
is true if all the values tqi are homogeneous, as it happened with the sufficient condition
4.3.
Besides this proportional rule we have proposed can be easily computed and verifies
excellent properties from the point of view of the immunity to possible manipulations.
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We go on providing an axiomatic characterization of it in a similar way as we character-
ize the proportional rule given by equation 4.2 in section 4.3.
To start with, let us redefine the two properties introduced in section 4.3 for char-
acterizing the rule ϕp to the case of an allocation rule f defined on QSq. We omit their
intuitions because of the similarity with the properties P1 and P2 in section 4.3.
Q1. Non advantageous reallocation. Let the queueing situations (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) ∈
QSq and (N, {λ˜i}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) ∈ QSq be such that λN = λ˜N and tq
N = t˜qN . Then
∑
i∈T
fi(N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) = ∑
i∈T
fi(N, {λ˜i}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N)
for any T ⊂ N with λT = λ˜T.
Definition 4.3. Take (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) ∈ QSq where tqi = tq for all i ∈ N. For each
subset S ⊂ N, the S-manipulation of (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) is the new queueing situation
(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {tqi }i∈NS) ∈ QSq where
• NS = (N \ S) ∪ {iS},
• λiS = ∑i∈S λi, and
• tqiS = tq.
Notice that, in these conditions, cq(N) = cq(NS) for every S ⊂ N. Now we present
the second property.
Q2. Non advantageous merging or splitting. Take (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) ∈ QSq where
tqi = t
q for every i ∈ N. Then, for each S ⊂ N,
fiS(N
S, {λi}i∈NS , {tqi }i∈NS) = ∑
i∈S
fi(N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N).
It is clear that the proportional allocation rule ϕq satisfies Q1 and Q2. Moreover, the
next theorem shows that these two properties characterize it.
Theorem 4.3. The proportional allocation rule ϕq is the unique allocation rule defined on QSq
which satisfies Q1 and Q2.
Proof. We have already mentioned that ϕq satisfies Q1 and Q2. Let us check its unique-
ness. Take an allocation rule f defined on QSq which satisfies Q1 and Q2. Consider
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(N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) ∈ QSq and fix arbitrarily j ∈ N. We have to prove that











We define for all i ∈ N, t˜iq = min
k∈N
{tqk}. Then Q1 implies that
f qj (N, {λi}i∈N , {tqi }i∈N) = f qj (N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N). (4.16)
Now take the S-manipulation of (N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) for S = N \ {j}. We know
that:
• cq(NS) = cq(N), (4.17)
• cq(NS) = f j(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜qi }i∈NS) + fiS(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜qi }i∈NS), (4.18)
• cq(N) = f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) +∑
k 6=j
fk(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N). (4.19)
Since (4.17), (4.18), and (4.19) hold, and f satisfies Q2, then
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) = f j(NS, {λi}i∈NS , {t˜qi }i∈NS).
Hence, it is clear that f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) can be written as a function of λN , λj and
t˜qj (notice that t˜
q
j = t˜
q does not really depend on j). So,
f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N) = F(λN ,λj, t˜q).
Just as in the proof of Theorem 4.2 we have that F is linear in its second variable (we
only have to consider F(α, ·, β) : (0, α] −→ [0, α2 + α2
√
1+ 4αβ ], for all α, β ∈ (0,+∞)).
Then,




f j(N, {λi}i∈N , {t˜qi }i∈N)
= g(λN , t˜q)λN ,
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and so g(λN , t˜q) =
cq(N)
λN
. Now, in view of (4.16) and (4.20), we get:














Moreover, also as in section 4.3 we have that these two properties are independent.
We conclude this section with the particular case in which all the agents fix the same
maximum values for the expected times that their agents spend in the queue.
4.4.1 The case tqi = t
q for all i ∈ N
In this section we consider different n parallel M/M/1 systems with parameters λi and
µi, and all of them with the same maximum value for their customers waiting in the
queue tqi = t
q.
In this case it is clear that the sufficient condition (4.15) for cooperation is true. More-
over it is also true that λStq 6 λNtq, thus ∑
i∈S
ϕi(cq)− cq(S) 6 0 and therefore ϕq(cq) is
a core allocation. In fact, under this condition the rule ϕq(cq) is characterized only by
property Q2, as it is established in the next corollary.
Corollary 4.2. The allocation rule ϕq defined over the subset of QSq where tqi = t
q for all i ∈ N
is the only allocation rule over this subset that verifies Q2.
We also have that, under the condition of tqi = t
q for every i ∈ N, the cost game cq is
concave as the next proposition states.
Proposition 4.5. In the conditions above the cost game cq is a concave game.
Proof. We have to prove that for any S, T ⊆ N such that S ⊆ T and i 6∈ T
cq(S ∪ {i})− cq(S) > cq(tT ∪ {i})− cq(T).
We have
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We have that f ′(x) < 0. If we take x = λS and y = λT we have λS 6 λT and we obtain
cq(S ∪ {i})− cq(S) = f (λS) > f (λT) = cq(T ∪ {i})− cq(T)
which concludes the proof.
We obtain as a corollary that in this case the Shapley value is a core allocation too.
4.5 Conclusions and future research
In this chapter we have studied some queueing problems from the perspective of co-
operative game theory. In this sense we have dealt with a situation in which different
agents maintain their own servers to attend their own populations, and fix a maximum
time for their clients in the system. Then we have considered the possibility of cooper-
ating and maintaining a common server to attend all the populations with a maximum
time in the system equal to the minimum of all the times that they had before coopera-
tion. We obtain a cost game that is the sum of an additive game plus an airport game.
Then the Shapley value is easy to calculate and always provides a core allocation.
Afterwards we deal with the possibility of reducing still more the cost of the com-
mon server introducing a priority discipline in the queue. We have proved that there
exists a preemptive priority discipline that satisfies all the agents’ time exigences be-
fore cooperation and with a smaller cost than with the discipline “first to come first to
be served”. The cost game we obtain in this case is not concave and we propose and
characterize a rule to allocate the common cost different to the Shapley value and that
is always a core allocation.
Finally we deal with the same situation of different parallel servers, but when they
all consider amaximumvalue for the expected time that their clients spend in the queue,
instead of in the system. Surprisingly enough, this apparently slight change leads to a
very different situation: cooperation is not always a good option in the sense that the
cost does not always diminish. We give a sufficient condition for cooperation to be a
good option and propose and characterize an allocation rule for distributing the cost.
We also give a necessary and sufficient condition for this allocation to stay in the core of
the game.
For the future we have in mind to study some other allocation rules for the game of
times in the queue that always stay in the core in case that cooperation is a good option.
We also want to study some other queueing situations from the point of view of
cooperative game theory; for instance we would like to consider different models in
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which there is not a place where to queue and therefore the cost function has to take
into account the losses of clients. The same models with different cost functions are
other possibilities for future research.
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Resumen en castellano
La presente tesis se enmarca dentro del amplísimo campo de la Teoría de la Decisión.
El individuo se enfrenta a un mercado de posibilidades en diferentes contextos y debe
seleccionar una o varias alternativas entre todas las posibles, utilizando diferentes crite-
rios de racionalidad, utilidad, etc.
El enfoque básico en los problemas de selección de alternativas se basa en el uso de
relaciones binarias. Este modelo se encuentra ya expuesto en el seminal texto de Debreu
“Theory of Value”(1959). Se trata de aproximar el problema explicitando cuál de entre
cada dos opciones posibles es preferida a la otra, lo que matemáticamente se modeliza
mediante relaciones binarias.
Los trabajos pioneros al respecto, como los de Edgeworth y Pareto, suponían la aso-
ciación de un valor numérico, “utilidad”, para cada uno de los posibles resultados, de
modo que cuanto mayor fuera la utilidad de un resultado más preferido se consideraba.
Fueron los teoremas de Debreu (1959) y otros los que dieron condiciones que justifica-
ban matemáticamente esta suposición.
Sin embargo, en este tipo de modelización se supone un comportamiento transitivo
por parte del decisor que la experiencia demuestra que no es siempre real. Este aspec-
to fue ampliamente considerado por Arrow (1951). En la tesis abordamos el estudio de
diferentes situaciones de elección en las que tratamos de “explicar” la preferencia reve-
lada por parte del decisor en diferentes contextos.
Otro lenguaje también extensamente utilizado en la descripción de diversos pro-
blemas de elección es el de las funciones de elección. En el presente trabajo consideramos
diversos aspectos sobre la racionalidad del comportamiento de un decisor que, de ca-
da posible conjunto de alternativas a su alcance, selecciona un subconjunto (Aizerman
(1985)).
Todo lo anterior se restringe a procesos de elección en los que no hay interacción
entre individuos.
La rama de las Matemáticas que surge para estudiar las situaciones conflictivas, esto
es, aquellas situaciones en las que varios agentes toman decisiones y el resultado final
depende de las decisiones de todos, es la teoría de juegos.
Las primeras aportaciones a la teoría de juegos datan de principios del siglo XX con
los trabajos de Zermelo (1913), Borel (1921) y von Neumann (1928). Sin embargo, se
puede considerar que la teoría de juegos nace como disciplina científica en el año 1944
a partir de la publicación del libro “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” de John von
Neumann y Oskar Morgenstern. Posteriormente, en el año 1950, John Nash definió el
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concepto de equilibrio en juegos en forma estratégica.
La teoría de juegos se puede dividir en dos grandes áreas: juegos no cooperativos y jue-
gos cooperativos. En los modelos no cooperativos los agentes no pueden tomar acuerdos
vinculantes y se estudia cómo debe actuar cada uno de los jugadores para maximizar
sus propios beneficios. En los modelos cooperativos los agentes sí pueden tomar acuer-
dos vinculantes, e incluso formar coaliciones, y el objetivo es repartir el beneficio o el
coste resultante.
La tesis está organizada en cuatro capítulos independientes. Los tres primeros abor-
dan diferentes situaciones de decisión individual en las que un decisor debe elegir entre
varias alternativas u ordenarlas según sus preferencias. El último capítulo considera
problemas en los que hay al menos dos agentes implicados. En concreto estudia dis-
tintos juegos cooperativos que surgen al representar diversas situaciones de teoría de
colas. Presentamos a continuación un resumen de cada uno de ellos.
Egalitarian evaluation of infinite utility streams: analysis of some Pareto effi-
cient axiomatics
En el primer capítulo tratamos de resolver conflictos de distribución entre un número
infinito y contable de generaciones. En este contexto los economistas están tradicional-
mente interesados en postular y combinar axiomas que garanticen un cierto trato equi-
tativo entre las distintas generaciones, con axiomas de eficiencia.
Las propiedades de eficiencia se materializan en diferentes versiones del axioma de
Pareto. La propiedad de equidad es a menudo considerada sinónima de la de “anoni-
mato”, que se señala como la adecuada para ser verificada por una función o relación
de bienestar social (aparte de diferentes condiciones de continuidad). Hammond (1976)
postula otra condición de equidad, la “Equidad de Hammond”, que establece que al
comparar distintas distribuciones que asignan los mismos beneficios a todas las genera-
ciones excepto a dos, “cualquier cambio que disminuya las desigualdades entre las ge-
neraciones en conflicto preservando el orden entre ellas es socialmente preferible”. Re-
cientemente, Asheim y Tungodden (2004a) han introducido una variación de la propie-
dad de Hammond para comparaciones interpersonales: la propiedad de “Equidad de
Hammond para el futuro”. En ella se postula que “un sacrificio de la generación pre-
sente que supone una ganancia igual para todas las generaciones futuras es débilmente
deseable siempre y cuando la presente generación continúe en mejor situación que las
siguientes”.
Otro factor a tener en cuenta en el problema de ordenar “cadenas de utilidad in-
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tergeneracional infinitas” es el dominio para los niveles de utilidad asociados a cada
periodo (igual para todas las generaciones). En este contexto resulta más realista exi-
gir ciertas cualificaciones a los dominios que se consideran. Por ejemplo, puesto que la
percepción humana no es ilimitada, parece razonable que el dominio considerado sea
discreto. También es una restricción natural que las utilidades tengan una unidad patrón
(como ocurre cuando se miden cantidades monetarias).
En este tema existe una tendencia natural por parte del investigador a intentar en-
contrar una expresión numérica explícita asociada con cada cadena infinita de utili-
dades. Sin embargo, como ya sospechó Ramsey (1928), respetar el igual trato para to-
das las generaciones supone algunas incompatibilidades intrínsecas para asegurar la
eficiencia. Descontar la dotación de la generación futura es lo usual para conseguir-
lo, pero obviamente no trata a todas las generaciones por igual. El criterio de Rawls,
WR(x) = in f {xi : i = 1, 2, 3, ....} es ‘más ético’ en el sentido de que no está influen-
ciado por la posición que ocupe cada generación, pero aunque es monótono viola las
versiones más débiles del axioma de eficiencia de Pareto. Por ello, una aproximación al-
ternativa a la resolución del problema de agregación postula la existencia de relaciones
de bienestar social.
La búsqueda de la equidad intergeneracional en el contexto de agregación de ca-
denas de utilidad infinitas se inició con el trabajo de Ramsey (1928), que establecía
una conjetura sobre la dificultad de agregar dichas utilidades eficientemente respetan-
do la misma. Diamond (1965) prueba la imposibilidad de conseguir una función de
bienestar paretiana, continua respecto de la norma del supremo y que trate igual a to-
das las generaciones, cuando se considera el intervalo unidad como dominio para las
utilidades. Por su parte Basu y Mitra (2003) prueban que este resultado de imposibili-
dad permanece sin la hipótesis de continuidad y sin ninguna restricción ni cualificación
topológica ni del dominio.
Por su parte Svenson (1980) hace una demostración no constructiva de la existencia
de un orden de bienestar social sobre el conjunto de cadenas infinitas de utilidades veri-
ficando la condición de Pareto y algún requerimiento de equidad (anonimato). Para ello
considera una topologíamás fuerte que la usada en Diamond (1965) y el mismo dominio
(el intervalo unidad). Bossert et al. (2004) proporcionan un resultado de posibilidad más
fuerte que el de Svenson, y Hara et al. (2007) aportan algunos otros resultados de im-
posibilidad en la misma línea. Basu y Mitra (2003) amplían el resulado de posibilidad
de Svenson para un dominio general de utilidades y, al mismo tiempo, establecen la
relación entre estos resultados en el sentido de que un orden de bienestar social que
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satisface los axiomas de Pareto y anonimato no puede ser representable 1.
Asheim y Tungodden (2004) obtienen otro resultado de imposibilidad para un orden
de bienestar social cuando el dominio de utilidades es el intervalo unidad, exigiendo la
condición de equidad denominada “Equidad de Hamond para el futuro” (HEF) y otros
postulados adicionales.
Asheim et al. (2007) prueban que es imposible agregar cadenas infinitas de utilidad
con una relación binaria superiormente semicontimua que satisfaga Dominancia Débil
y HEF. El dominio que consideran es cualquier Y tal que [0, 1] ⊆ Y ⊆ R.
En este sentido Basu y Mitra (2007) consideran la posibilidad de debilitar el axioma
de Pareto y obtienen que es posible combinar anonimato y una forma débil del postu-
lado de Pareto (denominada Dominancia Débil) en una función de bienestar social, sea
cual sea el dominio para los niveles de utilidad.
Por otro lado, en el estudio de ciertas combinaciones de axiomas la estructura del
dominio es crucial. En el mismo trabajo, Basu y Mitra prueban que en su resultado
original de imposibilidad, si el axioma fuerte de Pareto es sustituido por el axioma débil
de Pareto el resultado de imposibilidad permanece. Pero si el dominio considerado para
los niveles de utilidad fueraN∗ = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, entonces el resultado de imposibilidad
se transforma en uno de posibilidad.
La búsqueda de funciones de bienestar social que verifiquen otros axiomas de equi-
dad no es frecuente en la literatura.
Banerjee (2006) considera la propiedad HEF en el caso de funciones de bienestar so-
cial (en lugar de órdenes) y obtiene otro resultado de imposibilidad cuando el dominio
es el intervalo unidad y la función tiene que verificar el axioma de Dominancia Débil.
No conocemos ningún otro trabajo que estudie la compatiblidad de axiomas de
equidad diferentes del de anonimato con una función paretiana.
Probamos en este capítulo que, bajo las condiciones del teorema de Banerjee, la im-
posibilidad también se transforma en posibilidad si el dominio de utilidades es N∗ en
lugar del intervalo unidad, cuando se exige un axioma más fuerte que el axioma HEF:
el axioma de “no sustitución restringida (RNS)”. Además, nuestra demostración es con-
structiva, de modo que obtenemos una expresión explícita para una función de bienestar
social que verifica el axioma de Pareto Fuerte y RNS (más fuerte que el axioma HEF).
En una línea similar de investigación nos planteamos la existencia e interrelaciones
de diferentes versiones del postulado de equidad de Hammond que puedan ser com-
binadas con funciones de bienestar social paretianas. Se consideran ambos dominios, el
1Un orden< sobre un conjunto X es representable si existe una función real f sobre X tal que x < y⇔
f (x) > f (y).
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discretoN∗ y el continuo [0, 1]. En el caso continuo todos los resultados que se obtienen
son de imposibilidad, mientras que en el discreto, si bien concluimos que el axioma
fuerte de Pareto no puede combinarse con ninguna de las expresiones del axioma de
equidad de Hammond, demostramos que sí es posible obtener funciones de bienestar
social que satisfagan una expresión de tal axioma con una versión más débil del axioma
de Pareto.
Este capítulo está basado en Alcantud y García-Sanz (2008).
Ranking opportunity sets. A characterization of an advised choice
Son numerosos también los problemas de decisión en los que se hace una selección de
un subconjunto de alternativas previa a la elección final del agente. El capítulo 2 trata de
la ordenación de tales subconjuntos de alternativas, también denominados “conjuntos
de oportunidades”. En el modelo estándar se considera una relación binaria definida
por el agente sobre el conjunto de alternativas, que se extiende a una relación en el con-
junto de subconjuntos no vacíos de dicho conjunto de alternativas. En la literatura sobre
el tema existen numerosas interpretaciones para este tipo de problemas y se consideran
adecuados distintos axiomas dependiendo de los contextos específicos.
Un ejemplo sencillo en el que un agente “ordena” subconjuntos de alternativas apa-
rece citado ya en Kreps (1979), y consiste en la ordenación de diferentes menús en un
restaurante: el individuo elegirá un plato, pero inicialmente ha de seleccionar un menú
para ya más tarde quedarse con una única comida. Otros contextos en los que podemos
encontrar situaciones de este tipo son diversos casos de votaciones como la selección
de un comité, la admisión de un grupo de estudiantes en un colegio, la selección de un
grupo de trabajadores, la formación de coaliciones (el agente debe asignar valor a los
diferentes grupos de colegas con los que asociarse), etc.
En todas estas situaciones los elementos son posibles alternativas y los subconjuntos
de posibles alternativas son “conjuntos de oportunidades” (o menús). Existen diferentes
criterios para ordenar estos conjuntos, que pueden ser aplicados considerando las carac-
terísticas particulares de la situación tratada. Citamos algunas de tales situaciones para
ilustrar y motivar el capítulo.
• Elección bajo incertidumbre total. En estas situaciones una decisión puede llevar a
diferentes consecuencias y el decisor no tiene posibilidad de asignar probabili-
dades a las mismas. Diferentes criterios pueden ser aplicados en estas situaciones:
el criterio maxmin (pesimista), el minmax (optimista),...
• Libertad de elección y preferencia por mayor flexibilidad. En este criterio el decisor da
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valor no sólo a la calidad de la elección sino también al grado de libertad del que
disfruta. Por ejemplo, es usual preferir una situación en la que el decisor selecciona
por sí mismo un elemento que otra en la que es obligado a optar por una alterna-
tiva concreta, aunque la opción final sea la misma en los dos casos. También es
frecuente que un decisor prefiera un subconjunto con más alternativas donde ha-
cer su elección final que otro que contenga menos, porque (por ejemplo) todas las
alternativas son atractivas para él, o porque no sabe si sus preferencias cambiarán
en el futuro antes de que deba hacer una última elección.
• Racionalidad limitada. En ocasiones, en los procesos de elección se tiende a con-
siderar sólo ciertos elementos “focales”, o ciertos rasgos, ignorando el resto de
elementos o de la información disponible.
Mencionamos aquí especialmente el criterio de utilidad indirecta, que es el
que utilizamos a lo largo del capítulo 2. Éste se aplica cuando sólo importa
la calidad de la elección final del agente: se prefiere a aquellos conjuntos con
“mejores maximales”.
Muchos autores han realizado aproximaciones axiomáticas de estos problemas: se-
leccionan ciertos criterios deseables para situaciones concretas y buscan órdenes que
satisfagan diferentes combinaciones de los mismos.
Fishburn (1972) fue pionero en considerar preferencias de votantes sobre conjuntos
de alternativas. Kannai y Peleg (1984) obtienen un resultado de imposibilidad para un
orden sobre el conjunto de subconjuntos de un conjunto verificando dos axiomas atrac-
tivos. Algunos otros resultados de imposibilidad se obtienen debilitando estos axiomas
o considerando algunos otros (Barberá y Pattanaik (1984), Fishburn (1984), Holzman
(1984)). Bossert (1989) caracteriza un quasi-orden con los axiomas de Kannai-Peleg y
una propiedad de neutralidad también utilizada por otros autores. Nehring y Puppe
(1996) extienden un orden sobre el conjunto de elementos a un ranking de sus subcon-
juntos no vacíos basado en principios de independencia y continuidad. Caracterizan así
rankings que dependen sólo de los elementos máximo y mínimo de los diferentes sub-
conjuntos de alternativas. Bossert et al. (2000) y Arlegi (2003) aproximan el problema en
una situación de elección bajo incertidumbre completa, describiendo cuatro reglas de
decisión que no se basan solamente en los peores y mejores elementos y que se justifi-
can intuitivamente en términos de “racionalidad limitada”.
Este contexto se amplía para incorporar el valor de la libertad de elección (Bossert et
al. (1994), Puppe (1996), Pattanaik y Xu (2000) y Xu (2004)). Dutta y Sen (1996) y Alcalde-
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Unzu y Ballester (2005), entre otros, caracterizan las reglas utilitarias, y Alcantud y Ar-
legi (2006) una familia significativa de rankings de conjuntos aditivamente representa-
bles. Algunos otros modelos han servido para estudiar estos problemas. En Barberá et
al. (2004) puede encontrarse un amplio resumen al respecto.
Por otro lado, tanto la teoría de la decisión individual como la colectiva pueden
basarse en múltiples criterios que pueden ser aplicados sucesivamente, todos a la vez,
etc. Por ejemplo, podemos pensar en una familia decidiendo dónde ir de vacaciones
o cómo distribuir su salario (probablemente los padres y los hijos tendrán diferentes
criterios). En muchas situaciones de este tipo damos preferencia a un criterio sobre otro
y usamos un segundo criterio sólo en caso de empate entre alternativas después de
aplicar el primero (órdenes lexicográficos).
El estudio de composiciones lexicográficas de dos criterios para ordenar subconjun-
tos de alternativas ha sido realizado por diferentes autores. Algunas de tales composi-
ciones están completamente caracterizadas usando los axiomas apropiados. Remitimos
al lector interesado a Barberá et al. (2004).
Nuestra aproximación al respecto sigue la línea de elección bajo el modelo funda-
mental que determina el ranking de subconjuntos, considerando sólo las mejores al-
ternativas de cada uno de ellos. En este sentido el modelo responde al principio de
racionalidad limitada, demodo que el agente se concentra en ciertas alternativas “clave”:
el subconjunto de los mejores elementos. Tal modelo es el germen del criterio de utilidad
indirecta caracterizado por Kreps (1979). Nosotros analizamos una situación en la que
se supone que tenemos definido un preorden completo R sobre X (un conjunto finito de
elementos) que no es necesariamente un orden lineal.
En una primera sección estudiamos una elección que se realiza en diferentesmomen-
tos del tiempo. Ambos, los conjuntos de alternativas y los criterios de decisión en cada
momento, pueden ser diferentes. Definimos una relación binaria para tuplas de subcon-
juntos ordenados (elementos de un producto directo), cada uno del conjunto de alterna-
tivas disponibles en cada uno de los momentos de elección considerados. Comenzamos
con una subsección en la que tratamos el problema con sólo dos momentos distintos
de elección, de modo que tenemos parejas de subconjuntos de alternativas, y luego lo
generalizamos al caso de n momentos diferentes. El ranking que aplicamos se define
utilizando el criterio de utilidad indirecta (A < B⇔ ma´x(A)Rma´x(B)) aplicado a cada
una de las coordenadas con un orden lexicográfico.
Esta cuestión ya ha sido estudiada en Krause (2008) para el caso de dos tiempos de
elección diferentes. Él caracteriza este criterio mediante 5 entre los que incluye un axio-
ma de neutralidad y otro axioma técnico llamado “simple time discounting”. Krause uti-
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liza una notación ligeramente diferente de la nuestra y supone que para cualquier sub-
conjunto que incluya alternativas de ambos momentos de decisión “es natural” supon-
er su equivalencia con un subconjunto de dos elementos, uno de cada momento, dado
que sólo se trata con el criterio de utilidad indirecta. En este sentido sólo expresa los
axiomas para los subconjuntos de dos elementos. Utiliza también preórdenes comple-
tos definidos sobre los dos conjuntos de alternativas.
En el presente trabajo caractizamos el criterio definido, tanto para el caso de dos
momentos de elección como para el caso general de n momentos diferentes, con sólo 3
axiomas y en un modelo donde los preórdenes sobre los conjuntos de alternativas no
están fijados, en la línea de Kreps (1979).
En una segunda sección utilizamos también el criterio de utilidad indirecta para
ordenar los subconjuntos de un conjunto de alternativas X, pero cambiamos el modelo
anterior considerando la posibilidad de tener un “consejero”. Este consejero no tiene
definida una relación binaria sobre X, pero para cualquier subconjunto S ⊆ X selecciona
algunos “elementos fundamentales” (los que él prefiere), que representamos mediante
una función de elección C : P∗(X) → P∗(X) tal que a cada conjunto S ∈ P∗(X) le
asigna un subconjunto no vacío de él mismo C(S) ⊆ S. Así, en nuestro ranking de
subconjuntos sólo recurriremos al consejero para aquellos subconjuntos que resulten ser
indiferentes por nuestro primer criterio (el de la utilidad indirecta). Aplicamos entonces
ese mismo criterio de utilidad indirecta, pero ahora a los subconjuntos previamente
seleccionados por el consejero.
Al ranking de subconjuntos así definido lo denominamos “ranking asociado a una
función de elección”, que es un preorden completo.
Finalmente consideramos la cuestión siguiente. Dado un orden de subconjuntos de
un conjunto finito X, <, que es un preorden completo (de tal modo que existe un pre-
orden completo sobre X inducido trivialmente por <: aRb ⇔ {a} < {b}), ¿cuándo es
este orden observado el ranking asociado a una función de elección?. Probamos que esta
pregunta tiene una respuesta positiva cuando < verifica dos propiedades concretas.
La situación de esta segunda sección puede ser considerada un elección en dos mo-
mentos del tiempo en los que los conjuinto de alternativas y los criterios de decisión
(relación binaria sobre el conjunto de alternativas) son los mismos. Sin embargo quere-
mos incidir en que el ranking asociado a una función de elección no es un caso particular
de la primera situación, dado que en el segundo momento de decisión no aplicamos el
criterio de utilidad indirecta a los subconjuntos del conjunto de alternativas sino a sub-
conjuntos de cada uno de ellos previamente seleccionados por nuestro consejero.
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Rational choice by two sequential criteria
En el capítulo 3 abordamos problemas en los que la preferencia del decisor se representa
mediante una función de elección en lugar de una relación binaria. Esta rama de la teoría
de la decisión tiene además un factor importante de aplicabilidad, de modo que sus re-
sultados subyacen a diversos modelos económicos, sociológicos, psicológicos, etc., lo
que proporciona a su estudio un atractivo añadido. Las funciones de elección que, para
cada conjunto de alternativas, seleccionan aquellas que son consideradas las mejores
respecto de una cierta relación binaria sobre el conjunto de alternativas, son conside-
radas “elecciones razonables”. La cuestión más interesante radica en el estudio de cuán-
do, dada una función de elección, podemos garantizar la existencia de una relación bina-
ria tal que la elección observada coincida con los mejores elementos por dicha relación.
Si la respuesta es positiva decimos que la función de elección es racional o que existe
una relación binaria que la racionaliza. Los diferentes métodos de axiomatización de
una “elección racional” que han sido desarrollados sobre la base de funciones de elec-
ción generadas por relaciones binarias y criterios de optimización, quedan recogidos
bajo la llamada teoría de la “preferencia revelada”. En Suzumura (1983) encontramos
una recopilación de las caracterizaciones de este concepto clásico de funciones de elec-
ción racionales, que ha sido ampliamente estudiado por diversos autores entre los que
podemos citar a Arrow (1959), Richter (1966), Wilson (1970), Sen (1971),...
Algunosmecanismos de elección no clásicos han sido considerados por otros autores
como Aizerman y Malishevski (1981). En esta línea, Nehring (1996) da una primera
contribución al problema de la existencia de elementos maximales para funciones de
elección “no binarias”. En Tian y Zhou (1995), Rodríguez-Palmero y García-Lapresta
(2002) y Alcantud (2002, 2006) aparecen resutados en ese mismo sentido. Gaertner y
Xu (2004) presentan algunas extensiones de la noción clásica de racionalidad dando un
concepto de la misma basado en el modelo clásico, pero teniendo en cuenta que algunas
de las alternativas pueden tener un cierto “grado de disponibilidad”. Éste se puede
dar si el decisor puede, por ejemplo, considerar el proceso de elección inaceptable, o
si alguna de las alternativas está prohibida por alguna ley. Bossert y Suzumura (2007)
“presentan unmodelo de elección donde se tienen en cuenta diversas normas externas”,
modelo que incluye al tradicional como un caso particular.
Las razones del interés de la teoría de la elección son diversas. Podemos citar entre
otras las siguientes.
• Numerosos problemas de teoría de la decisión, matemática aplicada,... se basan en
la elección de las “mejores” opciones en algún sentido de cada conjunto dado de
146 Resumen en Castellano
posibilidades.
• Muchos modelos económicos y sociales examinan cuestiones de elección indivi-
dual. También en fenómenos psicológicos la idea de describir el comportamiento
individual en términos de elección de las mejores opciones es un tópicomuy atrac-
tivo.
• Algunas cuestiones políticas tienen que ver con modelos de este tipo cuando se
formalizan diferentes aspectos de elección individual y cuando la opción quemaxi-
miza la utilidad individal también maximiza la utilidad colectiva.
Como era de esperar, el estudio de la racionalidad de un decisor es amplio en la li-
teratura. Podemos encontrar al respecto diferentes resultados de la posible racionalidad
de una función de elección dependiendo de si satisface o no las propiedades adecuadas.
El significado de “racionalidad” ha tenido diferentes interpretaciones y nosotros uti-
lizamos la que identifica una función racional con la optimización de una relación bi-
naria, independientemente de las propiedades que dicha relación binaria verifique. Sin
embargo, la literatura sobre funciones de elección racionales también considera amplia-
mente la cuestión de qué propiedades verifica la relación binaria que racionaliza a una
función de elección: aciclicidad, transitividad, quasi-transitividad,... Incluimos también
en esta tesis algunos resultados en esta línea.
Además, la posible racionalidad de una función de elección no depende sólo de las
propieda-
des que verifica, sino también del dominio sobre el que está definida. El problema de
elección implica la definición del conjunto de opciones y sus subconjuntos. La presen-
cia o no de restricciones sobre los subconjuntos es esencial en el modelo formal. Sen
(1971), Bandyopadhyay y Sengupta (1991) entre otros consideran funciones de elección
definidas sobre dominios que contienen todos los subconjuntos finitos y no vacíos de un
conjunto universal de alternativas. Sin embargo Sen (1971) observa que, si bien no se re-
quiere que el dominio incluya también a los subconjuntos infinitos, ningún resultado se
vería afectado si tal cosa ocurriera, y también que para los resultados que él demuestra
bastaría con que el dominio incluyera todos los subconjuntos de 2 y 3 elementos. En el
capítulo 2 de Suzumura (1983) encontramos una recopilación de esta cuestión incluyen-
do el caso en el que el dominio consiste en una familia arbitraria de subconjuntos no
vacíos de un conjunto universal de alternativas. Más recientemente Bossert et al. (2006)
desarrollan nuevas condiciones necesarias para que funciones de elección sobre domi-
nios arbitrarios sean racionalizadas por relaciones binarias quasi-transitivas o acíclicas,
y dan una nueva condición suficiente para el caso de racionalidad acíclica.
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Otro aspecto a tener en cuenta en los problemas de decision es la posibilidad de con-
tar con varios criterios diferentes para decidir. Podemos, en tales casos, dar prioridad
a algunos de ellos sobre los otros y aplicarlos de modo secuencial, lo que se denomi-
na “elección secuencial”. En caso de que tengamos dos criterios aplicados de manera
secuencial decimos que la elección de hace mediante dos criterios secuenciales. Esto
supone formalmente que componemos dos funciones de elección en un orden estable-
cido (Aizerman y Aleskerov (1995) también consideran este tipo de comportamiento de
elección y denominan a la operación “superposición” de funciones de elección). Así,
aunque seguimos los requerimientos clásicos de racionalidad, admitimos un mecanis-
mo para tomar decisiones (la composición de funciones de elección) que es bastante
natural y lógico, aunque puede dar lugar a elecciones no racionales en sentido clási-
co. Nuestro decisor considera racionales no sólo las elecciones derivadas de una única
relación binaria, sino también la aplicación secuencial de tal tipo de elecciones. Ejemplos
de esta situación son bastante frecuentes: selección de personal aplicando criterios que
reducen sucesivamente el conjunto de alternativas, selección de lugares y hoteles para
vaciones (por ejemplo, eliminamos primero los que están demasiado lejos de la playa,
luego los que son demasiado caros, y sucesivamente),...
Algunos autores han estudiado aspectos similares de teoría de la elección. Kalai et al.
(2002) estudian la racionalidad de una función de elección por la aplicación demúltiples
relaciones binarias cuando la elección es un único elemento del conjunto de alternati-
vas y aplicando todas las relaciones simultáneamente. Houy (2007) también estudia si
el orden de aplicación de los criterios afecta o no a la elección final. Nosotros seguimos
la línea iniciada por Manzini y Mariotti (2007), que consideran la racionalidad secuen-
cial de una función de elección por la aplicación de diferentes relaciones binarias en un
orden fijo, específicamente en el caso de dos relaciones. Estos autores se restringen tam-
bién al caso de funciones univaloradas. Nosotros creemos que es interesante el análisis
del problema en términos de funciones de elección no univaloradas y es el caso que
tratamos en el capítulo 3 de esta tesis.
Estudiamos cómo se comporta una función compuesta de otras dos, esto es, qué
propiedades de las verificadas por las funciones iniciales verifica la función compues-
ta. Aizerman y Aleskerov (1995) hacen este estudio para algunas de las propiedades y
para funciones de elección siempre definidas sobre dominios que contienen todos los
subconjuntos finitos y no vacíos del conjunto de alternativas. Nosotros añadimos a esos
restultados el análisis de algunas otras propiedades sobre dominios de la misma clase,
y también el estudio de lo que ocurre con algunas propiedades para funciones de elec-
ción definidas sobre dominios arbitrarios. De los resultados que obtenemos concluimos
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algunos corolarios que establecen la racionalidad de una función de elección obtenida
como composición de otras dos que son racionales en algún sentido.
Para aquellos problemas en los que el dominio contiene todos los conjuntos finitos
y no vacíos del conjunto de alternativas, consideramos una función de elección que no
verifica las propiedades de racionalidad que demandan los diferentes teoremas de elec-
ción racional. Nos preguntamos cuándo podemos encontrar dos funciones de elección
racionales (que verifican las propiedades exigidas) y tales que la elección en dos pasos
por estas dos funciones coincida con la realizada por el decisor, que habíamos observa-
do. Cuando la respuesta es positiva decimos que la función de elección es “racional por
dos criterios secuenciales”.
Finalmente damos una caracterización completa de las funciones racionales por dos
criterios secuenciales en términos de dos condiciones necesarias y suficientes contrasta-
bles.
Cooperation in Markovian queueing models
El cuarto y último capítulo de la tesis considera problemas en los que al menos dos
agentes están implicados, de modo que las decisiones de cada uno afectan a los resulta-
dos de todos.
No resulta difícil encontrar situaciones sociales o económicas en las que coinciden
distintos agentes y con distintos puntos de vista. La Teoría de Juegos es la rama de las
Matemáticas que considera esta clase de situaciones.
Los agentes implicados en un problema de juegos tienen objetivos bien definidos,
de forma que actúan racionalmente, y al mismo tiempo tienen en cuenta el conocimiento
o expectativas del comportamiento de los otros decisores, de modo que también actúan
estratégicamente.
En losmodelos no cooperativos, los jugadores pueden negociar sobre qué hacer, pero
no son posibles los acuerdos vinculantes. Por el contrario, en los modelos cooperativos
sí lo son, y también los pagos laterales pueden estar permitidos.
Por otro lado, la Investigación Operativa analiza situaciones en las que el decisor se
enfrenta a problemas de optimización guiado por una función objetivo.
El estudio de la cooperación y la competición enmodelos de Investigación Operativa
es un tema fructífero y atractivo hoy día. Muchos campos dentro de la Investigación
Operativa, en los que varios agentes interactúan en situaciones que pueden ser mode-
lizadas como un problema de optimización, han sido abordados desde la perspectiva
de la teoría de juegos. Borm et al. (2001) proporciona una recopilación al respecto.
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Una de las grandes ramas de la Investigación Operativa es la teoría de colas. La com-
petición en modelos de colas ha sido considerada en munerosos artículos, un compen-
dio de los cuales es Hassin andHaviv (2003) (para un resumen del tema de control de co-
las remitimos al lector a Tadj and Choudhury (2005)). Hay también varios artículos que
tratan de aspectos cooperativos de secuenciación y planificación (véase, por ejemplo,
una muestra en Curiel et al. (2002) o algunas otras referencias recientes como Moulin
y Stong (2002) y Maniquet (2003)). En cualquier caso, de modo bastante sorprendente,
los modelos de colas en raras ocasiones han sido tratados desde el punto de vista de la
teoría de juegos cooperativos. González y Herrero (2004) es uno de los escasos artículos
en los que se analiza la cooperación en modelos de colas. Se considera una situación
de Markov en la que varios agentes que mantienen sus propios servidores se ponen de
acuerdo para cooperar y mantener un servidor común que atienda a todas sus pobla-
ciones. Cada agente especifica un valor máximo para el tiempo que sus clientes pasan
en el sistema. Se estudia el problema de cómo distribuir el coste del servidor común que
satisfaga las especificaciones de cada uno de los agentes, y se aplica a un problema de
distribución de costes en el sistema de salud español. También más recientemente Yu et
al. (2008) estudia modelos de cooperación en sistemas de colas. Estos autores no fijan sin
embargo diferentes valores máximos para los tiempos en el sistema de los clientes, sino
que es el mismo para todas las poblaciones tanto antes como después de la cooperación.
El estudio de la cooperación en modelos de colas es un tema relevante que puede
suscitar el interés de teóricos de juegos y de especialistas en Investigación Operativa. En
muchas situaciones del mundo real los proveedores de un servicio particular se ponen
de acuerdo para mantener servidores en común que atiendan a todas sus poblaciones:
pensemos en un grupo de bancos que comparten una red de cajeros automáticos, un
grupo de universidades que comparten un ordenador de gran potencia, o un grupo de
hospitales con un banco de sangre común. En todas estas situaciones son importantes
cuestiones que deben ser enfocadas desde un punto de vista científico, como son la
distribución del coste de los servidores comunes o cuándo es interesante cooperar para
un grupo de proveedores o receptores de servicio.
En este capítulo, basado en García-Sanz et al. (2008), tratamos tales cuestiones en
algunos modelos de Markov.
En un primer momento tratamos una variación del problema estudiado en González
y Herrero (2004). En este modelo, cada agente especifica no sólo el valor máximo de-
seable del tiempo de sus clientes en el sistema sino también un valor máximo para la
probabilidad de que sus clientes gasten más que ese tiempo, algo que creemos bastante
razonable en estas situaciones. Por ejemplo, en el caso del sistema español de salud no
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sólo es razonable asignar un valor máximo para el tiempo que están los enfermos en
el sistema (espera y atención), sino que la probabilidad de que dicho tiempo supere el
máximo fijado debe ser baja. También estudiamos el caso bastante natural en el que el
valor máximo se fija para el tiempo que un cliente debe pasar en la cola, en lugar de
en el sistema. Son numerosos los ejemplos que podemos considerar en los que lo que
realmente nos preocupa es el tiempo que pasamos esperando haciendo cola, y prácti-
camente nos es indiferente el tiempo real que se emplee en atendernos (pensemos, por
ejemplo, en el caso de las listas de espera en los hospitales). Finalmente consideramos la
posibilidad de que se puedan disminuir los costes del servidor común permitiendo una
disciplina de prioridades en la cola diferente de la de “primero en llegar, primero en ser
servido”.
Además, en este tipo de problemas es usual plantearse cómo distribuir los costes
producidos si se formara la gran coalición en la que todos los agentes cooperan. En
cada caso proponemos una regla para distribuir tales costes. En el primero, el valor
de Shapley, y en los casos en los que consideramos el tiempo de espera en la cola y
la posibilidad de prioridades en la misma, proponemos una regla y la caracterizamos
axiomáticamente.
Conclusiones y cuestiones abiertas
En el primer capítulo de esta tesis hemos estudiado la posibilidad de obtener un ran-
king de cadenas infinitas de utilidades sin abandonar el postulado de equidad conocido
como “equidad de Hammond para el futuro” (HEF) además del axioma de Pareto. Pro-
porcionamos una expresión explícita de un tal compromiso cuando el conjunto de posi-
bles utilidades está contenido en N∗. Los resultados de imposibilidad de Zame (2007,
Theorem 4′) –que suponen que ninguna relación de bienestar social que verifique las
propiedades Pareto débil y anonimato puede ser “descrita explicitamente”– hace nues-
tro resultado especialmente valioso.
Además obtenemos argumentos para contribuir al debate sobre cuál es la influen-
cia del dominio de utilidades cuando se combina equidad y eficiencia de Pareto en la
aproximación de Basu y Mitra. Si nos basamos en la ética dada por las propiedades
HEF/RNS concluimos que el dominio de utilidades es un factor determinante: si es
[0, 1], incluso la más débil de las combinaciones posibles da lugar a un resultado de im-
posibilidad, pero cuando es N∗ hay criterios explícitos para las versiones más fuertes.
Este no era el caso cuando el Anonimato era el principio de equidad considarado: no
podemos asegurar que una estructura dada produzca compatibilidad o incompatibili-
Resumen en Castellano 151
dad sin considerar el grado de eficiencia de Pareto que se pretende.
Además probamos que si imponemos HE, entonces el dominio [0, 1] determina in-
compatibilidad mientras que N∗ no (deben examinarse los otro factores: la forma pre-
cisa del postulado HE y la versión del axioma de Pareto que se usa).
En la misma línea nos planteamos la existencia de diferentes versiones del axioma
de Equidad de Hammond (HE) que pueden ser combinadas con funciones de bienestar
social paretianas, tanto en el dominio discretoN∗ como en el continuo [0, 1].
Las siguientes tablas incluyen algunos resultados que han servido para motivar
nuestro trabajo, y que permiten comparar diferencias entre las distintas aproximaciones
al cambiar el dominio de las utilidades.
Tabla 1. Resumen de resultados en dominios de cadenas de utilidad YN bajo Anonimato
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP No existe ? No existe
WP Existe † No existe
D Existe Non existe 
WD Existe Existe ‡
La afirmación ? está probada en Basu y Mitra (2003). Las marcadas con †, ‡ y 
aparecen en Basu y Mitra (2007). Las otras afirmaciones de la tabla se deducen de  y †.
En cada uno de los cuatro casos donde la compatibilidad se garantiza, se puede
intentar identificar los grupos de permutaciones para los que el anonimato extendido,
(o Q-Anonimato como está introducido en Mitra y Basu, 2007) es compatible con los
axiomas respectivos de eficiencia en la aproximación de Basu y Mitra. No nos hemos
propuesto aún este aspecto, que abordaremos en trabajos futuros.
Tabla 2. Resumen de resultados para dominios de cadenas de utilidad YN bajo RNS
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Existe ? No existe
WP Existe No existe
D Existe No existe
WD Existe No existe 
Banerjee (2006) prueba que  es cierta incluso si RNS es sustituida por la propiedad
más débil HEF. En el capítulo 1 justificamos la afirmación ? y proporcionamos una ex-
presión explícita para una función de bienestar social que satisface HEF+ y el axioma
fuerte de Pareto. El resto de afirmaciones de la tabla se deducen de ellas.
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Estos resultados se añaden a Asheim et al. (2007), donde se obtienen incompatibili-
dades de HEF con el postulado de Pareto bajo suposiciones de continuidad.
Con respecto al axioma denotado HE(L), todas las combinaciones en la tabla son
imposibles. Salvo que se diga lo contrario, las afirmaciones en la tabla siguiente se refiren
todas a las otras variaciones del postulado de Equidad de Hammond.
Tabla 3. Resumen de resultados para dominios de cadenas de utilidad YN bajo
diferentes versiones de HE
Y =N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP No existe ? No existe
WP Depende de la versión ‡ No existe
D Depende de la versión No existe
WD Depende de laversión No existe 
La afirmación  está demostrada en el capítulo 1 con independencia de la versión de
HE que se utilice. Las afirmaciones por encima de  son entonces inmediatas. El caso ?
supone la no existencia para todas las versiones del axioma de Equidad de Hammond.
La combinación de ‡ y las afirmaciones por debajo dan lugar a la no existencia para
HE(L), pero incluso si se impone Anonimato podemos combinar HE(a)+ y WP/D/WD
y obtener una función de bienestar social cuando Y =N∗.
Recordamos que el criterio Rawlsiano prueba que en las tablas 1 y 3 anteriores, la
existencia está garantizada cuando el axioma de eficiencia requerido es Monotonía (con
independencia de X). También para la tabla 2 el caso discreto es trivial porque en tal
caso podemos incluso obtener SP y WFR(x) = in f {xi : i = 2, 3, ....} satisface MON y
RNS como mencionamos anteriormente.
La segunda situación que hemos considerado (capítulo 2) tiene que ver con la exten-
sión de un preorden completo definido sobre un conjunto de alternativas a un ranking
(que también será un preorden completo) de los subconjuntos del conjunto de alterna-
tivas. Hemos estudiado situaciones en las que la decisión se toma en momentos dife-
rentes del tiempo, aplicando en todos ellos el criterio de utilidad indirecta. Definimos
un primer ranking en tiempos diferentes ordenando tuplas de subconjuntos de alterna-
tivas (cada uno del conjunto de alternativas disponibles en cada uno de los diferentes
momentos de elección). Los conjuntos disponibles pueden ser iguales o distintos, repre-
sentando la común situación en la que un decisor no tiene generalmente a su disposición
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las mismas posibilidades en los distintos momentos del tiempo en los que tiene que ele-
gir. Además los preórdenes definidos sobre cada uno de estos conjuntos pueden también
coincidir o no, dada la posibilidad de que se produzca un cambio en las preferencias de
un decisor de un momento del tiempo a otro. Hemos caracterizado el ranking de tuplas
de subconjuntos que consiste en la aplicación del criterio de utilidad indirecta, en orden
lexicográfico, a cada una de las coordenadas, empezanco con la situación particular en
la que sólo hay dos momentos diferentes para la toma de decisiones y generalizándolo
después al caso de n momentos de elección diferentes. Además también tratamos una
situación de ordenación de subconjuntos de un único conjunto de alternativas, sobre el
que tenemos definido un preorden completo. En este caso consideramos, si hay indife-
rencia entre dos subconjuntos al aplicar el criterio de utilidad indirecta, la posibilidad
de que un “consejero” seleccione de cada subconjunto unas cuantas alternativas “fo-
cales”, sobre las que aplicar el criterio de utilidad indirecta. Para el futuro pensamos en
la caracterización de otros tipos de criterios en dos o más tiempos utilizando rankings
alternativos al de la utilidad indirecta. También en el caso de utilización de un consejero
pensamos en la posibilidad de ser más exigentes y no permitir “cualquier consejo”, sino
que éste venga dado por una función de elección que verifique ciertas propiedades de
racionalidad.
Y son precisamente cuestiones de racionalidad de funciones de elección el aspecto
estudiado en el tercer capítulo. Establecemos diferentes resultados de racionalidad en
sentido clásico para funciones de elección que se obtienen componiendo otras dos, tanto
en el caso en el que el dominio de las funciones de elección verifica la restricción común-
mente aceptada de contener todos los subconjuntos finitos y no vacíos del conjunto de
alternativas, como para aquellos casos en los que el dominio de las funciones de elec-
ción es arbitrario. Nosotros consideramos como racional a un decisor que obtiene su
elección aplicando sucesivamente dos o más funciones de elección que son racionales
en el sentido clásico (esto es, su elección resulta de optimizar una relación binaria sobre
el conjunto de alternativas). Caracterizamos completamente las funciones de elección
sobre dominios que contienen a los subconjuntos finitos y no vacíos del conjunto de al-
ternativas que descomponen como composición de dos funciones de elección racionales
en sentido clásico.
Dejamos pendiente para futuras investigaciones un resultado análogo para el caso
de dominios arbitrarios o, al menos, la identificación de condiciones suficientes en la
línea de los teoremas de racionalidad para las funciones de elección sobre dominios
arbitrarios. La descomposición de una función de elección como composición de más
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de dos funciones racionales también resulta interesante y además permitiría calificar
como “racional” un rango más amplio de comportamientos.
El cuarto y último capítulo de la tesis lo hemos dedicado al estudio de la cooperación
en algunas situaciones de colas, mediante su aproximación teórica a través de la teoría
de juegos cooperativos. Hemos estudiado cuándo la cooperación es interesante para los
agentes en las diversas situaciones consideradas. En algunos casos en los que no resulta
de entrada beneficiosa, damos condiciones suficientes para que lo sea. En todos los casos
en los que la cooperación es atractiva hemos propuesto y caracterizado una regla para
la distribución de los costes generados por la cooperación de todos los agentes.
Hay aún muchos modelos de colas que no se han considerado desde la perspectiva
de la teoría de juegos cooperativos y que son atractivos para futuros trabajos. También
puede resultar interesante estudiar nuestros modelos con diferentes funciones de coste.
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